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1. Statement of t he Problem 
The basic problem with whieh this diaaertation deals 1s 
that of determining the nature and social rang of the indi-
Vidual person as developed Within Hegelian thought. '}'he 
problem is all the more challenging for the present work 1n 
that the speaU."ic expressions of the individual as con-
ceived by Hegel on all levels of existence; follow a dia• 
leetic pattern in which uni vereal and particular are in-
aeparably joined. a>me indication or the r ange of t he 
problem is given by observing t hat Hegel traces the develop-
ment of human experience from the lowest level of conscious-
ness to the highes-t reaches of spirit. 
As a logical concept the indiVidual• llhetbe:r viE;rWed 
on the inorganic or organic levele1 repre$ents t he expree-
ston of t he particulaJ' aspects or moments :tm.plic1 t 1d thin 
the universal. The problem may be stated another way bY 
raising the question as to how universal principles find 
adequate expression 1n logic, nature and spirit. No prob~em 
can be treated in Hegel i£ hie logical method is ignored. 
The present 'WOrk is predicated on this principle. 
Of vital importance, moreover, in treating of a problem 
of t his kind td.thin Hegelian thought is to keep in ndnd that 
similarity in words ~ not, and often does not, imply 
l 
eim1l.arity 1n meaning. ~ore specitioal.l¥1 one wst con-
stantly keep before him the basic ditterence between tb& 
problem ot the nature of th$ individual and the deeper 
question ot individuality or uniqu.eneaa. As we shall see• 
Hegel finds no plaoe tor individuality as de.t1ned het"e. 
The guiding principle which should lend un:tty and con-
tinuity' to th$ _present 'WOrk is that of keeping the claims of 
the indi'\tidllal. and his individuality constantly 1n view. 1his 
means the conscious habit of asking questions about the indi• 
ViduaJ.ts nature, mission and de&t1n,y. The type of selt en-
visioned here 1e the ind1 vidual 11ho1 'Within the g1 ven limits 
ot his heredity and aeco1~g to t he opportunities afforded 
him by his env1ronmel'lt1 makes the neoes8ai';Y adjustments. to 
others · and to his world. 'Ibis is. the definition of the 
individual to be used as a standard in evaluating Hegel • s 
conception or the individual selt, a conception• moreover, 
departing sharply from that of Regel. For .t'urtber .oJ.ari.fi• 
cation it might be added that this sel.t is chU"acterized by 
a dynamic unity or mtuv types of activities such as those or 
sensing, perceiving, remembering, wanting, feeling, thinking 
and the like. The individuality of the individual could 
be de.:f1ned as his peculiar and unique combination or these 
activities, 
Howeve7 lDUf:h, therefore 1 the individual needs society, 
or "objective mind" in Hegelian nomenclature, ao a stimulus 
in the developaaent of his ind1v1duali ty, his uni®eness must 
be preaened. !t is in part the task of this diseerta:~.on 
to demonetzate that Hegel permits thie individuality to be-
come abaorl>ed 1n the individual" s social relations and 
to te the reaaons why his exposition leads to this eon-
elusion. ln.dividu.al experiences1 • shall contend, have a. 
gel'JUitle indivi<iuality of their own 'Whatever their relation-
ship to the mole may or may not be. The e"'el'-present 
danger 1n arv organic system is that the unity aeems more 
completely" real than the m:ul Upl:lcity and uy be thought or 
as existing foJt itael.f s:> that 1n some mea$\lre at least its 
members ext.#t tor it.. Th•· only sateguard se•s to be that 
in an all-embrac;J.ng systematiC) whole• unity and 11IUltiplio.-
1ty IBU.St be equal.l.y :real and the one must be .real tnrough 
the o~. Hegelts concrete universal, it will be argued1 
purports to do this but does not a~tu~ achieve it. 
2., '!be lfeaning and Scope of Fhlloeophical Psychology 
PhUosophieal. psyehologyl as understood he~e is close- . 
ly :related to.- it not identical. l'li th; a phU.osophy of mind. 
This appears to ~ Hegel's undel"standing ot the term as 
evidenced by his phUoeophica.l treatme.nt' of' ' consciousness, 
· 1, 9!e art. by Ledger Wood on "fhilosophical Ps,ychol.ogyn in 
DOP (Runee ed,) 1 2,3~23St 1b which the principal. top:tas are i: 
1., tlle criteria or mentality, 2. relation between mind and con. 
sciourme,., 3, the exiatenco of unconscious or subeonsciol\S 
mind, h, the structure ot the mind, $'. the genesis ot nd.nd1 6, the nature of the self,. 7, the rrdJid-body r~lationship, u. the 
freedom of the will, 9· psychological met.bodolog,y, 10. mind and 
cognition~ 
self-consciousness and reason. Basically 1 as Hegel out. 
lines it., phllosophical psychology treats of the nature of 
· d and 1 ts place in the worl d. -In contrast to empirical 
psychology, it deals ld.th the more spe.culative issues a-
rising out or the r.alationship between consciousness and 
mind, with their epistemological and metaPt1sical ramifi• 
cations. Hegel • s psychology is nothing more nor lees than 
a metapby'sical psy-chology in which cultural history is used 
to illustrate the process whereby mind must manifest itself. 
Psychology proper deals with the structure, functions 
and behavioral et.tects of the mind. It should be noted that 
since the tiUJe of !\ant psychology has been establishing it-
self as an empirical science devoid of a priori metaphysi-
cal commitments, usually appeartng under the name or ex-
perimental psychology. 2- One of the essential aims of an 
experimental s cience is doubtlees the discovery of de-
scriptive fOi'mUlae by which the vanous processes that make 
up the physical and mental worlds l1I.I1Y be depicted.) Cer-
tainly, the goal of experimental science is the description 
ot facts; whereas that or philosopey is their interpretation. 
Hegel does not ignore what he termed •empirical psycholottY" 
.2. Edwin o. Boring defines experblental. psychology- aa 
"the psychology or the generalised, hUlllall,; no:rmal, adult 
mind as revealed in tile pqehologioal laboratory'." HEP (rev. 
ed. ),. a-eface x. See also art. "Eicperimental Psychology" by 
B. R. Fhilip in EOP · (Han'Uan ed., 156). 
). See A. E. Taylor; EOK, 192. 
ae is indicated by his statement, "die empirische Psy'cholog:te 
hat den konkreten Geist zu ihren\ Oegenstande_.tt4 
Although, as indicated above, empirical psychology is 
or more recent date, one should note that by goin back to 
Aristotle's De An.1ma he ay trace two diYergent elnents 
in the history ot payC)bol.ogy. There ie, on the one hand, 
purely phyaical. or scientitic psychology w1 th its empirical 
features, 11hUe1 on the other, there is the more philosophical 
~ speculative questions . of' the nature ot the experiencing 
mind itael£1 its relation to other mtnda• and to the ob-
jects preMnt 1n the . ]i1yaical world. In addition, there 
have been the controversial questions of the nature and 
deati.Dy ot the soul, the atructure ot . the mind, the nature 
ot conac1ou81'le$8 and the body-mind problem., to mention but • 
few.> 
In ~he P~&ru.molog1e which contains DllUIJ' searching in-
sl.ghts OD the nature ot human experience, the pattern 
ot developoent is tbrou.gh a aeries of logical steps .tram 
the isolated to the Absolute eelt. 'Jhe logic ot human _.. 
perience runs the entire gamu.t .f'rom the arat undit• 
ferent1ated1 uncertain stage of' eenae certainty to one in 
4. EP 1 aect, 378. For iUll intonD&tion on all sources 
ot data, see the Bibliography. References throughout We 
dieeertation 81"e designated by 1nitiala fir abbreviations. All 
quotations trom Hegel are in German; using the Hoffmeister 
edition or PG, the Lasson edition of EPl';, and the loelmer · 
edition ot m. 
S. 'l'heee and simUar metapey81Qal problema are treated 




which all reality is envisioned as the embodi.?OOnt of spirit. 
Beginning with man in hie natural condition., Hegel traces 
his progressive development thro-ugh the various institutions 
of society, reaching a ti tting c'Ulmination in art, religion 
and philosophy. !n his social relationships,. the indiviciual 
is seen first against a background of the universal lf.ill of 
man, to be followed in turn by an account of hia relation .. 
ship to the Absolute. 
He~l•s exposition of the materi al speei.t'ically desig-
nated as psyohologr foll()lt's the familiar pattern of succes-
sive sta~es in t he evolution ot spirit . '!'hi:s, incidentally, 
accounts for the inordinate amount of space given to the 
eham sci.ence of phrenology in the ftllnomenologie. Psy-
e."lology-1 as· in the ease of al.1 other ~pproaches t o experiencEt, 
is· apprehended t.rom the stardpoint of spirit. . t ore spe-
cifically• psychology is incorporated under the topic of 
11 aubjective l!li.nd. n l t is the name applied to the third and 
hi ghest part o.f Hegel 's treatment of subjective (cognitive) 
mind. 6 The choice o£ the term appears to be quite an a:rbi.,.. 
trary one• since the whole of subjective mind treats of' the 
items usually discussed under· general psychology, though 
not neeessaril:y' according to modern payeholoeical nomen-
clature. I £ one turns to tile E!!:9ZclopJ!d1~, it is to be 
. ) . . -
6. See EP,>!J sects . lt40.482. In ro,. psychology is dis-
cussed in connection with ael.r ... consciousnees, physiognoJfV 
and phrenology.. PG, 221-254. 
6 
noted that any consideration of the self including the rich-
ness or its philosophical range, is singularly absent from 
the section dealing wi. th ttpsych.ology·tt under *'IhUosophy ot 
nd. tt There is;c of oourse, the typical analysis of knowledge 
'Wi tb the emphasis placed on knowl.e<lge rather than on the 
knower. In View or the limi ta.tions thus imposed upon the 
scope of psycholow, ;lt would have been better 1£ Hegel 
bad omitted the word .altogether. As the matter stands 
toward the close. of the section on "Subjective w.nd",. 
little is made o£ the tact that mental aetiVi ty can occur 
only in connection ltith indi-ndual thinkers. Regel is 
doubtless right in :refusing to study mind apart from its 
contents, but the inevitable question arises a.s to whether 
or not mind is merely thought--content? The thinker stands 
' 
over against a world ot 'ffhieh he must somehow obtain lmowl-
edge. Kn0111edge treated simply a.s knowledge in llhieh the 
role ot t he individual knower 't1l1rf go somewhat unnoticed, in-
vites the dialectic itseU to lead ult1mately to the view 
thai lmowledge 'Without the kno-wer is inconceivable. All 
knowledge is an appeal to the individual kno'ilel'. All eon-
sciousne ss is an appeal to the eoruscious individual. 
Ae a result of these prescribed limitations noted a-
bove, one mu.st turn to the Wider reaches ot Hegelian phi• 
losophy tor an adequate expre•u•ion or the philosophical 
psychology o£ the individual • In the Engzelopldie in par-
ticular, Hegel makes phenomenology a detinite part ot 
philoSOphY,1 instead or . 'Viewing it. · as a mere aocwnulatton of 
psycholoetcal knowledge. 7 A complete account ot mind re.-
quires it.s interpretation in terms of Geist. Ho\llleVer ~ 
i c .. ~~el JD&Y'. beCOJDI$ · d. thin the ambit of the facUlties and 
±\motions ot the mind, he ·is oonvinced that its manif'eeta-
tions are cl:early diseel"nible within the realm ot objective 
mind and ul titnately Within Absol.ute mind-.. · This makes his 
philoso:i)hical psychology distinctive. It. iS in a sense a 
searching eri ticism of the inadequacies and insufficiencies 
of what passes tor empirical psyehOloror in which all too 
ofte.n the mind is little more than a congeries of contiguous 
sensations S>mehow held 'together through the kind offices 
of a department ot the interior. Perhaps Hegel had Hume• s 
dilemma ·in mind at the t1me., At any rate his attitude on 
empirical psychology may be gleaned ~m the tollowi.ngi. 
Der !nhal t dieser \U$senschaft kann 
nach aJ.l.en seinen einzelnen Momenten •• B. 
ReCht• Ei.genthum, Moralitit, Familia, Staat 
u .. s.r. in der Fonn. vorgetragen werden; daas 
der nsch von Natu:r den Trieb zwa Recht, 
auch den Trieb ZW!l. Eigenthwn1 a.uz- Moralitlt, 
auch den 'rrieb cler Gesdhleeh'tldiebeA den · 
Trieb zur Geaelligkeit u.e:.t. habe. 
As he see:s it, the limitations or psychology as oom-
monl.y' understood are chte to the tact that it has .fail.ed to 
keep step with advances taken ld:t.hin the broad ti.eld of 
mental cul tllt'e 'and he no tee 1 ts refusal to enrich i tsel.t by 
7. EAr, especially sects. la.J-b39. 
a. m, sect. 19. 
8 
the deeper conception of reason. :lays he : 
Die t>sychologie geh8rt wie die togik ~u 
denjeni~Sen Wiasenschatten., die in neueren 
Zeiten von der allgeme1nen Bildung des Oeistes. 
und dem tieferen Begrifte der Verrrun.t't noch am 
wenigsten Nutzen geaogen llFen, und betindet 
sieh noch :lmmer in einem hckmst schlecbten 
Zustand$. 9 
Hegel does not undertake to coive a :psyohologieal ac-
count o£ the ind1viwal. mind. The treatment of ndnd as J.n... 
dica.ted in this dissertation cleat>l.y shows his aim to be 
epistemological rathet" than psychologicaJ.1 although it is 
quite in order lor an avowedly epistem.ological writer to 
inquire as to the nature of' the psychological material a.vau .. 
able and to note its .merits and detects. Hegelta theory of 
knowledge requires the psychological findings ·arising trOJn 
a study of all cognitive processes of mind. 
Philosophical psychology transcends empirical psyehol-
·ogy becauee o.£ the inherent limitations ot the latter. The 
basic concern of empirical psychol.ogy is the enumeration and 
description of our ma:ny impulses and · inclinations. . Regel 
is aware ot his restricted range · tr.r his oh!Sel"VG.tion that 
ttJie entpirische Psychologie er~~t und beschl"eibt diese 
Tr i ebe :urid:· R~ngen und die sich daraur grundenden Be-
dl'kfnisse . ulO It -.taa apparent to hint that maey eonf'l.iets 
of personal.i ty ~em.ain unresol'\1ed 1i" one goes no .rurther than 
the recorc!ing or desires and inolinations. Recognising the 
9. EPW, sect. L!J4. 
10. ffit sect. u . J.!ote . 
place of the datum self', yet sensing. its inadequa.eies , be 
declares a 
Die Einseit1gke1t dies Standpunlds 
bringt Bestimmungen und Folgen mit sich ; . deren 
Haupts«go naeh der geschehenen Er~rterung der 
Grundlage noch bemerk1.1ch zu macben sind. Vors 
erste, 12e:U nicht die ~tatur des Inhalts, sondern 
das Faktum des Bewusatseins aJ.s das Kriterium 
der &hrheit autgestellt wb'd, so ist das sub-
jektive Wissen und die Vere:tcherung,. da.ss ioh 
meinem Bewusstse:ln einen gel'lissen Inbalt 
vorf'indet di.e tbi'undlage dessen watt als wahl" 
ausgeben 11'ird. Was ich 1n ~inem newusstae1n 
vor.tinde, ldrd dabei dalu geste1gert in dem 
Bewssteein aller eieh vonutinden;. und f'llr 
die Na.tur des Bewusetseins selbst a.usgegeben.U 
' ' 
'l'he bordBn ot the above is that the test of truth is 
being erroneously· sought within the mere tact o£ conscious-
ness rathet- than tdthin the content. of experience. He '!d.shes 
to avoid the pitfall or subjectlve cf:;ll't:l.tu.de no matter how 
certain one may feel about a proposi Uon f'rom. a psychologi• 
cal point ot vi.,.. 
Hegel t s ·philosophical interpretation of the psychology 
of the individual, or indeed of t he group, is in ooncert 
w1 th his declared pos:i tion that the truth o! an empirical 
statement does not neeessatilY mean a meta~sical truth . 
The deficiency o.£ empirical psychology 1s due in part, there-
£ore, to the inadequacy of its nethod. He recognizes the 
value o.f' analysis w.L thin certain re~rtricted . fields such aa 
mathematics,. but observes its incompetency w1 thin the .f'i&ld 
of phUosopby. Since empirical psychology in particular 
u. EPW, sect. ·1l· 
10 
draws heavily on a.na:t.rtical procedUres, the transition from 
this interpretation of' psychology to philosophical psyehol• 
ogy becomes imperative i n ord~r to render a coherent a.oeount 
of' all t he factors iiwolved. Hie phllQsophioal p~Jeho:t.oror 
demonstrates how tr.e facts of experienoe are coh~ntly re-
lated. 
3. PreVious 'I'reatrnents of the Pl'oblem 
To many m.odei'il philosophers, Regel remains soJDe'W'ltat ot 
a German enigma, :representing a passing phase of our recent 
past. mich can scarcelY be fitted into the confined a.tmo&-
phere or current ph1loaoph1cal trends. But a earet\tl tUlage 
ot Hegel ian thought only serves to remind u., that much of 
our present phllosophical b'uitage finds its roots in th1.nkers 
as penetrating and protolllld as th.oe~e. 11ho gave German idealism 
to the 1110rl<l. In view of t he current concel"n wi. th other mat-
ters. it ·Should occasion no great surprise to discover a lack 
of informative l'JlatElria.l in contemp01"ary philosophical writing 
to Hegel• s philooophy in general and his acute exposition o£ 
hu.ma!l ~xperience in particular. A search through the leading 
English phUQ#JOphical journals verifies in ~t this coJto;o 
tention. Even in current and recent. artieles; one discovers 
a high percentage o:r them avo~dly uneympathetict~de ·Hegel .ih 
nat\U"e1 especia.lly those which are set in a poli:tical and 
soci.al oontext. Those somewhat concUiatory i.n nature con-
stitute little more than a token treatment o£ th~ Hegelian 
genius. It muat be noted) hOYieverct that in f.:ltandard books 
in phllosQpby, especially .in Britain and on the continent, 
Hegel receives the attention due a great thinker. 'l"nis -18 
not quite so true of the American scene. -
'!here seem to be macy l'tritEll's;; 'Who, while .not con'rl.need 
o£ any lasting elements in Hegelianism, adtui t quite freely 
that what Hegel says is ·often important and even ·perhaps 
sometimes true. · They eonsti~te a gt:'oup of significant 
thin..'lrers nho ,accept the protoundi ty of ~ Hegelian insights, 
but cannot aceept his philosophical system. in 1 ts entirety. 
'l'heir studied critiei.sm is or much value, although the ca:retQl. 
student of Hegel teels he learns more· directly fr0ll1 the master 
. himself than he does .from his ctities1 helpful as they · ~ 
questionably are. 
\ ith .regard to the specific problem constituting the 
core o!' this present vrork; there are very few books on Hegel' s 
phUosophy that offer much help, a.l though there are the high-
l y intorma.ti~ comments of the translatol.'s o£ his basic 'WOrks 
for which every Englieh reader o£ Regel i.s grateM. To 
'iallace' a accompanying notes on the . !Qjp-c and , hiloso;phz of 
§Eirit, to Baillie•s introductory su.mmaries to many sections 
of the fbllnoxoo,nologie, and. t o the c~ful and illuminating 
tranalator"s notee of Kno.."'E in t:r-e Al;il~sophie des . Rechts, 
. . ; 
the 'Writer of this work reco:rds his indebtedness. These, 
hov:ever, were never meant to take, the place o£ the necessarU:y 
l-aborious task of Hegelian analysis. As to the specific 
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}re)blem of Hegel 's p~iloso:phical psychology ot the indi• · 
vidual, it is apparent· that the nature and status o! the 
individual person ie among the moat crucial C9!lsideration 
in any organic philoso~. It is commonly conceded that the 
problem or the individual was pivotal~ the entire eight-
eenth cen'tu17, the background agaimrt whie.h Hegel r s more 
mature 11Drks wre 'lil"itten. But1 be that as ·it may, nobo~ 
' 
can gain .. that the struggles marld.ng the present eent-.u"¥ 
to date have never been far removed from the problem of the 
nature and destiny ot the individual in a world of crowds. 
It is perhaps the most de.tin1t1~ issue o£ our century. 
4. '!he llethods ot Procedure 
'l'hree separate; though 1n:terrelated, methods are uti-
li.zed in the present study". To ascer1iain the developaent 
ot Hegel's thought in regard to his exposition ot human ex-
pe:rience1 the hist.Qrical method is used. Sme attempt is 
made, thr~gh compariSOJ'ls arid eontrastc:s, to show how Hegel •s 
thought progresaed trom the earller days or the p!liloeophieche, 
D . . . . 
Propadeutik: to the. matm-e years ot the · IhUosophie . dee Recht e. 
Again, the. analytical rre thod, the fundamental importance of 
which is amply demonstrated in the n,dnoaaeDOl.ogie, 18 u.sed 
extensively in the expoei tory chapters ot t his dissf:!rtat:ton. 
F1nal.ly1 as a· medium or evaluating He lts t...'lought with 
apeeitic application to a general critique o£ Hegel*s philo-
sophical psychology o£ the individual to be found in Chapter 
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VI, the method or coherence becomes indispensable.. To no 
small degree, therefore,, a:rq merit .1ihich t his inquiry. con-
tains, is due to the application of t.."tese methods t'ihether 
used separately or concurrently. 'rhe student of Hegel may-
well take t he words of t."te mster to heart: "Die -~thode 
. f·· ist auf die,se V~ise nicht . ~ussorliehe Form; sondern die Seele 
und der griff des Inbalt$.ttl2 
This dissertation is organized as .follcme: After a 
brief survey of the chief so~ces of . data marking th~ con-
elusion of the present chapter, Chapter II launches into a.n 
a.nalyei.s of the dialectic method both in i te historical de-
ve"lopment and in its more specific Hegelian £()rmulation. 
Tbe inclusion Qf several netaphysical princl:ples constituting 
what Hegel terms nthe True" brings the chapter to a close. 
An exhaustive analysis o£ the logical category ot indiv1.~­
ality tracing its development thro·ttgh the entire ranee ot 
the Philnomenol.of?:e makes Chapter Ill an essential background 
against. which the ·problem of the individual may be assessed. 
It ;t.s of vital concern to ascertain whether or not Hegel uses 
the term "indiViduality" ambiguously, and to determine the 
degree of consistency with which it is discussed as an or-
ga.ni:c 'Whole. The relationship between indiViduallty and 
personality, including Hegel's detin:tt:ton of' the latt~1 is 
the framework 'Within which the content of Chapter IV is 
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present,ed. · 'lbe distinctive task in t his chapter is the query 
as to the adequacy of Hegel's account of personality, es-
pecially as it pertains to society and the ~olut.e . Chapter 
V attempts to wrestle with the met,aphysical _ "'oble!ns arising 
out of Hegel' a philosophical psychology by noting the solid 
achieveiOOnts, yet taking cognizance of the limitations, of 
modern empirical psychology. ,:;hil o thE) pr~sent 110rk does not 
envision any comprehensive treattoont of modern experimental 
psychology, yet the subject under consideration lends itselt 
t o questions o:f an empirical nature . In this one has the 
empirical emphasis of Hegel hilr.sel:f. It .auld, of course, 
be moat illuminatin£' to review Hegel' a emphasis on psy• 
chology 1n the light of the development in tba t :field since 
his day. The author poses the question of the possible 
relevance between Hegelian philosophical psychology and 
modern r stal t psychology. A cri tiqu.o both of dialectic 
ethod and a dialectic philosophy is offered in Chapter VI; 
noting the ay in lfhioh Regel attempts to relate the rational 
al".d the empirical in t.h Loflic and in the hllosophy of 
W.nd. A series of theses contain the eonclusions reached 
-
in the entire study. 
5 • t'{JUX\:OS of Data 
i. Frima.I'Y sources 
The primary SO\l+"CeS of data which fonn the basis 
of t he expository chapters of tl is dissertation were written 
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by Hegel himself and published during his l1£etim.l3 It 
is axiomatic that no serious study o:f Hegelian phUoaophy 
can be undertaken unless one is thoroughly comrcrsa.nt with 
these sources. 
1lany, i ncl uding the present m-iter, would place 
the PhXnomenol.om;e published in 1807 :first on the list, al• 
l . 
though it should be added that its peculiar style of witing 
may well prove a f'orm:idable barrier to the beginner. Indeed, 
the sustained argument of the book presents unusual dif'fi-
eulties even to the mature student of philosophy. This work 
may be singled out as perhape Hegel t s most. suggestive piece 
of lii'iting, even though it was written during what has been 
termed hie "fiel.";Y youth." I.oewenberg.l4 for example, insists 
that if there is any cornerstone in Hegelian philosophy, it 
is to be found in. this book. Ueberweg in his monumental work 
on the .!iistory of "'hilosophy m:oi tes as follo1 s: 
0 
• In The Ph~nomenolo~ of' ~p-it~ Hegel so.o··t;s 
forth the forms Qf <lf.We opmen of 1iuman con-. 
f!ciousness as it advances from the sta~re o£ 
direct, unreflecting,. unquestioning1 through 
t he di£.o~,.erent forms of ;reflection and self• 
alienation, up to absolute c:ogni tion. In this 
phenomenological presentation of the subject 
f egel interweaves with. each other the histories 
of tcie form.ati~g o£ the individual and the urJ.-
versal spirit• 0 
strauss halls 1t as 'the Alpha and Omega. of Hegel 
and his. later \u-1 tings only extracts from it;l6 'Whlle Bright-
lMi'l describes it as 11a map of the spiritual lif'e11 ,17 and 
evaluates it as "one of' the greatest orks of genius in the 
nineteenth century, v.i. thout ltlich modern culture would have 
been vastly dii'f'erent. n18 Baillie characterizes it. as "the 
first b'u.it of Hegelts intellectual maturitytt,l9 and is ot 
the opinion that the subject in the author•s m:i.nd may be 
said to be. '1the ,.,hole range of human experience as l ietorical .. 
~$ rea,lized in different £oms and at different stages, oore 
particularly in ?.'estern !!1urope,, n20 It is• he says, ua su.• 
preme exPression ·Of the idaalistic outlook on t e universe, 
ton man, on nature a."l.d on human lite• ,. and will doubtless 
have much to give for genel'~tions to come to those who under-
12. 
15. Ueber'i'!e , HP, II; 237 • 
16. Oited in \"'al.lace, LOR., X. 
~7 . Brightman, SL, 16. 
18 • Brightman, SL, 166. 
19. PG (tr. Baillie),. translator's !ntroduction, 11. 
20. PG (tr. Baillie), ·translator' s Introduction, 
17 
stand .. n21 Sett:...ng it w1 thill the framework of philosop..'ly's 
perenni~ problems, Baillie goes on to assert that 
at the present time the Fbenomenology may 
prove of assietanee i n appl"oaching the pro-
foundly i mportant philosophical. problems 
•hich have been raised by the novelty t -the 
com.ple.xi ty and the range of modern science, 
by tho freshened interest in ulOrality and re-
ligion, and by ·the imnonse expansion of 
historical kno ledge • 22 · 
Reyburn v.tews it as 1'both a part of philosophy and an i ntro-
duction to it.n23 Lasson ose work on Hegel has unqu~stion-
ably the element of authenticity about. it, gives t.hEJ f ollorring 
caretul evaluati.on not only of this work but of Hegel:i.an p'·ti-
losophy generallY': 
Hegel' s Ptd!nomenologie des Geistes nimmt 
in der Geschichte dar : hilosophie eine hBchst 
bedeutsaue C!telle ein ..... Ein universaler ~nirer, 
der in sch8p.teriacher .Krai."t und :mit bolll'endea 
Fle1ese eich des geistigen Besitzes seiner 
Zeit illl -weite8ten Umtange bc:rJlchtigt hat, 
ottenbart hier sei~ o{eisterschaft und drltekt 
in Hberlegenem Spiel nd t den Problemen der 
\1"w.rkliohkeit, die er in dem reinen Lichte 
d.es 3ieh selbst durchsichtigen Geistes 
aun8st1 der ganze.ll •':elt das Siegel seiner Souveranit11t au£.24 · 
No comment would be complete, hov.'ever 1 wi t.'i.out some 
reterenee to the way in nldch Hegel himself assessed this 
clarity: 
.............. 
2l. PG ( tr * Baillie ); S~ • 
22. i?O ( tr~ Brlillie h 52. 
2.3;. Reyburn, ETH, Intro. xiv. 
24. ro, Einleitung des fiera.u.sgebers, xvix. 
18 
In m.einer FhHnomenologie des r~istes, 
't1e1che d.esv:.ugen bei ihrer Herausgabe als 
der erste Teil des Systems der \Ussenscha£.t 
bezei.chnet ~orden, ist der Ga'ng genonmen, 
von der ersten., einfachsten F.rsoheinung des 
~ istes, dem unmittelbaren Bewusatsein; 
anzuf'anaen und die Dialel..--tik desaelben bis 
za'l'!l St::mdpunkte der phllosophisohen · . ssen• 
scha.£t au cmt.wiclmln, dessen Notwendigkeit 
flurch diesen Fortgang a1lt'gezeigt wird.. '"::s 
konnte hierfu aber nicht beim Formellen des 
lossen Bcvmsstseins stehen geblieben werden; 
denn der Sta.'ldpunkt des phUoso:£irl.sohen Wi ·ssens 
ist zugl.eioh in sich der gehaltvollste und 
konkreteste, somit als Resultat hervorgehend 
eetzte er auoh die konl¢eten r.lf3stalten des 
Bewusetseins, wie z .. B. 2~r or al, Sittl1c keit, KUm~t, Religion voraus. '/ 
E'J..sewhere le says that the phe.nomenoloror o£ Spi:rit 
is "die iissenschaf't der i! fa.l:lruilg des Detru.satseins. "26 That 
Hegel himself oet. a. high value on this his first real piece 
of phllosophic.al writing is further substantiated by the fact 
t hat he designated it as tr..e first pa1•t, of his system ot 
thought, the Icg1o to form a sequel to it, to be t'oll.011ed in 
turn by t110 concre·oo phllosophical sciences, namely; '.the 
-
J;bUoeo®l ot flatur~ and '1'-e Philosophl o.f Spiri~. 27 
But the tnaster himself freely admi:tted that there 
'Were shortcomings in his n~asterpiece . He later .felt t hat a.t 
many plaees "the arguments I1a.d been overweip-)tted. n28 To 
Niethammer he expr-essed the hope that he migllt be able in a 
second edition, ttto unload some of t he ballast and get the 
25. EP .. , sect. 25. 
26. ro, . Einleitung, 74. 
27 • r.PW, llt·e:t:ace to £irst edition. 
28 . triefe1 I, 80. 
a p fioat more eam.ly. u29 Again~ in ~ le -tter to Schel ... 
lin:; i n mich He~l pr omlses to send hir.l a copy o.~- t b - book_. 
he an cs Sche1ltn ... t s 1 . ul,.:. nee or the tmsa.ti~fnctor·r c 1ar-
acter of t h last parts of tho t'J rk and sayr.; that n h.e com .... 
position or the ook as concluded at - dnigh . bef ore the 
battle of Jcn.:1 . 1 30 
or the beneflt of the 1Cnr-li· r eader, an excel-
lent t.ransl tion of the .or ... has ~n . enderca · y J . B. 
illie . Unlilro some other ·int erpreters31 of Hceel, Ea ·111e 
reco nizes fully t h genius displayed i n t he work. But in 
~ 1 ite of Baillie's rilliant contribution t hi"' early :ieee 
of m-itin, has not reeei ved t he &'lme degre of critical 
evaluation as ave the later I.egelian :orkc, alt ough the 
or of oyce and Hartmann must not be over l ooked in this 
connection.32 
rext in importance, as far as t is dissertation is 
concerned, is the nore systematic Enqcloclldic der phil osophischen 
l'!issenschaften, published in th~ year Hll7 . This ork set!! 
forth t he three b sic divisions of Hegel t s philosophic 1 
stem, I'.atlely, Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and hilosophy 
of Spirit . -:- ·allace asserts it to be "the only complete, 
ture, and authentic stat e!Xlnt o.f Regel ' s philosop~ :tca.l 
29. Briefe, I, 80. 
30. ~jpte, I, 102. 
31 . · e . g ; Stirling in OOH . 
32 . ibid.,J.'h3D. 
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system." 3 "~ere", says another, "he appears as one attempting 
the task of surveyi.rtr- the total result of human lmowledge "1'11. th 
reference to its unification in terms of an idealistic phi-
losophy."34 Two parts, the ~oec and t he Phlloso@Y ~~ 
Spirit,. have been translated into English by 'llliam allace . 
In t he Phllosol*!,y of Spirit tl1ere are excellent introductory 
esea.ys of more than passing merit contributed by the trans--
lator. one outsta.niing feature of Wallace• s work is that he 
has reproclueed Hegel•s statements only,; having elimi nated 
the zus&tze of the editors. The subject matter itself' falls 
under three main divisions. Firet1 Subjective nd, by 'Which 
Hegel means the study of 'What he terms anthropology or the 
soul,35 together w1 th consciousness and finally peycho1ogy. 
The second diviaion deals with what is called Objective tl.nd, 
involving such matters as law, conscience and social ethi cs. 
Division three is titled Absolute !~find, embracing Art, Re-· 
ligion and fbilosophy. 
Logic, .forming, as already stated, the first part 
of the EneyeloJ?!die, constitutes the thesis of a comprehensive 
dialectic. In reality Logic contains the guiding principles 
33. LOB, ix. 
34. Royce, LMI, 214. 
35. Hegel distinguishes soul fl;oom spirit. "The two 
distinct, soul being as it were the middle term between body 
and spirit or the bond between the two. The mind, as soul~" 
is immersed in eorporeity; and t he soul is the animating 
principle of the body." EPW (tr. wallace), sect • .34. Ad-
dition. 
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of Hegel's metaphysics, although the epistemological aspect 
is much in evidence, since he makes no sharp distinction 
between the two. '!'he ideas with which he deals form the 
basis of all human experience. That the logic being taught 
in his day did not impress him is seen by the ·follol'ling com-
tnent. Said he 1 
The traditional IDgic is a subject on hich 
there are tex~books enough, but at the same time 
it is one which can by no means remain as it isa 
it is a thine nobody can make anything oft •tis 
dragged along like an old heirloom, only be-t 
cause a substitute - of lVbich the Gnt is 
universally telt - is not yet in ex1stenee.36 
In the Philosophy of Nature, serving as an anti• 
thesis to Logic., Hegel portrays the dynamic nature of thought 
as it confronts the external world. It is this world, he 
argues, which makes . experience possible and apart .from which · 
it has no aigni.fieanee • nor indeed, reality. The system o£ 
categories as listed in the logic has its counterpart in the · 
:A'!Uosopby of Nature. 
The substance of the third diVision ot the En-
-
cyclopRdie, the Philosophy of Spirit, is the content of self• 
consciousness as this is revealed in actual human experience. 
The Phllosophy of Spir1 t thus becomes the synthesis of the 
Logie and the fhiloeophy of Nature. Baillle says that "the 
!hilosopey of Mind traces the Yarious stages in the evolution 
ot mind."37 
36. Brief'e, 1 1 172 (cited in ~~ace, LOH, xii-xiii.) 
37. m (tr. Baillie), 42n .. 
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In the year 1840, a small volume containing material 
from lectures givtln by Hegel was published unde.r the editor• 
ship of Karl Rosenkranz.. The book as entitled PhUosoph1eche 
Proedeutik ard is the original outli~ o£ a course in Jbi• 
losophy 1i11ch Hegel offered durlng the years 1808-1811 while 
he was director of a Gymnasium in Nuremberg.. Hegel incor.-
porated phUosopby into the curriculum in this way. The 
entire course eovered a three year period. During the fU.-st 
year instruction was given in the Science of Ri hts, ?!orals 
atxl Relig.l.on. 'Jhe second year was, devoted to a study of 
Phenomenology of ~irit and Logic. The coneluding year was 
spent 1n covering the SCience of the Idea and .Philosophical 
Encyclopaedia. The material was organized dialectically to 
include Consciousness, Self'-conseiousness, and .finally, 
Reason. 
Reyburn38 holds that Hegel. uses the ethical approach 
to phllosop}W in this course. The outline or "The HlUosophy 
of t ind11 is contained here but the final stages have not yet 
been reached., 'lbe 'Whole treatment of the ethical mind is 
called practical rather than objective. 
u. ~condar,y Souroes or J)lta 
Among some of the more representative secondary 
sources the f'ollowin are ..,orthy of note 1 
:. 'l'. Harris has not only been an exponent of 
38. Reyburn, ETH; !ntro. xv-xvi. 
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Hegelian thought on the American scene,39 but comes marest 
to being a disciple of Hegel* 1he Jourml; ot peculative 
Fhl.losoP& hich he es~ablished in 1867 was devoted princi-
pally to the study o!' Hegelian philosophy.. Perhaps more than 
any other person he did more to introduce Hegel to erica. 
durin the latter half of the past century. ny illuminating 
articles on Hegelian thought and method may be found in the 
issues or this journal during the .years from 1867 to 1893. 
Although Andrew Seth in his Hegeliani8m and • r-
SQnali ty purports to offer a eri ticism of Hegelianism and 
not of Hegel himself, the boOk contains, nevertheless, a deep; 
and, on the whole 1 appreciative account of Hegel t s spirit and 
aiJ!l.... Seth discusses the relationship of Hegel t s logic to 
experience, and indicates the bearing of thought on reality 
by calling attention to the mtaphysieal nature of Hegel • s 
logic. The thesis o£ this work is the exposition of mat 
its author regards as "the error of identit,ying the human 
with the d:i:vine self'-con8Ciousness, or the unification of 
consciousness in a single selt.nUo Seth holds that this er-
ror arisel!l out of the egelian tendency of ta1d.ng a mere 
.form £or a real being. His contention that "the attempt to 
unity the divine and the hU!ban subject itt ultimately d 
structive of the l'eality of both"Ll is one that should not 
)9. See IW.rh.ead1 art .. (1928}., 226-240. 
40. Seth,; HAP, 226. 
41.. Seth, HAP, 2.).). 
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li btl.y be set aside . 
In Hegel's Doctrine of the Will• J. A. cVannel 
states that the aim of hie. essay is nto give an outline of 
Hegel's doctrine of the 'Will as realized in sociel insti-
tution,., .• nla His treatment of the will offers little in the 
way of anything distinctive about the individual will, but · 
the 11 as understood in terms of its social setting. 
Under the pt"omising title.; The Secret of Hecyl 
(1898 ) 1 James HUtchison Stirling in a 751 page volume, attempts 
to reveal the ·secret by presenting an account of the origin, 
principle; form and matter of the Hegelian system. Hegel's 
secret. according · to Stirli ng, is found in the fact that 
Hegel "made explicit the concrete universal that s implied 
in Kant. "lt3 Be dewtes a lengthy preface in substantiating 
this claim. T'ne book is a frank portr. ~1 or one man' ·s 
struggle with the philosophy of Hegel. Stirling tells us 
that his notes represent "various atages of success or un-
success in the stuctr of Hegel .• 1144 He confidently believes 
that it was I egel who ttspeeiaJ..ly continued and developed in-
to full and final form all the issues which Kant had ever 
properly begun. n45 Rosenkranz evaluates Stirling's work as 
follows a 
42. J. A. !acVannel, lnM'. 20. 
43. ·Stirling, SOH, Preface, xxii. 
44.. stirling, soo, :h 
45 • Stirling, SOH, 20. 
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•· t elcher Teife und Sel staOOigkei t 
der englische Geist sich der speculation 
Hegels ~u verdlchtigen im Stande .sein w:ird, 
ereehen 1d.r zetzt achon aus Schriften, ld.e 
die von Stirling : The Secret g.r Hegel, ~& 
ein wa.brha.ft eretaunliches ibanomen ist. 
John JlcTaggart Ellis McTaggart in his Studies in 
the Hegelian Dialectic o.fters one of the few English ex-
positions of the dialectic method in itself'. Ho~; it 
is debatable whether UcTar..gart a.l:ways offers sate guidance . 
'!here is, notldthstanding• a rather full account or the 
merits and defects or this method as cTaggart sees thel!l1 
but the reader should note his overa.nxious attempt in as-
suming that the triad is a rigid formula to llhich ite con-
tents must exactly conform. 
:tn 19031 R. Mackintosh wrote on Hegel and 
. ' . 
Haptiani81Jt by reminding his readers that 8Heeel 's phi• 
losophy leas than any other stands aloof trom reaJ.i ty or 
aspires to a construction 1n vacuo. n41 He believes Hegelianism 
has glven us an epistemology but not a complete ontology,48 
yet he admits there are solid and valuable ontological results 
in Hegelian epistemology.49 
In The Persistent Problems ot PhUosopby; (1907) 1 
a · . . . . , ... ' t . _ . I ·. . . · _ 
Mary Whiton Cal.ld.ns treai&li the philosophy of Hegel under the 
heading of "Yonistic Spiritualism." calkins quotes with apparent 
46. Roeenkt-anz, HDN, 296 • . 
47. $3.cld.ntosh1 AH, 1. 
43. " cld.ntosh, HAH» 266. 
49. Mackintosh, HAH1 287. 
approval a statement by R. B. Haldane that Hegel is "tho 
gJ'eatest master of abstract thoug)lt that the mrld has ever 
seen since Ari etotle died-."5° The distinctive feature ot 
Hegel's idealism is f ound in his uncompromising doctrine 
that "there exists an Absolute sel£ and that every finite 
reality is an expression of this all-co prehendine eel.t. n5l 
Hegel' s arguJIV!tnt for monietie spiri tuall.sm both i mplied and 
expreseed in his writings is, for OO.kina~ profoundly sig-
nifieant, ani, on the whole, quite convincing. 
lfuno Fi·scher's HeE§el* s teben, rke, und Lehre, 
published in 1911, contains many help.ful swnm;:t.ries of doctrine 
of great value for the purpose of expounding Hegel . 
Benedetto Croce •s Vhat _i;s Livi~ and .·. at is tead 
of the hiloso:phy of neel? (1915) is an eara!st attempt on 
the part of 1 t ·s author to answer his o11n question. croce 
styles himself an Hegelian in the sense of anyone who pos-
seeses a philo.sophical epiri t and is a participant in our 
philosophical culture-surely an attractive invitation to 
Heeelianit11t. The author would keep alive what he considers 
vital in Hegel, namely, t.ha coooept of the concrete universal, 
together with the dialectic of opposites and t he doo~lne of 
the degrees Qf reali.ty.52 Hegel, .according to Croce, at-
tempted to refute every speculative construction of the 
50. Cited in PPP, 360. 
51. oa~klns, PPP, 360. 
52. Croce, WLIII, 20). 
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individual and of the empirical, of history and of natureJ 
sought to establish the autonomy of the various forms of 
spirit., 19hil.e, at the same time, preserving their unity and 
finally endeavored to resolve the whole o£ per~o1'13li ty into 
a pure philosophy of spirit.S3 
A very helpful introduction and sympathetic ex-
position of certain aspects of Hegelian thought appear in 
Josiah Royce 's two books, The Spirit of · .!Qdern. ·. hiloso;ev 
(1892} and Leeturee of} dern Idealism (1919), Chapters 6-9 
of the latter being particularly useful for an understanding 
II or the f'htln01Qeoolof2.e . It is l'd.de)J' recognised that oyee 
is one o the more careful atd sympathetic interpreters or 
Hegel, and hi tribute to Regel would seem to give some 
credence to this view. Says hea 
People usually call Hegel a cold-hearted 
system-maker, who reduced a.ll our emotions 
to purely abstract logical terms~ and con-
ceived his Absolute solely as an incarnation 
of dead thought. I, on the contrary, call hilll 
one mo knew narvelous)J' well, with all his 
coldness, the secret. of human passion, and uho, 
therefore, described as few others have done, 
the paradoxes, the problems, and the r.lories 
of the spiritunl. life. His great philosophical 
and systematic eiTOl" lay, not in introducing 
logic into passion, but in conceivine the 
logie or passion as the only logieJ so that 
ycr.1 in vain endeavor to get satillfaotion from 
Hegel te treatr.oont of outer nature, of soience, 
o£ mathematics, or or Sl'lY' coldly theoretcial 
topic. About all these things he is immeneely 
suggestive, but never final.. His syste , as 
system• has crumbled, but his v1 tal comprehension 
53. Croce, DH, 203. 
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o£ our lite _remains .forever .54 
- -iehard Kroner in his Von Kant bis Hew;;t (1921-1924) 
give Us in t o volumes a compl"ehensive ~ y of Hegelian 
thought. 'rae first volume centers around the topie, "F'rom 
the critique of Reason to the !1hilosophy o£ Nature,.u In 
volume two, Kroner • s discussion ta.ke s its point, of departur 
from the fundamental principles o£ the fblloso@Y_ of ?Pirit 
in \'ih1.eb he considers the general character of Hegel t s 
s,yatam1 the ~oijic as the fundamental proposition of the Ph~­
!,<nso!?Qz; of SE~i..t, and t he f.tignificatlt meanin of t he prin-
ciple of negativity. 
Giving his contribution the eonmonpla.ce title ot 
The I'hlloSOWf ot: . He gel (1924}' vr. T. s·tace offers a standard 
systematic exposition of Hegelian thought. Up to the time 
of its publication; ,Stace assert. that no book -rdth a. similar 
purpose existed itt rhglish. As an introduction to Hegel his 
wor k perhape serves that purpose tor the -beginner. ',lt.e ru-st 
section is a survey of Hegel's philosophical f'orerunoors• 
particularly those 't'ihose t,'M,tings seemd to have i&PJ.uenoed 
Hegel. The guiding principle -of the book is that o "in-
eluding onl;r such Cl~itieisms as seemed necessary to give the 
student an intelligent understanding or Regel.n55 
Nicolai Hart mann 1 s · Die . P,hUosOBhie_. de~ deutschen 
Ideal:1.81!ltlS Bd n (1929) is a 'POrk or outstanding merit :!n 
54. Royce~ S ~ . , 226-227" $5. Stace, POH, Preface • Vi. 
its treatment of Hegel. Hartmann intrQduces his material by 
a consideration of' tl e psycholo-gy o£ He~l under the topic~ 
11VoT.l tesen und Verfitehen l!egels." In two subotant.ial c 1apters 
on the dialectic• Hartmann 3rgues tha.t it i a kind of meta• 
physical exp rimentation1 at any :rate, a des~lption of what 
one finds in pursuing the unfolding of historically per• 
sistent problems. The author regards dialectics, not as an 
abstra~t scheme or ll:J3t'hod to be i dentically applied in each 
particular case, but as the specif'1e art of speculative 
thinking, alrrays creative and there.:f'ore different at each 
parti<:mlar step. Hartmann 's book is a. valuable guide as 
one makes his ay through the dialectical dif:f'i.cult1es in-
vol ved in many problems. 
Al.ong with Hartmannt·s contribution.,. there a. peared 
during the same year Theodor L. l1aeringrs book entitled, 
H<t~l r . sein \·!Ollen und sein ;~er~· 1aerlng sets forth in 
great detail a chronological an.d syste.>aatic treatnBnt of ·hlle 
thoughts and language of Uegel.. He regards the searchingly 
empirical spirit of Hegel as too ~ofo:und to be appreciated 
by the lj,rn..ited intellectual powers of many of his eot:~mentators. 
It is Haering's contention that Hegel as the f'irst and only 
Tiestern philosopher who made experience the fundamental basis 
o:t all his int.elleetu.al coriceptJ6 ne designates the 
Phanomenologie as an introduction~ yet anticipatory, to 
56~ l:,aering~ Hwtr, 1. Einl.ei t1ulg, S. 
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Hegel t s f~tU~so& of Spjl.ri.\• '!he . an thor .preaents an ex• 
cellent synopsis of Hegel' s philosophy at the close of his 
ork. 57 · 
·~ention should be made of a penetrating historical 
st'Udy of Hegel 1 s phUosophy th special application to the 
soeinl and pc~i tical movements of. his day by Herbert . mreuse 
in Reason and Revolution: 1ef')l and the PJ.se o~ .ocial 
~.eog {1941) . arcuse maintains that Herr,el• s basic con-
cepts are hostile to the tendencies that have led into 
Fasc::i.st .theory and practice.58 
In · 1948, there appeared . in translation the early 
itings of Hegel U..'lder the title Eart¥ Theqlo!lieal .Titings 
by Knox and m=ooner . 'l'hese early writings clearly indicate 
the exploratory Z'l..ature of Hegel * s thought even during those 
formative years, They speeif1eally point to hie early in-· 
tereat in matters of cu1 tu.re and eiviliz.ati<m. 
Finally, a. R .. o. JAtre, under the title A StuSf: 
of Hegel t s !t>gi~ (1950), has place.d at our disposal one or 
the most 11ainstaking cxpositiol').S or Hegel's l&gio to date,. 
The book re resents the author •s more mature evaluation or 
Regel t s phllosophy, and shOlf$ considerable merit over hie 
In~roduetion to rre~l, published in 1940. 'lhe author ot 
thio dissertation has round i.t both st1r.ru.latin~ and exeeed-
in~,ly inst.ruetive. J.~ seems to suggest that om does not 
57 • Haering, 1· . , n, 479-518 • 
~8 . Ma.rcu.se., RA..~, Preface, vii . 
kno Hegel until he has mastered hia logic. 
An1on.· articles 'bea:rin!" ei the.r directly or indirectly 
on Hegelial'l thought, arid arranged according to the chrono-
logical order or publicc.tion, those by the f'ollo .... nng . i te:rs 
mn:y be cited: ·Harris, Hartmann, Stirling, Rosenkranz., Hall, 
.atson, Royce, !aldane, ·"al.dar, Caru.s, Fa eett_, ·' eken, Logan, 
t"allace, Rogers, PAillie, !Kac:K'eiWie, ibben, Calkins, :Bl'adley_. 
Overstreet, . Dakenell, CUnn:L"lgham, Hudson, usoio., A.ckorman1 
Glockner, ;,mirhoad, Perry, Binder, Hessine, Lasson, Kuiper, 
.b'hr.e, Hook, f'..ohen, .Raju, tnewenberg, Brightman,. 1\dams, Strong1 
tee, ·"isdom, PoPPOr, Godfrey, · ~lsh, Reichenbach. 
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CHAPTER II 
GENERAL SURVEY OF HEGELIAN PHILOSOPH! 
1~ . Hegel's .~Uosophical Background 
German idealism of which Hegel is an outstandin · represent.--· 
ative must be seen against .the backgrotmd o-£ the British empiricism 
of Locke and Hume. The clash between the two (or so it has been 
usually interpreted in the history of philosophy) perhaps r!Oes 
beyond t he limits of two opposing schools to involve the whole 
field or philosophy itself. The deeper is-sue is 'Whether or not 
man ean achieve a rational mastery of nature and &ociety.. In 
Heeel, this issue is clearly in the forefront at his thinking.. It 
is, for one thing, the key to his philosophy o:t the state. 
To realize this rational mastery required knowledge of the 
truth, and t he truth as C'rei'ma.n idealil!llll saw it, was a universal 
in contrast to the mani:fold appearance of things as perceived by 
the ordinary individual . t.fruth1 it was claimed,. is universal and 
neeesSc."U"Y1 and thus stands in sharp contrast to the typical ex .. 
perience of accident and change,. OVer against his rational vie 
point is that of the British empiricists who attempted to demon-
strate that any uni~ which reason claims to have is nothing more 
than habit or custom. General ideas are quite impossible.1 It 
1. Locka held that general ideas are ttthe inventions and . 
creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and 
concern only signa ••• when therefore we quit particulars, the generals 
that rest are only the creatures of our own making. u (EHU, Book III, 
Chap. 3, seet. 11.) l1ume believed that eeneral ideas are abstracted 
from t he particular, am represent the particular and the particu-
lar only." (THN, Book I,. Part 1, seet. vii,) 
the empiricists were r ight, then all efforts to seoure some order 
in the prevailing f'<:Jrms of lite would be futile. l3ut the German 
idealists argued that the principles of unity and. universality 
are not g:1 ven fac~s of empirical experience. '!here are unquea-
tionably the e:xp: essim of man t s reason. 
Both Kant and Hegel recognized t he dimensions of t he problen; 
a s is evidenced by the faet that each of them connected the thea-. 
retieal ith the practical reason. This is seen clearly in 
Hegel• s transition .from t.'le Begrit.f ot reason to his view of the 
state as the union of individual and common i nterests, and thus 
as the realization of reason. 
'!his is t he philoso!Xlice.l background, then, against which 
Hegel orked. He ·$i.w1 as did all the Ge;rman idealists, t hat if 
the philosophy of empiricism 'Were to be · applied to the social 
order 1 1 t "nould mean nothing short of the abdication of reason. 
To attribute the existence of geooral ideas to the force of 
custom, and the principles underlying reality to psychological 
mechanisms, 100ant the denial ()f reason and truth. 'nle problem 
the idealists set themsel vee was to show that general concepts 
m. th their necessity and universal.! ty are more than the product 
of i magination, and must be validated by something more permanent 
than the fleeting experiencee represented in individual psycholoeY•2 
2. '!his is not to i mply, hOweVor1 that Kant and He 1 ignore 
the f'undamental importance or experience. The opening words of 
lCant . c trV showe his ~ng empirieal bent. lh.:it Kant went on to 
point ··:us the !'act that the empiricists had f'alled to demon-
strat..e that the modes by which empirical exper.ienco is organized 
are also f\lrnished by experience . (These are the forms of sensi-
bility and t he categories O·f the understanding.) 
.It is common knowledge .to t he student o:t philosophy that 
the Kantian lrey to knowledge is what he called "transcendental 
apperception" and forms the ultimate basis for the unity o£ the 
experiencing person, and hence for the neces$i ty and universality 
or all o jective relations. Kant argued t hat since ue lmo the 
impressions given us through t he senses only in t he eon text or 
the a priori forms of t he mind, we cannot kno what t-he 'thing~ 
in themselves" { Dl.nge an sioh) are .that give rise to those im-
pressions. 'the If.nge an sich are completely unknO\lable. 
The reason for t he inClusion here of this Kantian vie 'f of 
lmowledge is that Hegel regat"ded this skepticnl element in Kant 
as an unnecessary ban-ier to his effort in .rescuing reason .from 
the empirical onslaught hurled at :reason lJ.· Locke and Hume. If 
things-in-themselves are unlmo ble, then reason is merely sub-
jective and the world falls int o the devastating dichotomy o£ 
subjectiVity and objeetivi ty, sense and understanding, thou ht 
and existence . Any euch dualiS!ll.t Hegel believed, struck at the 
very roots of reality. The great task ot philosophy is to brin 
nature and soci.ety within the scope or reason. He 1 sets .forth 
the unifying principle in the concept ot reason. His philosophy 
is a .system in which all realms of being must be included under 
t he principle or reason. Hegel thus brings inorganic and or ante, 
nature and society under t!1e nay of reason. This is why the 
transitions £rom the toey.c to the Philoso:plv of' Nature., and from 
t.he latter to the fhlloao15r of .uind, are made on t he supposition 
that the laws of nature renect the rational structure or being 
(t.ogie) and lead in turn to t he. laws of the mind a a reflected 
in the Ph1l.osop!:l;( of Mioo. In the real.m of lllind, ·freedom. is 
achieved by the fulfillment of t he potentia.li ties in reality •. 
2. 'l'he Linguistic Problem in Hegel. 
One of the most difficult features of Hegel's philosophical 
system is the atl"ange and somewhat forbidding etyle or· l~guage 
which he employs in expounding his ideas. It i:S doubtless true 
that his technical vocabulary has discouraged maey a reader mo; 
tailing to find a key to the fortl"esa~ has decided to remain 
outside. 
!t is of interest to note that Regel t-~gards language as 
logically prior to thinking, the categories o£ Being operating 
especially in sensuous experience, for example . Ye , in spite 
of this broader conception of language• Hegel also conceives it 
1n its verbal sense, as that 'Which makes t hinking possible . says 
he: tttndem die Sprache das • rk des Oendankens iat~ so kann ~uCh 
in ihl" nichts ges:agt "Werden, was ntcht al.l.eeme~ ist. nJ It is 
apparent, then1 that language to Hegel is aerumQUs,4 and one 
must not overrate Regelts statemm.t that what is expreseed in 
language mnst be universal.. His View on language may be etim-· 
roari~5ed tbust Language logicall$ precedes thought as well as 
expresses it. Hegel is not concerned with its historical origin. 
3. EN; ·Sf!!tCt. 20. 
4. It Should be noted, however, that a& language deve~ops 
it loses its sensuous features. see EPr-r, sect. h59. The View is 
discussed in soJ!lEl detaU in ibid. • Chapter IV. 
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He sees the $ll-1mport::mee or t.Tying to reach the thoughts or 
others through their linguistic expre.ssion. This is significant 
when one turns to Hegel• s philosophy i t.ael:f. It in in so S!"..all 
degree the extraordinary range nd depth of the proble s 'Which 
Hegel poses £or solution, that give rise to his technical 
phraseology. There is t e problem of development, for example . 
How is it po!sible? By mat principle or principles do t 11n~s 
develop? 'ohat is the internal relationship bet en nature and 
spirit? Trese are the problems that doubtless innuenced Hegel 
in introducing the technical language associated . th t .e dia-
leetic. No one Who creates a special technical vocabulary does 
so ,n, thou t recourse to the problems he is st.ruggling first to 
formulate and then to solve . He misreads Herrolian phUosophy 
who concludes that it is merely a sinecure in syntax . 
Arry vie . suggesting a eet o.r rn.athena.tical symbols as the 
final product of language receives little if' arry support i"ran 
Hegel. He notes the i mportance of nam.ee be-eause they represent 
a concrete uni t;y' of the diverse, a concrete universal . »Es iet 
in Namen, class wir denken. uS Verbal language is the ayste ot 
interrelated names, and, represents in tru ftegelian inter-
pretation, a phase in the development o£ Gpir1t.6 
Hegelian terms sh01f unmistakable igns of the care and pre-
cision with "fthich their. ~thor develops his philosophical concepts. 
5. EPt, eect. L62. 
6. See lE ; aect . 459 . 
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Furthermore, the typical Hegelian phrase covers such a 'Wide 
range of application, that any piecemeal crt ticism fails to do 
full justice to Hegel's comprehensive vision. · 'Ihe distinctive 
word or phase •is well-nigh meaningless apart .from i .ts context. 
!t must be noted, ho eveli', that Hegel does not create a new 
philosophical vocabulary a la ;hitehead, but rather uses tra-
di tiotW.l words in a distinctively Hegelian sense. 7 
....... ; 
7. 'l.'he thorough student or Hegel wUl be reminded here of 
the Hegelian ~xicon included in the Glockner edition of' He.gel's 
Werke. But 1 t is compiled on the principle o£ assembling the 
relevant citations in Hegel • .s writings which have a bearing upon 
the term under consideration. All explanations of terms £a111 
consequently, nthin this principle. 
J. A Lexicon of Hegelian T(Jl'DlS 
Absolute Idea- the highest possible category of thought . 
Abstract - that .1ic.."l is separated from itt connection in 
reality. 
Abstract Universal - a universal which has no organic connections 
vd..th its particulars. Hegel sometimes calls it em-· 
pirical univeraaJ.ity~ (m,. sects. 301.; 304.) 
an siQh _.. the implicit, the potential . Hegel describes it as 
"der !{eim, die rua e, das verm8gen, ~s 1st das, i'J::l3 
Aristoteles newnt, d. 1. die 140gl1chkeit 
( aber die re~e l~glichkei t, nicht so eine ober.n£chl.iclle 
rt8gllchkeit uberhaupt), oder, l7ie es genarmt wird, das 
nsieh, das, -was an sich ist und nur erst ~o . " GP, 
( ed. Hoffmeister) 101-102. 
rtJ.r m. ch - tbt.explici t. 
au!heben - to preserve through transcendence. The entire dia-
lectic movement depends upon it. 
Bew;i::f'f - the concept in the light of hich the facts are in-
telligible since they are embodied -wi t hin 1 t. It is 
the inner living principle .of all reality. "Der 
Gedanke ist nichts ~eres, Abstraktes, sondern er 
ist bestimmend, und zwar sich selbst bestinmend; oder 
der Gedanke ist wesentl.ich konkret1 Diesen konkreten 
Gedanken nennen rdr den Be griff." · ro ( ed. Hoffmeister) 1 91. ( al.laoe, Baillie, Reyburn and others translate 
Begx;if'f as nnotion. "') · 
Concrete -a t hing is concrete hen it is taken in connection 
lfith its true context. 
Concrete Universal - a lrilole in which the parts depend on the 
whole for their life but, at the same ~1me1 the per-
sistence of life neceasi tates the differentiation of 
parts. 
Ceterminate Being - to have existence from the point of vievr of 
others. In Hegel 's usage, it means the same as being 
£o~ o i.;hex·s . 
The Idea (Idee) - the concept in oo :far as it gives realicy and 
exiStence to itself. Hep.el capitalizes it in order to 
distill{:-:uish it f'roo the objeet of thought . "Die !dee 
ist der Regrlff, i.nsofern er sich real.iaiert. n PO (ed. 
Hoff'mei ster), 98. 
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oralit£t ~ abstract ;rt():ra.11ty but containing conscientiousness. 
Realitlt ~ hen an entity haa objective existence in rel. ion 
to something subjective. 
Sittlichkeit - the concrete morality of a rational social order. 
4. Hegel t s Conception of Philosophy 
That Hegel gave to phUosophy" a place of fundamental 
si ,nificance is the conclusion to l'1hich one is driven after 
haVing read discerningly from his Tfritings. In t his respect, · 
he lived his lite8 and organized his t hought ·in the true clas- · 
sical tradition.9 For him, phUosophy could never be cont3ined 
within a series of academic courses on the subject. FhUosopey 
is, in etfect, the ultimate form of all human knowledge. Its 
development required the rich, deep soil of all human experience 
and could not be expected to f'J.crurish in any o.ne restricted 
sector. benever and wherever t he restless, rational spirit ot 
man launched him f'orth on voyages of mental discovery, t here the 
philosophical impulse was a t mrk. Those, therefore, ho see in 
his system only the lifeless ·rOl"rtl of an abstract dialectic, or,. 
at best, but an obscure metapbysics, have singularly -failed to 
see the empirical. ba81a of hil thought. 
i. Definition of PhUosophy 
Hegel detines phUosopby as "an dae wirkliche F...rk:ermen 
deseen, was in 7ahrheit ist.ul.O and felt. that a ~eneral description 
8. It is questionable if t he life of Hegel was t he dreary 1 
dry and emotionally colorless at.tair as portrayed by the oom-
·mentators. · The Briefe suggest otherwise. See also Sterrett, 
SHPR, passim.. 
9. His debt to the Greeks, especially Plato and Aristotle, 
is apparent. See ro, '22, 57 I 2)9) EPR, 1), 20~-_ ~6, 40, 56, 120t 
170£, 1821· 312, )19, 3271 3341 laO, 461, 4711 490 (on Aristotle} 
and_E , 13, 201 431 931 1141 .3511 406• LlO, 460tt, 471 (on 
Plato.) 
10. ro, Einlei tung, 63. 
' • 
of it mtght be rtals denkendc Betrachtunr; der C,.egenetHnde. nll 
Elsellbere he states that "the business of philosophy is only to 
bring into expliei t consciousness what the worl d in all a~s has 
believed about thought. ttl2 As to its content,. he assures 1lS that 
"nicht das Abs'b!'akte odcr Umd.rkl.iehe ist ihr Ele .nt und Inhal t, . 
sondern daB 1'4rkliohe 1 sich selbat Set~ende und i n s1ch tebende, 
das Dasein in seinem Beerif.fe. nll At:tain, 
die Darstellung muss, der Einsicht in. die Nat1U' 
des Spekulativen getreu. die dial.ektische Form 
behal ten und nichts hereinnellllen, als '-psofern 
es begJ."i!'ten wird und der Begritf iet.l.4 
As to the. importance ot phil.osophy for other £ielda ot 
thought, Hegel has this to t~ayt 
Es aoheint gerad.e in den Mangel von Kenntniaaen 
und von St.udium der Beaits der PhUoc:ro.phie gesetzt 
zu ~n und dieae da au.t'zuh8ren, wo jene antangen. 
~e 1fird hiutig ~ ein formelles, inhaJ.tleeres 
ieeen gehalt.en, und es fehlt sehr an der Einsichtt 
da:!is, wa.s auch dem Inbalte nach in irgendeiner 
Kenntnis und liasenachatt mabrhei t. is:tt die sen 
Namen al.lein dann verdienen kann, lfenn es von 
der hiloso};hl.e erzeugt wordenJ dass die andern 
11ssenschatten1 sie ml>gen es mit RB.eonnieren1 
ohne die ?hilosophie, versuchen. soviel sie wollen, 
ohne sie nicht ~ben, Geist .. Wahrheit in ihnen ~ 
haben verm8gen.l;> 
11. PhUosophy as System 
Hegel is insistent that some sort ·Of phUosophical 
system is necessary.16 System as he sees it, howevel"', shoUld 
u. EPI, sect. 2. 
12. EPN (tr. ·~ace), sect. ~2~ Addition. 
13. ro, orrede, 39. 
14• PG• Vorrede, 54. 
lS. PG, Vorrede, S4-SS. 
16. EPr/1 eecte. 13-l.SJ sect. 86. 
not be taken to mean a system of ·thought merel.y,. but an actual 
organization, an orderly and coherent ax-rangement of all ·the 
facts of experience, a developing fluid system. The systemati• 
z~tion of the man;r . types ot expet-ienoe as pre~.nte.d in the 
!!,_llnRmenoloSi;e would .aeem to validate this view~ Unless it i .s 
systematiz~4, he say&ti'.:i.~. ·phUoaophy is not so1entif1o. 
: . .. · ·. ·'!'· : ' ; 
Ein .fhUo.sophieren ohne System lmnn nichts 
·rassensel'laftJ.iches seitiJ ausserdam dan solches 
Philosopbieren · .tlir .mob -~ eine subjekUw 
Sinnesart av.adrHckt, . ist es se:tnem lnhalt nach 
zuti1JJ.ig. E1n Inhal:t bat allein als lloment des 
GanSen Seine Recbt!ertigung, ausser demselben 
aber eine unbegr,'lndete vorausi!IBtaung oder 
subjektive Gewie.ftbe1 tJ dele philosophisohe 
Scllriften beacbrinken l.'ich darau£-, aut aolohe 
ise nur Gesinnungen u.nd lteinungen auszuspreehen.l7 
111. The Empirical Basi~ of flh1losophy 
One ever-recurring theme throughout all RegE?lian 
thought is the absolute necessity ot building e~.rthing upon a 
firm :foundation of factual data. As Baillie so truly aays; "he 
(Hegel) sa• the neoessi tv for chaining speculatiw imagination 
to the ~l1d ground of tried and verifiable experience. nl8 · 'l'hia, 
inoidentall,y 1 i(J in sharp contrast to the view that Hegel apun 
his phUo.eophical system out Q£ his head.. \'fri tine to the ra-
. tionalist theologian Paul.us in '1814, Hegel deolaredt 
You know that I have had too much to do 
not merely 'With ancient literat'llre, but even 
with mathematics, latterly witb the h~gher 
analysis, differential calculus, chemistry, to 
let ayself be taken i ·n by the humbug ot _Naturw 
phil.oaoPhie, phUoeophi~without knowle(f'ge ot 
17. EPI• sect. 14. 
lB. PQ (tr. Baillie), l). 
fact and by mre .foree o.t• imagination, and 
treating oere .fanoies, ewn imbecile fancies 
as Xdeas. l9 
It is instructive, moreover, t o note what he says in 
his exposition of Wa~UosoP!P;e• 
Ee ist schon erinnart worden, dass, 
ausserdem dass der Gegenstand nach seiner 
Begriftsbestimmung in dem pbilosophischen 
oanze ~ben 1st, noch weitet- die empiriache 
EZschcinung, welche deraelben entSFicht1 .namhatt 
11u machen und von ihr autzu.ze1gen 1st, daaa s1e 
jener in der Tat entepricht. Dies 1st jtldoch 
in Be$iebung aut die ot-..endi~~t des Inhal ts 
kei.."'l Beru.fen auf die Erfehru,ng . 
True to his empirical emphasis; Hegel draws upon the 
inexhaustible storehouse of :facts as found in history, science, 
and in ordinary human experience to establish his vstem of phi-
losophy. 'fnis is not to deny, however, that He el was limited 
by the range o£ knawlec:!Ge available in his day. 'obody can pos-
s-ibly' include tbe entire range o£ huraa.n expe;-ience Tt.ithin the 
orbit of his mind. 
'· nte Dialectic Uethod 
1. The Veaning or the Dialecti() 
'!be geDesie of the word "dialectic" goes· back to the 
Greek dialektike which generally means the art or debate . 'l'tlo 
component parts, cU.a (through) and leg~. (to converse) are 
united to give ue the wot"ld 1 tself. 2l 1.'hus, etymologi.caJ.ly ~ the 
19. Briete, 1, 373 (cited by allace in LOB- xiT~ xv). 
20. !PI,. sect. 246. · 
21. See art. on "Dial.ectictt in DP (ed. Runes) .; 78-79. 
root meaning of dialectic is to explore, through conversa.ti0n• 
as much of the meaning and content o£ the subject under discussion 
as possible. 
The descriptio11 of the dialectic as given above indi-
cates t he o istemological aspect involvod1 since it denotes eB"!' 
sential.ly a 111ethod or thinld..nr,. towever, in historical usa e., 
it ha~ not been confined solely to the epister.tological, but has 
aleo been employed ,to a~eerta.in the taphysical nature nf the 
subject being considered.. Thus, several di tinctive meanings 
have been given in the eourse o£ t1me. 22 
In ite broader interpretation, the use of t.'lle dialectic 
appJ"oach to a problem clearly indicates the drive or the human 
mind towards completeness and coherence. Knowledge is attained 
first or all by beginning ~th the partial• the unrelated, the 
fragnental"'1J in Hegelian phraseology, the thesi • But the mind 
is never satisfied 'W.i th the l.imited horiaons a£ the tragmenta.ry. 
It seeks that 1Jhich Ues beyond but is related to what one al-. 
ready knows-the anti t."te.s-is. out .of the productive interrelation 
22. Four distinct meanings of the dialectic are given 1n 
Eisler• s 8rterbuch der phUtm!techen Bett;i.tte: • trnter-
redungslcunst, · ~~.efli038 &irlin diiiiiiJ 2. gr!truches vertahrenJ 
3. logiache Be gung des Donkens von, einem Begt-if'f zum andereu 
m1 ttels Aufhebung von idereprllchenJ 4. Ent'lficklung des Seienden 
durch oe~nsitze, die einander horVortreiben~ .AuseL"lander~hen 
in GegenSitze mit .tolgenden vereinigungen, die neue GegenSltue 
aus eicb entlaaeen. ws,. 268. Heinrich Schmidt i.{l his 
FbUosdtiachee '\V8rterooeh eqs t hat it was "Uraprunglich di• 
truiis't · r 'CfiiteiTediii'lg {sel es mit andern, eei es mit eich . 
aelbet) •· dann beeondere die Kunst der Beweiarllbrung .• " PW1 
8.3. 
ot thesis and antithesis co s the more complete truth of a 
synthesis. 'lbese movements of thoug,ht indicate t he dimensions 
of t he dialectic. 
U. Hietoriea1 l)}veloproant of .the Dialectic 
The first application o£ the dialectic approach to 
knowlec;lge is found in ancient Greek philosophy, the aeedo-bed or 
so much that is fertile i n stern thou€1lt• lindelbam in his 
monumental Histoq _of f hUoso&, carei\llly evaluates the Greek 
geniue in his incisive way: 
'lhe philosophy of the Greeks forme t he most 
instructive part or the whole histo.,.-.J o.f philoso-
phy from a theoretical ;point of View~ not only 
because the fundamental conc;eptions created in 
1 t have become the permanent foundations tor al.l 
further develo~nt o.f though t 11 and px'omises to 
remain such, but also because in it tho formal 
presuppositions contained in the postulates of 
the thinking Reason iteelt, attained sharp 
formulation as set C>Ver against the lllS.terial 
of lmowledge.1 Which, especial.l.1' at the be-.. 
ginning was still relatively omall in amount .... 
'l'hese advantageB appear alread;y in t he transparency 
and simplicity or the entire development, which 
enables us to see the inquiring mind at first 
turned outward, then thrown back upon i tool£, and 
trom this point o£ view returning to a deeper ap-
prehension of rG&lity as a whole.2J 
'lhia discerning statement by a great authority on the 
development of phUosophical thought, bring into sharp focus 
the sweep of the dialectic, and, at the sa.roo t ime, calls our 
attention t o :ege1 1 e debt to the _}reeks. The lid.nd turned outward 
on natnre r:aa..v "ftell represent the thesi&.J ite return upon itself, 
2.3. · lndelband, HOP (tr. Jame.s H. Turt.s), 2>, 26. 
as a "\"'holen, an appropFiate synthesis. "'!he natural r hythm of 
the intell ectual Ute"24 is Windelband• s phrasing of the dlalactic 
movement ot thought. 
(i) aeraclitus 
Heraeli tue (536 ... 470 B. c.) is usua11J· identified 
as the first dialectioi in the histoey or ·European thougbt..2S 
Faced Td.th a philosophy as obscure as it was obsessed 1tl. t h ~ 
ligion, Heraclitus boldly c tallenged 'the idea of any abicli g 
substance, and proposed the law o£ change as the oru:y unchanging 
reality. He discovered in thie l&W the order, reason and destiny 
of the world. two essential things are appll:l:'ent, he ea:j."S: 
(l) the harmony ot opposites, (2) t he complete circuit of mtter 
in the univeree. '1\1$ ":f.'l:t.Ut of things" rt~$llta in a ceaselesiS 
strife of oppoe1tee,26 yet differences and oppo$1tes are in the 
end reconciled by $>nte eot"t of itrfia:Lble hCU'll¥)fl1• Re~>e,. in 
embryo, is a philoeo~ ot proce$8a an i nterpretation or reality 
24• T!indel.~ HO.P (tr. Jam.e& H. Tu.fts)1. h37• ~,. :tn EIW1 sect. 88t .Hegel ob$erves tha~ in the history 
ot philosophy the stage or the logical Idea named 'Becoming fin.ds 
its analogue in the $Y"Stem of Heraclit\.ts. 1'men Heraclitus as-
serted that 'tall is ilow.lng" he enunciated Secoming as the f'unda-
mental featu-re of all e;)d.stence. ''&..en Regel goes on t.o add that 
~colning, hol'lever, ne~de to grow in depth and w&il#lt of meaning. 
Life is a Beoo11ting but t.his does not axhau:$-t its notion. A 
still h1gher form must be .found; · namely',. and. . 
26. t1llegel 1f3s pro:f.'oundly ·ilnpreseed 'Wi th the Heraclitean 
flux. More t tan aey other philosopher a-inee · Hex"aeli tus he 
realized the .element o£ a'b:'i.te or opposition 1d.thin the nux. !l 
Cohen, art. {1932)~ 301. · · 
which has become so & ggestive in modern times. 
(11) Zeno of Elea 
Zeno (490-430 B.c.) set torth what he considered 
to be the inherent contradict ions inescapably present in any view 
hich attirms a plurality or beines. Being, said he , is in-
finitely small on the one hand, and infinitely large on the other . 
Number, too, appears to just as paradoxical. 'lb.at which exists 
must be ithout limits, whUe complete being not in the proeess 
of becomin is limited numerically. Furthermore, he affirmed, 
the proposition that empty space is real is refuted by an in-
finite regress and motion is an illusion. 27 1'hus did Zeno use 
the dialectic as a means of refuting his philosophical opponents. 
Aristotle is reported to have nemod him the .:f'ounder of the dia-
lee tic. 
(111) Socrates 
V.ith the aea:rch o£ Socrates (469-399 B.c.) tor 
ethical truth the dialectic method begins to assume real im-
portance . By the ti'm$ Socrates appeared the relativity o£ the 
Sophists had nung full eirole. out of th shadow-land of 
Sophistry there emerged the compelling figure o£ Socrates to 
direct Greek thought once again into the direction ot objective 
truth. The outward and viaible sign of t.l:lis inward and spiritual 
search is the dialogue ldlich became the accepted vehiole or all. 
27. "Wie Zeno zuerst von der Bewegung zeigte, dass sie sich 
lfiderspreche# dass sie also nicht sei." EP 1 sect. 89. 
who ould converse.. Tt.ere must be a mutual sharing of t hought. 
The dialogue was desi:mated as the road to truth. By means of 
a series of eearchin 1 $killtul questions Socrates drew out the 
views or others, laying bare for all Ath<mian eyes to see t heir 
inner contradictions and inconsistencies .• 28 And he did all ot 
thi-s in the universal interest of truth. For Socrates the dia-
lectic becomes t he art or investigation leading to a clarification 
of ooneepts. 
(iv) Plato 
It 11as Plato (427•347 B.c.), ho ver, who made 
the dialectic the fundamental method in discovering the nature 
o! reality.29 Whereas Zeno and Socrates u•d this method to destroy 
the !'alee opinions of other.s, especially on et.llical matters, Plato, 
on t he other hand,_ seiroes t he dialectic as an i ndispensable instru-
JOOnt in arriving at a coherent account ot things. He uses it in 
"the grand style."lO 
28. It should be noted, however, that the antithesis between 
Socrates 8nd the Sophists takes place in the Platonic dialogues. 
It is in reality the literary form through which Plato constructe 
his philosophical system against the baclcground of contemporary 
doctrines and opinions. But even. o.t that, the clash is not a 
phUosophieal Armageddon. 
29. EPW, eect. 81. "Among the ancients Plato is termed the 
inventor of dialectieJ and his right to the name rests on the 
.fact, that the Platonic philosophy" :f.'irst gave the free scientific, 
and thtia at the same time the objective, form to dialectic. 
( all .ce,. LOH; 149.) . 
,30. In EP\'11 sect. 81, Hegel observes that Plato "elllploya 
the dialectical method to show the f'ini tude of all hard and fast 
terms o£ Understarding. · 'lhue 1n the Parmeni®s he deduces the tnanT 
from the one, and showe nevertheless that the tnal\V cannot but define 
itself as the one. In this grand otyle tU.d Plato treat dialectic." 
He refers to the Panaenides as "woh1 das gr8ute Kunstwerk der 
al ten Dialektik." FG, Vorrede, ~1. 
It ·is the }lrocess 'Whereby kno · Q.edge of the Ideas 
is. · achieved ard aey means which would lead to this end would be, 
or -:->la to, of ines'toima.ble worth. Uebenleg has this t e say on 
ato's use o£ the dialectic.t 
nte nethode der Erl..""emitniss der ldeen 
.ist die Dialektik1 die den Doppelweg der 
Erhe'bung ~um All.gemeinen und des .Rllckgangs 
vom !ll.gemeinen z-wn Desonderen in sioh 
beg:reitt,. Die bildliche (my'thisehe) Darstellung 
ist eine Vorstute . del' ,01alektik und insotern, 
als die ldssenschattliehe ~kenntniss . 
unetticht bleibt, ihr Surrogat zugleioh 
aber ein notbwendiger Bestandtbeil des 
poeti.sch- philosophischen und des re-
ligiSsen Oharakters dar platonischen . 
nta.loge •. ll · 
(v) Aristotle 
Since di.aleetie 1s an actiVity of thought, i t is 
not surprising that we find euitable reference made to it in 
t he logic ot bietotle (381J-.)22 B.c.). The e!senee ot his argu-
ment is as to.llowa t Science, said he, so f ar as proof" is eoll-f 
cerned1. has its limitations. More specillealJ.y, the Ul.ti te 
grounds· o£ proof cannot be proved. :r:.r, therefore, science is 
to Mtill its function o:r explaining the particular by means 
of the general1 1 t must move trom particular to general but the 
latter is just the realm in which proo£ eannot be deduced. · 
Startin~ points Jtllst, therefore$ be sta.bli:shed tor any proeess 
.of deduction or proving. These must be held as the highest 
prinCiples ot explarlation. The activity ot thought much 1s 
31~ ~g, GP, 185 • . 
mandatory tor this process Aristotle d~signates as dialeotic.32 
I n his proach to the dialectic, he apparently distinguishes 
bet en that type of r eason reached syllogistically f'rom . neral-
ly accepted opinions, an reasoning, on the other hand; based 
upon true and primary premises. Dialectical reasonin£! 1. he a,.... 
serts, ·is t he pat h to t he principles. of all true inquiry. 
(vi) Itant 
Obviously neither an expoei tion of t he Kantian phi-
losophy nor its relationshi J to Hegel's system of t hought can be 
encompasaed rd.t hin t his present study. At the same time, how-
ever, some reference should be made to Kant • s t hought on the dia-
lee tic. 
No matter to 'Yihat extent the ancients employed 
t he tem "dialecticn,. he says, 1 t never amounted t o more than "a 
logic of Ulusion." It merely gave t o intentional sophistries 
t he appearance ot truth. Indeed, it is argued, general logic if 
v.lewed in terms or. an instrument is always a logic of Uluaion, 
that is, dialect ical.3J Logic gives us nothing conoerni the 
content of knowledge . It offers the formal conditions of agreeroont 
· th the understa.nc:U.ng only. Dialectic as used in the Kr i tik der 
reinen vernunn, the:retore, is but "a cri tique of dialectical 
32. Bei dem Vielen Beachreiben und Verstindigen, das 
Aristoteles naeh seiner \'~ise wesentlich beibringt1 iat bei ibm 
immer ~s Herrschende der apekulative Begri.tf . E · , sect. 187 • 
.).). "Die all@!DJeine togik nun, als vermeintes <rganon, 
heisst Dialeictik. " !r.V, Part II, Div. III, B 85. "Um deewil.lcn 
hat man die·se Bemung der Dialektik lieber, a.ls eine- Kritik des 
dialektischen Scheins, der togik beigeaBhl.t." K:- .V, Part II, Div. 
III, B 66. 
i1lusion. 34 
n sp1 te of Kant's apparent lack of enthusi 
for th principle of t he din.lectJ.c as historically used, hi s 
critical · philosophy calls :for some such inst.Tument. Hegel him-
self o served that "in modern times it was~ more t han tiny othel", 
K'..ant o resuscitated the name of Dialectic, and r estored it to 
its post or honor . He did it by rking out the antinomies of 
the reason. ,,35 '!he true dialectic is perhaps beat illustrated, 
there.rore, as egel suegests, in his use or the antinomies. '!hey 
were without doubt very real ini"luencas in Kant ' s thinld.n .• He 
often proc~aims that t he appearanoe of the coni'lict of reason 
..;. thin itself in the field of metaphysics was a continu.al source 
of onder and stimulus to him. It is unquestionably true that . 
He , 1 r.orked on the mental forms outlined by Kant, altbou h as 
we shall eee in the following section the contradictions 'Yfi. thin 
reason which lfere a stumbling block to Kant, were , tar egel, 
stnpping stones in ilie upvard climb of the diaJ.ectic . 
6. The Hegelian Use of the Dialectic 
It was Hegel's constant claim that everything ithin the 
field of phlloaophy ich had eurvival value v:ae conserved ''lith-
in his own syst-em. In all probabil1 ty he was sincere in reg3rding 
himself a:J the preserver. of all that was valid and virtuous in 
34. Kr.v~ Pt.· rr~ Div. II:t, n • 
35. LOH ( tr. ,,allace) 1 lL9:. ~ r Hegel• s criticisn of the 
l'Olnt1an phUoso,phy see, • 'lbe Critical PhUosophytt, • , oocts . 4o.-60. 
The essenoe.'.or: th · criticism is the absence of process in Kant. 
. . 
S2 
the writings of the past. ne ras no Allee-zermaJ..mender • .36 In 
the ready mrds o£ Baillie a 
ne sa , as no rh!.losopher since Aristotle had 
eeen, the necessity for .establiShing hi own 
phUosophica.l position, not by the refutation of 
the philosophical theories ot the past, but by 
incorporating t.ltem within his own system. He 
sought t o &> so by giving lo ical continuity to 
. at in appearance was roore his·!;orical sequence• 
ar.d b~ s."'tol'ling that his o11n distinctive principle 
o thesis was at o ce the presupposition, t le 
outeoroo, and the gQmpletion of the theories of . 
his predecessors. J·r · · 
StUl another interpreter of Hegel notes his debt to his 
predecessor.s: 
1ftle greatness of Hegel largely appears 
in the continually vivid pl"esence to his mind 
of all predecessors. He contrives so et£ectively 
to diminish the merely casual element in histori-
cal perspective that it is the very great thinkers 
o:t the past, relatively irrespective or their 
date, who prgnde, the best introduction to his 
phUoso.Jil.y .J 
And again, ·ttho conceived his own phUosop~ as the inheritor 
o past philosophic a worthy of t he name 1 a.nd took pains t o die-
play them as stages of a develop nt culminating in his olftl 
Idealian. u39 originality 1 1 t has been sa1.d1 consists .first. in 
a sorbin~ the thougpts of ot.hers. Hegel m. indeed orig_nal in 
this sense to eay nothine or the way in i ch he transcended thi 
type or or1ginaJ.j:ty. To cntalof.:,rue hir.l as 11cratty borrOTtertt40 
36. A description ot the Kantian pr ocedure . Hegel, on the 
other hand, was an Alles• Aufhebender . 
)7 • PQ,_ Translator 1 B !ntrod. 1 12 • 
.38. tare, rm, sa. , 
39. , !ore, ITH, Preface, x . 
40. Stirling' s too hascy disposal of Hegel . 
S3 
ie to speak auperfi.oial.ly1 if not falsely • . 
10 mighty strea.'ils of Idealism ,poured their content s into 
the "!egelian reservcil"', t he latonic Aristot~lian and the Kantian .. 
This does not moan that H gel was a passive receptacle for either·. 
He does, however~ feel his kinship to Pleto. 41 Perhaps ~ant T/88 
too close in time and countr.r, even apart from his bif'urc:ati-on 
of reality, :tor ~-~ogal to sing hin praise.s.. B:ir all the eVidence 
available, it would seE:lm t hat Hegel felt he had mastered the 
constructive contributions o.f both and then set <r11t to transcend 
them. 42 In a sense the transcendence took the form of a har.noni-
zation ot the t o. To designate. Hegel aa ~ta revoll.ttionary w.ttb 
his eyes fixed on the pastt•, 43 may be nei tber UlW'llina.ting nor 
true, but that he drank deeply at the fountain head of historie 
msdom is everywhere apparent in his ·m:-1 tinga. 1e shall briefly 
refer to his deb'b to Plato and Arietotle since in method and con-
tent he o ed wch to them. His acqu.aintance Wi tb the mi. tinge 
o£ Aristotle may be gathered t.rom the following remark., 
n ~ 
· Die BUcher des ArUtoteles uber die &:Jele 
mit aeinen Abhandlungen 1S.ber · 'beson.tlere Sei ten 
und Zustllnde derselben S·Uld deswegen noeh 
immer das -von-liglichste oder ein:tige .erk von 
speku.lativem Interesse ~bar diesen· Oegensta.nd. 
Der sentJ.iche Z1!1'eek einer fhilosoph1e des 
GeisW$· kann nur der sein,. den Begritf in die 
Erkenntnis c!es Oeistea 'Wieder einzutllhren·, 
damit auch den Sinn jener arietotelischen 
;Mi I . p lit?i 
4l.. !n the ~face to the second edition. or his .JJ;it-
ten a f.etr -weeks .before his .death, Hc::;el refers sy:mpathe c · to 
Plato as his tore~nner • . On the other hand, hcme_.ver.l he closes 
EPW with a passatte from Aristotle's Meta~idk XI!., I• 
42. • Hegel fs significance in ttm m.= of'Y of philoso~ con-
siats in the fact that he mastered the Oroe p~:Uosoph.v and did not 
at the sa'Ge t ime recede f.rom the 'Kantian.n Harris, art., (1881); 249-. 
4,3. 1!\lre1 ITH, Preface, s .. 
S4 
Bficher Wieder a\lf'zuschlietssen.l44 
It is also ~stiona.bly true that Regel .1\tlly accepted 
the Aristotelian principle of development and Aristotle's em-
phasis on pure to:rm as the complete realization of all potenti• 
atitq would most certa:i.nly strike a responsive Hegelian chord. 
BaUlie boldly states that the discussion o£ sense-certainty in 
the Fblnomenolofe:t:t is$ "almost a :tre.sh restatement of analy~is 
' ' 
and criticism of the nature ot«IIT{)7tri5 in Plato and Aristotle"45 
and as for the conception of Absolute kno.l"1ledge; it is 0a re-
production of Aristotle's interpretation of p'Ul'e thought. tt-46 
!lUre points aut that in the later dial.Qgues he began to make use 
of the Forms aa a s:Jrt o'£ synthesis of OPPOsites. Some of the 
Forms; for example, one and !fJ.fJY, · hole and Parts, cannot be af ... 
firmed ir mutually exclu::~ive o£ eaoh other. J. . 'OOng the Forms 
which are not mu.tu.ally exclusive are Being and Not-being., and it 
may well have been 1ato' s conception of this pnrticular pair of 
opposites v.rhich m.o6t impressed Hegel in his formulation of the 
l ogical categories.h7 
!~gel made the die.leetie48 the roothod of his philos.ophy ap-
plying it in his formulation of t he categories -of logic, selecting 
Lh. F.P1 1 ee"ct. 378 . Hegel also closes EPH {RlUoso~b;y of 
W.n:l) with a quotation fro · Ari$totlets Metaphzsic~ fi, • 
- k5. PG, (tr.,. Baillie.), Transllltor•s tntio., . - Purpua1 
DSGH, brings out the same relationship. 
46. ro (tr. Baillie), 49. C£ Aristotle, 1!£taphysies, 1074b, 
2~1075a., 10. . • 
h7. tture, rm. 117. 
48. For an evaluation ot the dialectic~ see ibid., 2.3/.ff-
it as an indispensable tool :i,n t he shaping of human experience, 
am holdi n..., tha.t it aLone l ai d are thG secrets of r eality. c 
stu~ nt mo m.shes to have a thorough gra of tl e ' 9 egelian -'hi· 
loso hy t'lllG t ma ter t · a idea o.f the dialectic . It ls Hegel t s 
bunch o keys . Droadly spea_d.n.e~ it represents t e developnt:;nt 
of thou t £rom the a stract to the concrE:te . It l o involved i n 
the mental proce s of passing f1'o. the part to the hole , and 
: ·. ~ . : . 
fro, t he incoherent to t he co1~rent . The principle t ork in he 
dialectic is t .e .. rinciple or gr<mth, of develop:nent .. ;;hen :.er,el 
refers to concepts as dialectically r elated he means t' at they 
beco.. ore and more mani ngi\ll as they advance fro t e lo ter 
to t! h_ghcr by ans of an in.'herent proce ... s of logical opo-
position and unison. In short, a general statement of the dia-
lectic t.dght be that of an account of t he mind' s search for eom-
plc:teness and coherence. 
i . The Tr1.adic Fo:m. of the Dial ctic 
Hegel u s t· dialectic in a specific_, technical sense 
to describe the negative oovement of thought .f'rom thesis to anti-
thesis, and then e. ploys the term "speculationn to designate the 
concrete thought of the synthesis. He states the procees as fol-
lows: "Das Logische hat der Form naeh drei SaitenJ (a ) die 
abetrakte oder ver$tindige; (b) die dia.lektisehe oder negati-v-
" n 
1 
t.n verniinttige; {c) die spekulative oder positiv ... vermlnfti ,.e . n,..,. 
In no oonse~ hOlllever, shm:ild those stages be looked upon as t.llree 
49. E ~; sect. 79. 
56 
separate parts or loeic. They are but aspects, or moments in 
every logical proposition. As already indicated, it is in the 
second stage, or the dialectic, t.hat tlnite entities supersede 
or transcend themselves a.nd pass over into their opposi tea. In 
t his dynamic dialectic process, Hegel discovers the impetus be-
hind all scientific progress, as well as its one unifying 
principle .SO El.aellhere his thought on the dialectic is expressed 
as .followas 
Der Begritt der wahrhatten Dialektik 1st, 
dass sie die 110th11'8ftdige Bewegung del- reinen 
Begrif.t'e auheigt, nicbt als ob sie dieaelben 
dadurch in Nichts aufl.8ete, eondern eben das 
Resultat ist, dass sie diese Be'wegung sind und 
(das Reeultat ein:f'ach ausgedrllckt) das Allgemeine 
eben die Einheit aolehem entgegensetzten Begriffe.5l 
It seems clear trom the above, theretore 1 that in 
Hegelian usage the thesis implies the ant:Lthesie1 whUe both are 
raised to a unity Which at the time preserves their distinctions 
in the synthesis. But obviously the process does not end there. 
This eyntheais again constitutes a particular, a new thesis, llhich 
implies its antithesis and eo on until the ultimate truth is 
reached in what Hegel calls Absolute Mind. VcTaneart, one of 
the well-known interpreters ot the dialectic has this to say.a 
It is only 'When the contradictions are 
perceived. 'When they are recognized as in-
compatible in theii" un:reconciled tort!l, lfith 
truth, and 11hen the synthesis which can recon-
eUe them has been discovered~ that the dia-
lectic proceea is before us.5 
50. EPW, eect. 61. 
Sl. VGP · ( ed. Gl.oclmer}, 222. 
52. McTaggart, g.m, 6. 
The really fundaoental thing, he thinks, is "not the 
' 
tendency of the finite category to negate i tself,' but· to complete· 
1 tself:e tt53 Vure singles out the f3Yttthesis of oppoSites as the 
most prominent 'principle ot t he dialectic..54 McTaggart further-. 
more identifies the first and deepest cause of the dialectic 
movement as, ttthe instability of all finite categories due to 
their imperfect nature. 1he immediate result of this instability 
is the production of contradictions. "55 He l .ists two poei tive 
advantages ot t he dialectica (l) its systematic uncovering ot 
. the frame110.l"k or our t hought wit h the tracing of the categories 
throu h their many levels and interconnectionsJ (2) in demon• 
strating that the. analysis of the simplest act of knowledge car• 
ries us to the acceptance of t he Absolute !dea • .56 Popper sinp.,les 
out three prominent elements in the dialecticr (l) the op-
poeition contained therein against Kant • s anti-Rationalism, 
(2) the incorporation of t he dialectic into logic, ()) its ap-
plication on a world wide sca1e.57 
11. The Application of the Dialectic 
It is instructive to note the application of the dia-
lectic in the search tor truth. 1'be :subsequent material is 
selected f'rom the first part of Hegel•e great triology-the 
Logic. It must be eJiliilasized that a firm #asp of the pivotal 
53. JlcTaggart, SliD,; 10. 
54. Yure, X'fH, 115. 
55. McTaggart, SflD, 4. 
!)6. McTaggart, SHD, Ll4. 
S7. PopPer, art .• (1940), 420. 
importance ot the logical categories i .s nacessary. if one is to 
master Hegelian •taphysics- The developnent is al.ways from 
abstract (unrelated) to concl"ete (:related). 1iBeing and Nothing", 
we are as~d, "are most abstract., a.M therefore the moet 
elel¥lntal-y forms ot opposition. n$'8 
Having established thie pr1ol"-and poorer-categoey 
of Being, the problem beconea that of determining the others from 
this initial category. How at-e they dedueedt59 The di alectic 
itself suppl:tes the answer. 1he logical connection-s are already 
present, the task is that of their discovery. 
One essential ot all rational 'belief': is that the con-
sequent must, in some sense, be contained within the antecedent; 
since the conclusion is potential,ly present within the prem1eeet. 
I£ Y is to be deduced boom x. then I must contain Y at least 
potent1all.y. In other words, thought proce$ds from Being as a 
baeeline. However, upon examination, says Hegel; it is quite 
apparent that Being gives us mere immediacy only (that which ia 
common to all entities) and, according to de£in1t1on1 does .not 
p.ive us d1f.terences and determinations. But eince there ~, in 
tact, many ditferenee8, the problem is, ho are they deduced trom 
Being? 
58. Brlete. 76. 
S9. '!ie dialectic suggests that we dQ not deduce the oate. 
gories, but rather they deduce thelnselves.- By deduction Hegel mea.na 
showing how the parts are related to the lilole. In the antithesis, 
tor example, the principle ot oppo,.ition is not brought in from out-
aide but is contained within the thesis. 'nlus, Nothing is implicitly 
present in Being. 'll'le hUman reason merely dieoovers this and is 
the only sense in which deduction may be u•d• 
The solution to this problem eives us one of t.he most 
original applications of ~e dialectic method in al.l Hegelian 
thought. He discovers the revolutionary principle that all 
diffeJ;"entiae are not excluded from a universal., that a given 
concept may, am o.tten does, contain its own opposite within 1t-
aelf.6o Furthermore. it is a simple matter for this opposite to 
be deduced from 1 t. As a specific Ulustration of how the 
principle works, a shall consider the first triad ot his Logic-
Being, Nothing, Becaning. 
Here the positive is Being, the negative, ~thing. ow 
this negative, or "principle of negatiVity" as Regel calls i t, 
is never derived from some exteJ"nal, source. It is a matter of 
internal relations. It is always potential.ly within the positive. 
To put it another way, t he positive gives birth to the negative. 
Perhaps t his is why Hegel held that the categories produced 
themeelves, and are not produced by the thinker. Pure. being is 
literally nothing-a part left out llhen you think Sein at first. 
-
Two categories now confront each other. How is a 
reconoUiation a.tfected? .'hen, argues Hegel, a thing is in 
process of becoming this principle of negatiVity is at work. 
Becaning,. is, therefore, t he key to the oontl.iet. It resolves 
t he apparent eontraf,iiction, but morel It not only resolves the 
clash, it also contains their underlying harmony and unity within 
60. P.l.ato calls attention to the importance of thia 
principle in The ·armenides and The So@iet. Ct. Spinozats 
omnis determ.ina'tlo est negatio·. 
sr ' 
itaelt. Logically etated, the category or Beeor:d.ng is a not-
beine which is bei ng1 and a being ich is not-being. I n a word1 
it holds in synthesis bot h t he positive and t he negative;e 
No soonert ho ver, 1as the synthesis been reached 
than t he. process starts all over agaitt. 'l'hus the sntire cate-
gorical contingent moves forward to occupy some new outpost of 
truth, under the steady pressure of t he dialectic. Little uonder 
that Hegel reac}'}ed so much truth in so little time. Thought pur-
sued with such . a method becomes o.ne continuous "voyaee of dis-
cowry.tt6l 
From among tba many evaluations of the di oleoti.c method, 
many of which are quite .tree:cy offered, by a com tent scholar, 
one may be mentioned as containing both brevity and balance 1 
It !IJilSt be allowed that the Hegelian 
principle or t he i dentity o£ opposites is one 
of the most striking piece of speculative 
audacity i n t he history of thought. But this 
audacity is justified and was necessar.r if ~1-
loaophy was ever to solve ita ancient problema ••• 
_ 't'!1.ie principle of Hegel's 'WaS not, as is usually 
· Supposed, anything absolutely new. Apart trom 
explicit anticipations ot it in eaz•lie:r ·writers, 
it is in reality implied in ell p~vious phi• 
losopby. All that is nErW i n Hegel is that he 
was the first person explicitly to state ruxi 
formulate it as a ·logioal principle, · Hegel •a 
audacity and originality eonsiet simply in this, 
that he cxplnined and showed in detaU how it 
is logically possible for two opposi tea to be 
identical lthUe yet retainirle their opposition. 62 
61., Hegel's description of ro. 
62. ace, POtt, 941 951 96. 
7. The Ueta.physics of Hegel 
By metaphysics ls moant the persistent endeavor to give a 
coherently adequate account of the nature of Realit y. In Hegelian 
thought reality and .rational.:\.'t\1' are indissolubly joined. Reality 
is reached by means o£ a se:ries ot logical categories. . Indeed, 
He~l awears not to have dra'flt'l any hard and fast distinction 
between logic and metaphysics., it we accept the view presented 
in the Lofi!c• "Die Logik f'hlt daher mit der Metaphyeik zusmranen. 
der ~s.aenschatt der Dinge in Gedanken getaeat, 1telehe dltur 
gal:ten, die 7-.eeenheiten der D'i.nge· auezudrllcken."63 '!bus, il'l his 
eyatem, matter and tom are so close~ connected that epistemolog;r 
and metaphysics can be separated only' for purposes of diccussion 
and analysis. Hegel gives a dialectical account o! the universe, 
a universe ceaselesely !n purposive proce$8,; with struggle aa a 
prime mover . Furthermore, the real is existent. He takes "a 
' 
d:i.alectic of existence. as equivalent to a dialectic of reality. n64 
1. 111e Interrelation of llbrm and Content. 
lllueion_ hae already between made to the .fact that in 
Hegel form and eontent are inseparable. lio'W$Ver, interpre~rs 
of hi philosophy are not al:ways in agreement on this point. On 
the one hand, there aro those who Sl"e persuaded the essential 
contribution made by him is in hi'8 expoSition and use o£ the dia-
lectic. Accordingly, the tJeQ:ret lilUSt be found 1n his method. 
6,3. E ·, sect. 24. 
64. cTaagan,, cnt, 7• 
On the other to.and, t.l-t re are those ·tho believe hi 
greatness lies in his taphysical system, his searcr..ing analysis 
of I ali ith its disclosure of the naturo of realitr.r. It can 
scar el.v be r .tuted that the metaphysical emphas · s was prominent 
in fi3gel' s own mind since his entire logical system contains its 
content.. Iowever, Hegel never t hinks it is necessary to eeparate 
the one from t he o·t;her . 'l\1e result of · s phUooophy cannot 
separated fro the method whicll helped produce it. His warning 
about placing undue emphas:iliS on the reeult by itsel ahould not 
o unheeded. In speakin ot unrealized purpose 1 he declares: 
~nn die Saehe ist nicht in ihrem A ck 
erachoptt, sol'rlern in i.hrer Austuhrung, noeh 
ist das Reaultat das w.i.rkliohe aanze, sondern 
ea zuaaumen mit seinem rerdenJ der Zweck t8r 
sich :Lst das unl.ebcnd1ge Al.lgemeine1 wie die 
Tendenz daa blosse Treiben, da.s seiner Viirk-
liehkeit noch entbebrt; und das nacl-.."te Reaultat 
i .at der tgi.chna.m, der die Tendenz hinter Sieh 
gelaa.sen. > 
ii. Hegel ts r'hilosophical Taek 
As in the study of any creative thinlrer, the question 
which one must ask is,_ what was his fundamental problem? Broad-
ly spea?~g !or Regel it was the search £or the underlying 
principle of unity behind t he real:!ua ot na.ture and rnind. How 
are these realms to be reconciled? He proceeds to sho that the 
one is but the truth of the other and the principle by which this 
is dono is the principle of Reason. Reason, tor Hegel, is, there-
tore~ the imm.'lnent principle o£ the. world. 
6S . ro, vorrede1 11. 
But ho did he arrive at sach a conclusion? Others be-
fore him had Dought acme principle of unity v1hich might give sense 
to sensa tioriS and meaning to the manifold. Hegel discovered the 
unifying principle in self- consciousnoss and the self-de·temining 
nature .of m;:m . ' Self-consciousness gave unity to the multitudinous. 
t the key to ~lf-consciousncss is dii'.ferenee..discoverable by 
means of t he dialeet:l;p. Self .. eonseiousness, or what may re 
accurately be termed persor..a.li t.y is a 'luni tas .rmil tiplex!, 66 an 
organic lole.,. n unity in · hich all opposition between the person 
and nature is overcome. To state the problem another way, · Hegel 
solved the perennial problem of the dualism o£ mind and matter, 
spirit and nature, i"reedom a.r¥1 necessity_, the individual a.'1d 
society, the finite and th inf'inito, etc •• through a synthesis 
1'1hich resolved all appa.ren.t disparates. Thua t here is no poeitive 
i thout its negatiVI , nd no antithesis Vlithout a.n advance being 
made to hieher synt!tesis. The meta}XlyoicaJ. system ot Hegel, 
t herefore 1 reqaires tie dialectic as its epistemological key. 
iii. The tla.tu:re. of t r.a Real 
Five fundamental principles may be cited as oonsti tu .. 
tive of Reality aecording to gel . 'Ihese principles form the 
framework of his entire system so that his p..lJ.ilosophy is in one 
sense, but their dialectical expression. Briefly stated,. they 
are as follows: 
66. "Eir.hcitlichl«Jit und Einfaehkeit sind nicht identischJ 
das wahrhaft ·. istierende ist eine unitas tmlltiplex. Die Person 
ist ain solches !Xisterendes." (William stern, ros, 162.) 
(1) Dialectic 
Voven throu~h the entire ra ric of hv~ experience 
on all levels is the d:i.aleetic pattern. The dialectic is no a 
-
£r1ori parent.,.esis inserted m thin the ambit of human experience 
to give •t pith and purpose.. E)tperienoe is dialectic to its very 
core . ,.~reover, w.1at i s true of individual hum n experience is 
true aJ.so of sociAl institutions. they, too, dr~.matize the dia-
l ectic. And when one takes n histori cal perspec::tive Tfu, t. he.; . 
in essence, sees is t e broad movement of t 10 dialectic carrying 
out its manifest destiny ~ Open aey wind on the world one may 
care to, and there thin plain v.·ien is the ascending spiral ot 
t e dialectic . To sec ciearly1 there.fore, that t • e dialectic is 
not somethini, superimposed upon ll£e by a priori lo ic but in-
herent 'Within it, i s to take t he first step in Hegelianism.. 'I'; 
reali ze, finally, that it constitutes t he highroad to Reality 
is to join the compaey of one who haa "pe~trated arther into 
t .. e tl"t4--e nature of reality than any philo::otfl,er be£ore or after 
hie. n67 (Hegel. ) 
( i.i) Empirical 
The empirical as envisaged by He 1 ant an 1n-
elusive view of consciousness !'rom its lc:meet mani:festation t o 
ito _ighest tor!':l of eXpression. His was no narrow empiricisn. 
~eeul tiv t .. inkin~, mich incidenta.Uy, Hep;el holds to be the 
-cype o£ tl'l..in..ldng proper to phUosophy, is related to t he other 
~---------------------
sciences. The empirical basis . t philosophy is made clear by 
t he fol lowing 1 
D1ls Verhfu. tni ... der spckul"'t.iven -:. · ssenschaft 
zu den anderen Eiseenscha£ten 1st inso.tern nur 
dteses, dass jene den empirischen Inhal t der 
J.etzteren nicht eta. aut der Seite 1Ksat1 sondern 
ihn anerlronnt und ecbraucht# dass sie ebenso das 
Allgemeine dieser issenseh(U•'•tcm1 die Geoetze, 
die Gattungen u . s . £. anerkennt und ~' threm 
eigenen I nhal.te verwendet, daes sie aber aueh 
erner in diesf; · e.tegorien andere eintl.ihrt und 
eel tend macht. o8 
Again, he states elsewhere that "das renloon dem 
Inhalte nach i nso.fern nur wahrhaf't ist, aJ.s es in die che 
vertieft ist. u69 The PhJ!nomcnoloee is, in ef'fect, a description 
of human experience !lfhiCh most assure y sinks into the facts of 
that experience. After notinoo the empiric 1 f'oun tion of ! gel*s 
t hougnt, cVannel says1 
In the history ot philosophy, 1 t auld be 
difficult to find a more pr11ctical a?ld eober-
minded philosopher than Regel; and it is this 
t.~t gives to lrl.s system 1 ts greate t recom-
mendation.70 
(iii) Organic 
'!hat "das ahre ist das Ganze"n is tm keystone 
to the Hegel ian arch has long been recogni.zed by all Yegel1.an 
scholars no matter how divergent their vimra on other ~tters. 
Truth can only be reached, 1 t is claimed, . en all the reports 
are in. The wider the circle of ~ledge becomes, the greater 
68. E 1 sect. 9. 69. E ., sect . 23. 
10 . ~Vannel, H!Yii':. 14. 
71. PO, .orrede, 21. 
beco~s . the probabili't:lf of -truth, provided, or- course, aU in-
coming information is patiently am i.m_p;n'tially V{Cighed. ThiS 
approach constitutes our only salvation from segments~ To be 
the circle must continue: 
\:bre ... egel t,o giV(;; up otich an ul t·i.'721l.te 
conclusion and contempJ.at1on f;rom the point of 
view of the vrho1e1 his ph:Uosophy :rouJ.d . sil1k 
to a mere pasSing glimpse of a neeting epoch 
ot ti."ile and offer on:ty an in::~ta.nta.neou.-9 photo-
graph o! reality • 72 
Adeqeey and coherenc-e characteriZe the true. But 
adequaey doe.s not imply finality. No process is fued and final, 
and those mo have seen in Hegel•·s pl'~:.t~os~phy little other than 
a "block universe" have apparently failed t o appreciate the idea 
of development s.o resplendent theta. Indeed, human experience 
often outgrows our neatly eonstructed systems. But be that as 
it may, wholeness and Hegelia.ni are forevel" linked., His ~ 
pha&is on the whele .is the only tmS\'Iel" to- the :f.':ra~Jmentarinese at 
our time. 
The e$senee of' philosophy, therefore, is that one 
fact it:lplies another and as is in some way related to it. I£ tb.e 
human mind sel~ets any part of experienee, seeking to discover 
what is implied therein including the contrasting vie'\T which is 
part a."ld parcel ot it according to Hegel, it 'Will be driven in-
e~orably to include mo:re and more 'Within its pu:"View. The procesa 
continues ~tU all known :f'acts are embraced and there are no 
further contradictions and partialities. 
(iv) Oonerete 
Hegel uaes the term eonerete in eontr&st ' th the 
abs~act. In popular parlance one often hears the abstract re-
ferred to as that whioh is hard to understand or mat cannot be 
perceived by the e.enses. !n its philosophical usage 1 1 t some-
times eans the latter but more often (under Hegel ' s inf1· enee) 
it means separated fro.-11 its context in reality,. as a hand apar·t 
from the 'body". The abst.l:'act is thus without qual,. ties or re-o 
lationslu.pe.. 'lbe supreme illustration, asserts Hegel, is that 
The eoncrete as noted above is n antonym or 
abstract. In ito philosophical application the concrete is 
preaent when one graspe the elements indissolubl together in. a.n 
organic unity. It sign:U'ies rel t1oneh1ps. A tnhilber, for ex-
ample,_ is understood eo~tel.y when seen in relation ip to t he 
l'lhol.e system of J!J8.thematical. truth. 
Hegel continuallY utses abstract almst a ... a tena 
of ~proaeh and consistently declares the conerete alone is true. 
'The concrete, moreover, contains an inner source of development. 
~ J.'reie und wahl'hitte danke i~t in 
sich konkret ••• weil das. Wahre ala konkret nur 
als Sich in sieh entf'al tend und in Einhei t 
~::sa."'nnehmend und hal:tend, d.i. ale Total.itlt 
i.st •. 
The entire Hegelian philosophy is at I$lY be 
termed concrete approach to r..c".litw,. Leg 1 was ever nn inde-
fatigab]..e . defender G the concrete .• 74 Just s · tre Be 
ivan as the most apr·ropriate exampl, of t' e abstract, "' Spiri,t 
is designated as an illustration of t he con<-.rete. ndeed he 
sinp:les pirit out as "das abeolut Konkreteste., n·75 The figures 
1807 taken separately and apart £rom all events or t'hinc;s are., 
:in the Hegelian sense, abstract. To preface the letters A. D., 
however, would represent a higher degree of conoreteness and lese 
abstractness since a sped. fie year of the Christian era is. being 
referred to. The date recor.oos even more concrete if . we add that 
durinr, that year Georg ~iilhelm Friedrich Hegel published E!2, 
,, 
Blanomenolof?;e des aeistee. 
(v) Absolute 
All cornmenta tors on He eel are agreed that his phi-
losophy culn.inates in hat. he terms "the bsolute. n76 In view 
of all the information t at his interpreters have given of 1 t, 
74. u.acKenzie, art •. (1902), 62. "It was his (fiegel •s 1 am 
to asp tl'l..e concrete 1 to e the v10rld o£ individual acts ae 
holding in solution t he universal prineil)les by _ch they are 
to he interpreted.n 
15. EP\Y1 sect. 164. 
76. The word "Absolute" in t~rms not too different from its 
modern usage, is at least as old as 'Nicolaus Cusanus {140~-1464) 
who defined as th "Absolut.,r, o!'l!Ili'"..lm zui dit.as1 1e UJ1Ulll b-
solutum, th \t-:15 absoluta, oraossibilitas a'bso!uta- or valor ab-
soiutua.·ft- ( pof. 4?J6.) Its deeper tnetaPhiaieal significance, how-
ever, stems from more modern times. · For Kant, the ''Unconditioneda 
is t he ~ta •. 1ysical conC3ption of de1 ty1 so also for Fichte llho 
freq-J.ently uses the adjective "absolute." SChelling is credited 
w.ttb introdu.cin!S it into .fjhc fiel d ot phUosoph7 . It entered British 
philoeonhy throu~h Coleridge ~nd other devotees ot rman philoso-
phy. See also art. on "Absolute"t DP, 2. It might be added that the 
tAn'in Idee is a more common exprees1.on than Da..s .Absolute and is a 
.vn<>!\VIIl· . 
,-
it is 11 to listen to what Regel has to ay. 
. ,, . . . s Absolute iat der ~ist: dies ist die 
hacllstG D::finition des bsoluten-Iliese finition 
.u fiOO.en und ihren Sinn und Inhal t zu · egreif'en, 
die:s, ka i'll3n sagen,. war die abHolute 'l'endenz 
a.J.ler r ildun?. und Philosophie; auf die sen Ptmkt 
hat ~ich alle Religion und t.issenschatt gedrH:ngt: 
aus diesem I.rang alle1n ist die ·. ~ltgeschie-ltte 
zu 'bogreite •• 77 
According to · is authentic statement trom Hegel 
himself, tt may inl.'er that ·t.ha whole ain and purpose of ph:UosoJi1y 
is to describe the hole, the Absolute, or what Tte would commonly 
re:f'er to as God. 78 The Absolute can be interpreted only in terms 
ox mini, for mind is the highest expression of the reality with 
wrich have any acquaintance. Beyond t he Absolute w cannot 
eot since beyond the mind TJe cannot go. r"Ut the essence of mind 
is reason.. Hence. the Absolute iD reached through Reason. Hegel' e 
whole structure of thou.ght is, in a far deeper sense than maJ'\V 
r ealiZe, actual inf'ormation about tile Abso~ute. That the phi-
losophy of t he Absolute has engaged the lilind of men n d:l..tferent 
... 
centuries and under vru.7ing circumstances i doubtless true . 
According to one m ter, the trail of the Absolut.e may be found. 
under lnAl'JY guises and in the writin~s of n1 ey diveraent 
phUoso 1erth 
Thought when it asked why an apple £ell 
sou ht the Aheolute and found it-at leaet so 
.,ar as o\:.ter ttor :ls concerned. Thoueht• 
"When, i n Socrates, it interrogated many 
11 . zp~;, sect. .334. 
78. ttDass Got·'· die t~.ahrheit und er alle1n die Wabrheit 
ist . 11 • p::, sect. 1 . 
particul.a:r virtues £or the one univeroc,aJ. virtue, 
sought the Absol ut e . 1'hO:ught tn Hume when it 
asked the reaoon of our aserlpti on o£ effects to 
causes, sought t he Absolute, and,. if he did not 
find it, put others on the ·nxJ t.o fin it.,. W.~at 
since the beginning of t ..;.me., ~~hat in .any corner 
of tte earth has r ~.ilOs<;)phyl. h-:1s thinking el,.er 
considered bUt the Absclute?'f9 
The Absol ute or th~ ·.~bole is• in brief' • the o'b.o 
jeet of Hegel 's entire phUosophy, and represents 1•eali ty "rrl. thout 
qualification• All phUosophies are 1n one way or other con• 
cer ned Wit..l! this .same object in that no matter at they ma.v or 
may not "l.Chie~ they are al:we:ys concerned with what is ultimate . 
But Hegel made -the Bee;i;i! the language of the Absolute> the form 
With l'Jhich r eason \?or' as the medium through -which the Absolute 
19. stirling, SOH, I, ll~l40 • 
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CHAPTER In 
'l'FIE LOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CATEGORY 
OF INDIVIDUALITY ~i'l'HIN HEGELIA THOUGHT 
1. The Category of Individuality as a etru.ctural whole 
'!he critical examination of the subject of individuality 
within Hegel• s phUoaopby might •ll be approa¢hed under the more 
comprehensive r ange of the fundamental principles presupposed by 
all experience, namely, in terms of categories. Within Hegelian 
thought, while mch attention is devoted to the structural ar-
rangement of organization of parts within the organic whole, yet 
the consideration of t he question of movement within the s,ystem 
is even more basic. It should be noted here that in the case ot 
organic wholes, since the interrelation of parts to one another 
and with the whole is very close, an;y change l:rought about in 
an;y given pa:rt will significantly atreet other pal"te and the 
nature of the "Rhole i tsel!. '!his is especially true in the case 
of Hegel's organic system. In the present chapter, the category 
of individuality is de.tined as a structural whole. This appears 
to be Hegelts understanding of it. 
In the Logic, to lhich one must turn in eeeld.ng guidance on 
the nature of a problem of this kind, the tex-m that comes nearest 
to the category of individuality is die Einzelhei t. Significantly 
enough it does not appear untii the sta{l8 of the Bef£1tf has been 
reached, and the Be griff, eo we are informed, is the principle 
7' 
o£ freedca and represents a systematic mole~l It would seem: 
obligatory, therefore.~ to consider seriously Hegelfs t~eatment 
of imividu~ity as it appeare in the '(,og1C.:• 
The doctrine ·of the J3e@1.tt iQ divided into t hree partst 
(l) the tormal. or subjective aepect, (2) as objef;'tivity potses- . 
Bing the character of imtoodiacy, (3) the ;resultant unity or sub-
ject and object. 2 '!be type of indiViduality as a logical cat.b-
gory ralls umer the subjective or tormal aspect ot the Bev1:r.t. 
It is, t herefore• contributoTY to a thesis, the synthesis ot 
hich is t he truth of Begritr. or truth in and .tor itaelr.3 
Hegel , therefore, establishes individuality as falling within 
the purview of logic. 
Among the "m<Dents" or subjective Begr1£f ie that die 
. -
... Ei-.nz ....... elbe;;oo.;..o· ..,i_t which constitutes the eynthesis arising out or!!\!_ 
Allgemeinheit and die Beaonderheit . 4 It is detined as 
die Refiexion in sich der Bestimillthei ten der 
Allgemeinheit ·und Besonderheit, 'Welcb.e negative 
Einheit mit sich das an und i'llr sicb Bestiurnte 
und rgl.eich m.i t BiOh !dentiecbe oder .Allgemeine 
1st. 
In the language of the dialectic; therefore, the speoif'io char-
acteristics ot universality and partic.ulartty are preserved, yet 
characteristically transcemed, with individuality. 
Hegel reminde us,. howver1 that the form ot ind1V1duality1 
1 . EPW, sect. 160. 
2. EiW1 Met. 162. 
3. EPVI 1 sect. 21.3 . h. ll:P'N, sect. 16). See also pp. nr. sect. 3, in ltlich the 
momenta of the Best;Ut are given :in the same· order. 
5. EP~T~ sect. i03. 
~xpressed here on the level ot subjective ~f!i.t£, does not re-
fer · to t ho immediate or natural individUal in the sense in which 
one normally refers to individual things or persona.. 'n'l.is develop. 
ment of individual! ty appears later. 6 Vbile every function Or 
moment ot the Be@t;~f is itself a forecast or the whole Be£if'£1 7 
in that each moment is indissolubly one 1:1 th the whole., the in-
dividual or subject, on the other hand, may be the Befatl:i'£ e:i-
nre.s$ed in terms of a total1ty.8 
a • • 
It is ot'Vioualy apparent that the latter statcmnt is vital 
since it bears ~ectl.y on the px-obl$m ot the relationship o£ 
the ir&.vidual to the waole, su;bject to object, particular to 
universal. l-- ore over., .indi VidaaJ.i ty is as&ocia ted "With the eon-
crete Besz:ttt. Taken in the abstract, Hegel holds that indi-
viduality is the same as der Grund.9 He proceeds to bring out 
the interconnections o£ tl'lfl three functional parts or dialectic 
.forms of the subjective Begrltf, namely.,. uniVE~rsality, particular-
ity and individuality, by pointing out that the universal simul• 
taneously contains the partioular and the individual.. On the 
othe:r }1.and, the partiCUlar is in itself universal and is as an 
individual. Si.Jdl~ly~ the individual is to be understood as a 
subject involving genus and species within itself. In other 
Jw · · _.:,...,.._... 
6. Treated in E'PW,. sect. 1.66, under the designation ot 
Das ur;teu. Also PP. tn, sect. 11, in which individuality ap-
pears as §lbject. 
7. E:PW., sect. 160. · 
8. EPN. sect• 16). 'l'his point is emphasized especially at 
the end of this ehapter. 
9. EP· 'J sect. 164, 
orde, all t hree aspects are inseparable. The problem before us, 
therefore, is to ascertain the importance of this distinetiv& 
coneeption of indiViduality as the synthesis of universality and 
partieul.ari t y for a philosophical psychology of the indi. vidual, 
i l o p: Uosophical psychology as conceived in this di"ser-
tation concentrate s on t he individual, this by no means implies 
that the problem of the universal may be lightly disnissed, a.nd 
this is so because in Hegel's view the universal as Eegritt is 
decidedly not <.; BU.'l'l of common features characteristic of a multi-
tude of t hings. Not only in the interests ot kno'lt'led,_,ae 1 but also 
as a guide to practical conduct, Hegel' e conception of the uni-
versal should be sharply distin._.~ished .f'rom the view 'Which in-
terprcto it as an abstract, eemral term. The loeical signifi-
cance of t he Hegelian usage of t he .universal is that it cont ains 
impl1ci tly m thin it t e i dea of particularity i t hout hie.~ a 
satisfying synthesis i ·e impossible. It is, thus, an or anie 
whole, a conc;rete universal. He r;el expresses the dialectic 
development in terms of universal, particular and individual 
rather than in the somewhat more abstract formulation or positive, 
negative and synthesis. Particu..larity suggests a completion ot 
the universal rather than a logical antithesis to it. I£ this 
be so, t herefore, the synthesis does not stand merely in a sort 
of impartial position between .thesis and antitheais as in the 
earlier portions o.r the Logic, but represents a genuine completion 
of the process already euggested by part1eulnri ty. lndi viduali ty 
is more than an empty "WOrdJ 1 t marks a siBnificant advance toward 
the goal ot a ftlller truth. Je"el calls attention to t. is richer 
development i n his doctrine of the Begrif'f. 
s additional indication o£ the importance of t he category 
of individullli t y ·thin Hegelian thoue1lt, is t he claim that 11das 
Einzclne i st dasselbe, . as das .irldiche ist. nlO Elsewhere, 1n 
eommentin" 011 tho content of philosophy , Hegel observes that its 
cont,ent is not.Jd.ne more that actuality .. ll the r eason · ·ich io in 
the 1'1orld. Actu.ality ia defined ae, "di e un:nittelbar .::,e ordene 
Finheit des wesens und der Existenz, oder des Inneren und des 
lue-eeren. nl2 By aotua.li t y Hegel does not mean that the existent 
is always r a tional in t l1e sense of nn organic hole or that all 
existence implies rationality. Students of Hegel should keep 
this in mind especially hen objective spirit i s under analysis 
and evaluation. By actuality, e means t e synthesis of' existence 
and essence. If n individual falls to t'ulfil. the tasks and ob-
11 ations· a signed t o him,; then, as -we say, he is not a .real 
person, or t o put it in Hegelian term~ , he is not act ual . . It is 
worth notin . , too, that Hegel associates individuality with ef-
fectiveness .. "Die Einzolheit des Begriff'es aber ist schlechthi n 
das Wirkende, uoo zwar auch nicht mehr 'Wie die Ursa.ehe mit dem 
Scheine, ein Anderes ~u wirken, sonder n das v.trkende seiner solbst. tt13 
The converse is also doubtless true oo far as Hegelian thou ht is 
concerned, namely, it an individual is ineffective, then his in-
dividuality is not actual but a mere empty' ideal, or, at best, a 
10. EPVT1 sect. 16). 
ll. EP 'l, sect. 6. 
12. EPW, sect. lh2. 
lJ. EW., sect. 163. 
vague hope. In a sense, theref()re, He~l's philosophy ae a m .ole 
could be defined as an attempt to justify this identification of 
actuality l'lith rationali.ty and vice versa. To link up individual ... 
ity 'With actuality, in any case, is w put the discussion of in• 
di\fidual.ity on a sound Hegeli~n basis • . 
'the assertion may be made that in dealin.,~ 1'd t h t.lle problem 
of the individual in legel ' s philosophy, there is too much pre,... 
occupation w1 th the lo~ical and too little attention puid to the 
empirical. One criticism is that M.s approach is too fornlal.1 and 
hence empty ot content. Hegel anticipated sue. an alleeat:ton, 
h nee his own worde on the point · ohould not go unheeded:; 
m.e togik des Begritf's Wird e:wlhnlic...'l als 
rmr i'ormelle tli ssenachatt eo verstanden_, dass 
es 1hr aut die Form al:r solehe, des Begrif'i'e, 
des rrrteUs und .SChlusses, aber gana und gar 
nieht darauf an.ltom:ne, ob Etwas wahr sei,. sondern 
dies hinge . gans allein vom Inbal te ab. v~n 
wirklich die logischen Formen des Begri!'fs 
tote, unwirksame ~nd gleichghtige Behlll ter. 
von Voretellutlg!n oder Gedanken:; so wire ihre 
Kenntnis eine · .fHr die i ahrhei t sehr ilber.ndssige 
und entbehrliehe Hiato:r1e. In der Tat aber sind 
sie umgekehrt &1 s ~bri.len des Beg:i:-ift e der 
lebendige Geist des 1,~kl.1eh(Jn1 unci von dem 
'irklichen ist walll" nur1 was kraft dieaer P'(¢Dlen1 
durch sie und in ihnen wa.br 1et .• 14 
I£ this statement 'Which appears immediately betore hia dis-
cussion or individual! ty is appli.ed to his entire lonical structure_, 
it is at least plausible that the fQl"lllal category of indiVidual• 
ity is not a mere repoaitol",Y of thoughts and conceptions dev-oid 
of aey connection with the actual world, but, as Hegel himselt 
14. EPW, sect. 162. 
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holds, every cate ory 1'1i. thin the Bee;ri f f ~resses the vi tal 
spiri.t of the actual world. 
gain, Hegel ci.tes specifically sonwa abstract concepts such 
as t.l811, house, animal, etc., nhich contain universality o:lly. 
Says he : 
as auc Be · itte und zwar bcstimm.te 
Begriff'e genannt 'Werden* z. B. nach, Ftaua, 
Tier usf. sind einfache Bestimmuneon und ab-
strakte Voratellungen.-Abatrak:tionen, die 
vom Beg:rif'!e nur das ,;~oment der Allgereinheit 
nehmen und die Be aonderhei t und Eimselhei t 
~;egla.ssen, so nicht an ihnen en twiclml t sind 
und dami t gerade vom Begrit.re abstrahieren.l5 
2. ~gre s of Individual! t y 
In the orredc to the ~llno:menolo(!e , He gel informs us t hat 
it is in response to the t ask or shmdne o science i .n general 
is possible, how lmowled Je devt:lops, t.hat t he book itself' c £ 
into bein .16 This task could not be aeco.mplished,; so it is 
claimed, Without examining t he for mative development of the uni-
ver sal or general individual, on the one Bide, and the self• 
conscious spirit or particular individual on the other. Here at 
the very beginning of thia treatise on human experience, Hegel 
differentiates betneen t he universal individual as organically 
conceived and t he particular individual as expressive or incol'}o;o 
plete mind. ,i,!ind, then,. is interpreted in terlllS of staees or 
le els of development. 
15. , sect. 164. 
16. PO, Vorrede, 26. 
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.As one ascends the mental seale, the lower manifestations 
of mind become increasingly obscure., so that what once appeared 
as indisputable objective raet no longer appears in clear out- . 
line. Individuality, the development of 1ieh y;oul.d see .. to 
parallel the evolution of mind in Hegelian thought, ro1lows a 
dialectical. pattern of' unfolding. Ilegel draws an i nteresting 
analogy otneen the evolntionary deSign unmistakably present in 
the growth or individ ality, and the earlier toms t hrong . m ieh 
scientific kno ledge has passed, sta s n transcended . . the 
steady march or science. The particular mind, it is argu-ed, must 
traverse the same terrain as that covered by the general mind,. 
a d hence shares in the adventures of that general mind. 
Der EinZelne muss auch dem. I nhal te na.eh 
die :aildungastuf'en des allgemeinen Gei tee 
durclllau:f'en, aber als . VOt!t Oe:.tste ~ehon 
abgelegte Gestalten, als Stuten eines ga-1 
dar ausgearbei tet urtd geebnet ist.17 
The enlargemnt of kno ledge makes pos.sible the meaningful 
gJ-owth ot the individual. Apart from the ever-e.xpandim field 
of knowledge t here could be no phUosophic:al psychology either 
of the indi vidual or society. General knowledge is minored in 
t he individual •s attainment .of knowledge1 'Which is but another 
way of calling attention to our dependency upon ou1 ture as an in-
tellectual stimUlus. Herre+1 hG ver, puts it even more stl"ongl.y 
when he asserts that the general mind constitutes, "die Substanz 
dea :r nd:lvi<fuums. n.l8 'l'he de'V'elopment of mind, then, may be viewed 
-.---.-. -----------------
17" PO., Vorrede.; 27 • 
18. PG., Vorrede, 27. 
from the double aspect of tho individual and the universal . Hegel 
expresses the ran of each aspect as foUows-: 
Die Blldung in dieser R-llcksicht besteht, 
von der Seite des Individuums aus betraehtet. 
darln1 dass ea dies Vorhandne en-erbe1 seine 
unorganisclle atur in ei ch zehre und t8r eich 
in . sitz nebme . Dies ist aber von der Seite 
des allgemeinen Geistes ale der Sub.stans nichts 
anders , al:J dass d:..ese cich ih:r selbsthe1 s ... tein 
gibt, 1hr .erden und ihre Refiexion 1n sich 
hervc>l"bringt .19 
Furthermore, tho cruergcnoo, developn)(mt, and consumnation of 
individual.J.ty, us in ~ojhe case o all ,!egelian categories, is marked 
a lon 1 l a .... ori ous a d sl.o · )rocess requiring a see · ·• ly end-
les:J sez·ies of dialectical steps. Hegel ju,..ti.i'ies the length of 
t he jour ey ol7eve~ because all the stages arc necessary. 
EiOOsteils i st die rJnge dieses ~ ~egs zu 
ertragen1 deiUl jedes lament 1st notwend.igJ -
andernteilo ist bci j edem sich zu verwei.lan1 
denn jedes ist selbst eine indi.viduelle ganze 
Gestalt und .:ird nur absolut betrachtet, 
insotern seine BestiDI!ltheit als Ganzes oder 
Konkretes, oder de.s Ganze i n der Ir.i~Emt&n:i.ichkeit 
diese-r Bestinmung betraehtet l'fird. - ~U die 
Substanz des Indi iduums, ''leil sogar der 
~el tgeist die Oeduldgehabt, dieee Forman i .n der 
langen Ausdehnung d.er zeit · zu durchgegen und 
die ungehewre Arbeit der v ltgesehiehte, in 
t:elcher er in jeder den gan~en C'".ehal t seioor, 
~essen sie tlliig i st, herausgestal.tete, 11u 
ubernehmen, und "'£Ie11 er dureh keine geringere 
das Bewusetsein {lber sich erreichen lrormte, 
k~nn zwar der Sache na.eh das Individw..t:n 
nich t mit weniger seine Substanz begreifen. 20 
Thus, 1n order for the individual mind to know ita own 
nature, it must undertake the long dialectical journey into 
19. ro, Vorrede, 27 • 
20. PO, Vorrede, 27•28. 
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kno i ~e. 
A over ar,ainst t _.e procedure of om et' days featured by 
the e. phasis on the cul t i'Vat1on of t he natural mind, ar..d a. con-
ception of exp~riene that Y1 . s er ntea t ed t.,r ough an t.l:C"ou 1 by 
l l gemeinheit,, . egel vi•3· s h pre ... en ... t a$k as precisel y he r e-
"'tar se : 
Jc t zt bestoht daru.m die Arbei t nicht so 
sehr darin, dae IndiViduum aus der unmittelbaren 
si nnlichcn '!!:"c i se zu roini en um-. ea zur 
gedachten und denkenden Substanss zu raachen, 
a~ ... viel mchr i n dem Bnt gegengesetzten, durch 
das Aufbeben der f esten best-ten Gedanken 
das Allgemeine ZU verwfrkl-chen und · ZU 
begeiswn. 21 · 
U, therefore, Hegel 's approach to knowledge is correctly 
interpreted in the above, then his analysis of individualiey 
doubtlesa i'ollcms t he same pattern. The ultimate ai of ind1-
v1duali ty on this vie is to actualize that .hich i s un1 versal 
within 1 t and give it spiritual v.ttal.i ty. The result eannot be 
achieved except tnroug . the principle of negatiVity, an instru .. 
mental meana in breaking do11n and then transcending aJ.l fixed and 
determinate thoughts. Degrees of individuality are inherent, 
therefore, 'Within the dialectic or 1ndiv1duality. 
As tho present di saussion unfolds, it should become clear 
that the content under consideration is organic in nature and 
in its development follows a logical pattern, the influence ot 
which permeates it at every point. The organic and the logical 
21. PG, Vorrede , )O. 
ar insepara le in ·• 1 . • .te ~ ~s~(;e:n contn.ini ~c i!ldivi<hality 
may no .. al:r.a.ys bo e.xplicit an · its l""nr;e Eta.y somet · es vary. But 
t."'lc point is t.1 .... t t:1e ys"te._ is a..tways ?resent • 1. a.teve:r is said 
about individuality at t!.cy level of' the dialectic should t slce its 
nature rom the n, ture of t· e :;,-ystem as a t'lh.ol e, ~'1d the truth 
of any assertation cannot be ascertainc apart .f'rom t .e .,.. ole . 
lillether one agTeea nit!1 the. above or not, r o ex osition of H -.gel 
i s valid m:ch leavo~ this out f account . 
It n eds to be emr.hanizcd, m\l!'eover, ,1 a: in He Jlian phi-
losophy thero is a. ey~tf; • of r e l a tions so vi u~l to any su"'ject 
under discussion, t.."la t {;·part from the it is v;ell ni(ih i ncon-
ceivabl • Humen ':oo-.uedge, :.owev r, can never embrace all pos-
sibl.e r elations . The ini' renee seerw plain. '!!-li s lo6ic of r 
l ations is a matter of degrees. Hence the justi.dcation i n his 
dissertation f r ·I' e asserti on of' degrees of individual! t y , to 
be conceived lo ically and hence \"11 thin tJ1e realm of t.'-le uni• 
versal. 
I n He~l' s .Fh!lnomenol~gie which contains his mo~t deto.iled 
analysis of individuality, a great vratersl ed is reached in .he 
trans1 tion from Vernu.••tft to C',e;i.st. All the stage s throu ,~ which 
individuality in atzy" form passes previous to the Geist le 1 , 
have not only prepared the ay for the emergence of concrete in-
dividuality , but are in reality abstractions from t he life of 
concrete spirit, and as such1 are right.f'ully vie d as separate 
moments of eltpe.rience. 'ihe treatment offered by Hegel when in-
divid\Ullicy enters the kingdom of the concrete is more systematic 
and c;:>nstructive than in the earli er soctions of ·hhe Ph£nomenolqg1e 
i \.hicb the individ\m.l Ol1 ego is revie11ed apart 1'"ro.m social in ... 
sti tutillns or spiritual e..-.ristence.. The pro lcm o£ t he nature nnd 
place o£ t.. !e inctividual st now be tl"'nced on all levels of a%• 
-..:rience . According to th.e Hegelian ex..:•oeition one s 1oul h ... gin 
vrith consciousness, the lowest level of hillT'..an ._,zperience .. 
) 11 The Place of the Individual on the U3vel of Consciousness 
The individual in whatever form within the realm of con-
sciousness is the abstract individual. Abstt-aet22 is the term 
used to describe soroo aspect or quality eonsidel"ed apart from 
its total object. !n psychology, it may be noted_. t he term ab-
straet denotes the mental act of proceeding &om individuals to 
concept-s of classes, a procedlll:'e in which the common. !"eatures of 
several individuals are grouped together under one name-an ab-
stract name . 2'.3 The di.i'f~nce ~t~n this View of 11abstract" 
and that of Hegel's as the unrelated is quite apparent. 
i. As a Feature o£ Sense I!Xperienee 
For H gel llll knowledge o£ anything -whatever begin5 
with the ~dia:te,2L. -with pure Eeing, hence the first phase of 
individuality is tQ be found in consciausnese-. Two statements 
of Hegel ts tnaY suffice to estabUeh the validity of this position. 
Das reine Sein m.aoht den An£angt weil es 
22. !b1d·f ~q. 
2,3. See art. ttA.bstractionn in :OOP (ed •. D. D. Runes), J. 
2lt.. In ro by- i!mnediacy is meant sentmous iml'llediacyl whereas 
in the Logic conceptual iJnrlediaey or being is the thought in mind. 
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IO'IfOhl reiner Gedanke ala das unbestiDmte 
einfaehe Unm.ittelbare ist, dexe erste Ani'ang 
abel" niehtsr:"Vermitteltes und wetter Bestimmtes 
sein 1cann.2::1 
Dar ffissen, welches zuerst ode~ unmittelbar 
unaer ·Oegenatand ist kaml ke;tn anderes sein als 
dasjenige, welches selbst unmittelbarea Wiesen,. 
W1ssen,. des Unmittelbaren oder Se1enden ist .• 
W1r haben una ebenso unmi ttelbar oder autnehmend 
zu -verhal ten, also nicbta an 1hm1 wie es sich 
darbietet, zu verlndern und von dem Al.tf'lassen 
das Begreifen abzuhalten~Zo 
1bus the knowledge characteristic of t his early stage 
is o£ the sensuous, the undeveloped. the unrelated. Contrary to 
much popUlar opinion, argues Hegel, the type of cei"taint;y ex-
perienced here is about the most abstract, incomplete and in-
adequate form of knowledge there is. The truth is exhausted 1n 
the assertion that a t hing merely is. Consciousness· is nothing 
more than pure ego. ti'Ieh bin dar1n Jl1U' ala reiner Dieser und der 
('JE!genstand ebenso nur als reines Dieaee. t~27 No distinction is 
dra'W!l between !SUbject and object. Here Regel is ul'lD!istakably 
monistic in tds ep,t.stemologyJ· if we take his words at their face 
value. 
The logic of this position ia, consequently1 that the 
individual as presented here has no meaningful relation with other 
things, since mediation has not yet taken place. There can be 
no. man:i.fold of ideas it 'thinking is not prese.nt. The individual, 
as fact, stmply ie. 
2). EPW, eect. 66. 
26. FG, 79. 
27. l'G, 79. 
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Die Sache ist, und sie iat, nur weil sie ist; 
sie ist, dies ist dem sinnliehen Wiesen das 
~eenthl.iche, und dieses reine Sein oder dieae 
ein.fache Unmittelbarkeit maeht ihre Wahrheit aus. 
Eben so ist die Gewissheit als Beziehung un-
mittelbare reine Beziehungt dae Bewusstsein 
ist Ich• weiter nichta, ein reinexo Die·"rJ der 28 Einzelne weiss reines Dieees1 oder das F.inzelne. 
However; the dialectic of thought demands that knowl-
edge move out ot the . "pure this" stage,. otherwise it remains a 
contentl.ese abstraction. The stage ot immediacy as pure Being 
is transcended 1'f'1 th the introduction ot questions as to the im-
plications ot the "Now" and the "Here" of an object ot in· 
vestigation. The process is carried forward by and through the 
principle of negation. llediated lmowledge is required to tree 
an object from its sensuous inlnediacy. A distinction ot tar-
reaching importance, namely, that of immediate and mediated 
knowledge, has arisen at the very beginning ot the evolution ot 
lmowledge. From this point forward, it is the process ot modia-
tion which ld.ll ;yield most to the analysis of the category of 
' individuality, and, consequently, to the enrichment or human ex ... 
perience. All knowledge now becomes mediated knolrledge. 
Since the "Here" and the "llow" ot any given object are 
in ceaseless change, the problem becomes that of discerning some 
meaning in the series or "Heres" and "Nows" to give them continuity'. 
No particular "This" taken by itselt, nor any particular "Now" • 
lfill suffice. The universal Dll.st be sought. "Das Allgemeine iat 
28. .ro, 80. 
' 
65 
also 1n der Tat daa Wa.bre der sinnliehen Gewissheit .n29 It should 
be noted, hOlleVer, that the universal as used here is the abst.lract 
universal. 
According to the pattern which, as Hegel believes, 
thinking pursues, -we do not begin with the universal ·- abstract 
or otherwiee. Ae a matter of fact., he starte 'With the individual 
ttNo•" and the individual "Here" and discovers the universal through 
them. This is in contrast to any claim that represents Hegel as 
begin.ning and concluding with the universal. It is necessary to 
point out, hOlleVer, that Hegel discovers meaning in the indiVidual 
"Here" and "Now" only in so far as they are parts of the universal.. 
Furtherr.tore, the "Heres" and "Nc>lrsn become intelligible to the 
degree in 'Which they are held within the unity of conscious human 
experience, and in this connection, thought is the unifYing 
principle.3° i'hey pass but the "I" 1 as uni versal1, remains. The 
individual is universal. 
The findings for our problem. on this J.owest level ot 
t hought and experience :tiJ/8.7 now be surnmarizeds First, there is 
the stage of imediacy, pul"e being, mere existence. Then, through 
t he process of the dialectic, an antitheais is reached involving 
the second stage of mediation. The truth ot inmediaoy and media• 
tion is finally reached within a s,ynthesis consisting of the 
interrelation of ego and ,object. 
29. PG; 82. 
J(). ~e ERV, sect. 20. 
But what bearing does this reSult have on a philosophical 
psychology ot t he individual at . t his leWtl of t he dialectic? What 
is the nature ot indiViduality here? Mlat is the application to 
the practical realm? 
'!be realm under review as we can readily see is that 
of· sense With its epistemological cc».~ollary, sense-certainty. 
'!he degree of truth attained here is merely the truth and cer-
tainty of such reality as the objects of sense possess, a r esult 
little better than N1.chtigkeit. Hegel's thought on the matter 
is viVid til its Ulustrative aspect. Even the animals know bet-
ter than to keep phy-sical thin~s forever before them.. Says he 1 
Auch die Tiere sind nicht von dieser 
-eisheit ausgesohlosaen, sondern e;nreisen sich 
vielmehr am tiefsten in sie eingeweiht su seinJ 
denn sie bleiben ni~t vor den sinnlichen 
Dingen als an sich seienden stehen, sondem; 
versweitelnd an dieser Realitlt UDd in der 
vlb.ligen Qewisshei t ihrer Nich tigkei t langen 
sie ohne 11eiteres zu und zehren sie auf; Und 
die ganze Natur feiert~ w.te sie, diese ottenbaren 
J.trsterien, welche es lehren, 'Was die Wa.hrhei t 
der silmllchen Ding& 1st.31 
Such limited individuality on the sense level possesses 
may be stated in terms of the actual, absolutely particular, in-
dividual thing, each unique 1n itself and unlike any other thing. 
on the surtn.ce, existence is represented as absolutely certain 
and true. But all such individual th ings, 'Whatever one ~ mean 
by t hem, are best defined as actual things, external objects of 
sense, at ht>mO in their separation. To describe them is to say 
31. PG1 87-88. 
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what is simply universal about them. Hegel concludeaa 
Tird von etwas -waiter nichts gesagt, als 
dass es ein 'lrlrkl.iches Ding, ein Husserer 
Geganstand ist, so iet es nur aJ.s das 
Allerallgemeinote und dam1 t Viel mehr seine 
Gleiobhei t mi. t a1lem.1 als die Unterschiedenhei t 
aussesproohen.32 
In a li'Ord, since everything in an individual thing, and 
when one spea s of it as individual, he is simply stating mat 
is quite universal about it. Instead o:C bein~ known immediately, 
the t hing is knollll as a universal, and to .know as universal is 
to perceive. 
11. The Individual as known through Perception. 
The problem in perception is to discover the specific 
form asoumed by the universal, and to ascertain how seemingly 
unrelated di.fferentials are preserved 'Within the unity of a given 
object. 
As was true in the case of e.ensation, analysis is still 
pursued subject to all the limitations of sense. But more stabil-
ity is pretJent in universality than was true on the sense level. 
The demands of lmowledge are met in a more adequate '\'fay; conse-
quently. In his expositian Hegel singles out the problem ot 
perception as of primary concern in perceptual knowledge. I ts 
significance is seen f'rO!ll the fact that he calls the entire 
section, "Die ~.ahrnehungt ode:r dao Ding und die T£usehung. "33 
One form of the problem posed by perception is that or 
.32. PG1 88. 
33. ro, 89.. See also WL, Buch 2, Absch. 21 !Cap. 1. "Das 
Ding und seine Eigenschatten." 
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determining the precise nature of the object.. Examination die-
closes 1 t to be, ''das Ding von vielen Eir.;ensehaften. tt34 Per-
ception eo<1tairut negation, diatinction and multiplicity. This 
guarantees its dialectic usefulness. It is not surprisi ~ there-
fore, that in t..lte experience of perception we have the first ap-
plication or the principle of negativity in the lnomenolor;!e, 
a1 though a prior reference was made to it in the Vorrede in ldlich 
its author calls attention to "der Brnst, der SchJilen, die Gedul.d 
und Arbeit des Negat1ven.n35 As already pointed out, the prinei-. 
ple or negativity or the antithesis, gives the dialectic much ot 
its validity. Speaking of the reSillt attained following the ap-
plication of t.h.is principle to the universaJ., Hegel declareez 
"Das Aufheben stellt seine wahrhaf'te gedoppelte Bedeutung . dar, 
welche l'lir an dem Negativen geeehen haben: es 1st ein Negieren 
und ein Aufbelrahren zugleich. n36 Elsewhere 1n this dissertation37 
an evaluation of negativity is attempted. But the principle at 
this eta e has given Ding'h it,l8 a unity of many particulars. 
Properties are simple universals. 1'he paradox of unity and multi-
plici ty39 is reeolved by t e discovery that what is present is 








It is to be noted tba t the nature of a thing is rever 
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RJ, Vorrede, 20. 
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taken up apart .trom the perceiVing subjeot. In the £ace ot the 
man:,- properties ot a thing, the object itself is experienced as 
a utli'ty-1 as one. DiverSity rmust be related to the perceiving 
imividual. It 1s1 1n et't'ect, through individual reflec.tion that 
the tnth and idenU ty of an object is conc;:se1ved. IndividllaJ. 
consCiousness organices the properties into a coherent 'Whole. 
Existence is not perception me~ly, but thought about these per-
ceptions. 40 ~edge cannot be conf111ed to perception1 yet 
pf)re.ep~ion is contribltory to knowle4ge. The ·view is chuac~ 
1at1ca.ll.y Hegelian • 
Thit discovery ot the place and importance ot the per. 
ceiving individual. has posSible applications wh$n the level ot 
objective spirit baa been reached. It knoWledge possesses tl$ 
meaning tfe.gel claims 1 t has, then the signitie.ance ot the inde-
pende.ntly thinking individual beeomea manU'eat. VQreover 1 there 
oan be no kncnrl.edge id.thout a th~1 an indi.v1dual person. 
111. As the synthesia in tlnderata.nding 
'!be principl.e ot nagativitq on the perceptual level ot 
knolrledge gtW,"anteea that, while wbjeet and object are in-
separably united., they nonetheless possess a separate existence 
within the dialectic ~~oture. Here in the syni:Jlesis ot under. 
standing both subject and object• lihUe conet1 tuting the "momenten 
or elements ot what Hegel calls :Kratt.,4l are held together tn a 
90 
unity. "Indem w1r eo beide Momente in ihrer umittelba.ren 
E1nhei t erhal ten, eo .1st eigentlich der Verstand1 dem der Begritt 
der Kratt · angeh&rt. 1t42 Force is the medium through which t.~ese 
moments ha"te evolved. In terms or modern physics ftegel 's ·moments 
are comparable to the positive and negative poles. !he proceas 
ie one or attraction and repulsion. · The relationshi.p between 
these, however.- is not an external one. 
The .vnthesie toward which the dialectic has been 
moving, Hegel finds, is the inner 110rld, the eupereens:tble orld, 
or "ein Reich von C-esetsen. •43 '"Dies Reich der Oeaetse 1st awar 
die ,l&brheit dee Versta.ndes."44 t.tbue the truth (partial) ot both 
sen$4tion and perception is preserved within the Understanding. 
Dialectically, we are led. to a kingdom or laws, but 
laws, however, which do not give the final truth about t he world 
of appearance. "Insotern es aber nieht das aesetz iherhaupt1 
eondern ein Oesetz ist, hat ea die Bestimtheit an ihmt und e• 
sind dami t unbestimmt wiele Oesetze vorhanden. ,.45 This pl.urali ty 
ot laws, however, ie in sharp contrast to the principle of unrier-o-
standing which at.firms that truth 1a a universal. The many laws 
must coalesce to torm a Single la.w1 analogous to the law of 
gravitation in physics. But law on this· level .is discovered to 
be euaban'assingly abst1'act. 
42. PG, lOS. 
h.). PG, US. 
44. ro, us. 
45. ro, us. 
Hegel views the findings of the understanding as to 
law highly relevant to the "explanations" of physical phenomena 
otrered by science. The so-called explanation~ do not explain 
the given data. Force is introduced ae a ·concept having the same 
constitution as law. It is a "tautologisohe Bewegung.,n46 
"Mit dem &-kl~n also iet der ;an~l und : .. cheel, der vorhim 
; !,t ~1 ,. 
ausser deuL Innern nur an der Erscheinung war, in dae ltbersinnliche 
selbet etneedrungen • .,47 
In p;uosuing the course of the -dialectic, we are in-
formed that this changeless ld.ilgdom o£ laws has turned around in-
to its opposite. It becomes "die wrkehrte elt.u48 In the realm 
or experie~e, however, the result .or such an "inverted world" 
is not always salutary. Dipping into sociological data., Hegel 
observes that in primitive societies t o take revenge on an eneley' 
brought supreme satistaotion to one 19ho had been unjustly treated 
by his fellows. To stam and assert one's indiViduality, so to 
speak, to n;dress an injury, meant in substance the reinstating 
of one • s self' in the eyes of the group even thO.Ugh it might well 
involve the death or another. 
To capitulate: '.!he concept of force as -ne understand 
it with reference to nature1 has it$ eounterpart in the activity 
or understanding. 'lbe same kind of relation!hip ho"lds bet.een 
the unity and di.tterenee Within to.rce in the fields t:>t nature,. 
46. PG, 119• 
47. PG, 120. 
48. PG, 121. 
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as exi1ts in a process or mental aetivi ty. Force is a lll".itying 
principle 1 but the differences are the expressions or ""'oree con-
ceived Tdthin a rlialectical movement. Understandine is, sirr'...Uarly-1 
a unifying principle which seeks to reduce diff'ereneeo to so 
u1 timate unity capable .or explaining such d1 ver~ncies as in. 
digenous features . Thus. t e elements or the unconditioned uni-
~rsal present . in perception are held together by th estab11sh-
11M:lnt or . a kingdom of laws - the highest achievement or the under-
standing. taws as such, however.; at'e manifested in the detalled 
particulars 'Which those laws contJ"ol. As a consequenc_e, t.l'lere 
emerges the tTTO realms of laws; one, lawa in thetaSelves or 
noucena; t te other$ their expression i n specitic particulars or 
phcnomena.L9 f ow He~l attempts to reconcile these two realma 
dialectically is seen in hie exterded elepoei tion o£ seJ.£.-con.. 
sciousness.50 
In his t~atment of the understanding, He el has in-
troduced the supersenaiblc or intelligible world, but it remains 
something universal,. and, at this stage, quite devoid of sel.f'hood. 
But £or t he reference to the -revenge as the motive for the clash 
ot one irxliviW.al againat another~ no signi.tica.nt reference is 
made to individuality. 'lho re:ruJ.t is disappointing 1na8Iinleh as 
the u.'lderstandi:'l{t conserves the truth revealed on the levels of 
seneation and perception. The entire eeotion is narked by Hegel •a 
49. . -· .t t s two realms of Phenomena and Noumena. 
50. .l ca. ted in ro, lll-.3l2J fi,, sec'Es. 42li=437. 
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pronounced interest in the problem of knOT/ledge, and espGcially 
t e question of empiricism~ It i s per haps more a pol emic ag.ainst 
Kant• s treatment o£ the problem, than an earnest Hegelian co:r-
tribut1on t o i ts solution. In any case , his exposition yiel ds 
little n t he development of the subject of if'.dividualit'J. 
4. IndiViduality as Selt.consciousnea• 
As consciousness, am the individual with it, en:erge on the 
higher level of selt-conscioueness1 the individual is found to 
be inseparable trom the object.~ or, as Hegel expresses it, "das 
Ansichsein und das ~in-Andere&-Sein 1st dassel be. n5l tt 
should be noted at this time, holle'Ver; that while, logically,. 
consciousness precedes self-consciousness within the Hegelian 
thought-structure,. the latter f~rms the basis tor all conscious-
ness lfhatever.52· Consciousnesa on the sense-leYel pr$SUpposes 
the conscious indiv1dual1 even thougb1 as Hegel rightfully ob-
serves, it is not until he comes within the presence of another 
that he is moat conscious of his o'Wtl independent e:x:i.stence as an 
individual. . shall now proceed to denlop the idea of indi-
viduality under the phaee of 8el.t-conaciousnes•· 
Self-conseioutmess is now so o.nriched in content that 1 t 
requires an ever more searching mode ot analysis than prevailed 
.fOl"llleX'lY and Bhou.ld offer more tangible results ioward an under-
standing of individuality. In any case 1 since this type of 
51. PG• 133 • 
.52. Hegel recognizes thie in EPN, .. e~ect. 424. 
experience intt'oduees · new :torms ot manifestation• the analytical 
pro~ can be carried out more advanta.geoueo.,.y .• 
13roadly en~sioned• individuaU. ty Within the :scope ot aelr-
conseiousnesa develops along thll'ee dimensionst tlrst., in tel'ln~t 
ot nat\U"eJ secon41 in relaUon$hip ·to other sel~s; third, in 
terms o£ Reason.$3 These three forma serve as an operating 
principle by 'Which the dit.rerent degrees of S$lf<onaciousness 
are realized. It. i,. Hegel's ·eon"'-ntion.- and one of those char-. 
acteristic attirmations in his :P:tilosopby that individual self• 
eonsciouimess can nevar be :M.lt realised except in and thi'ougb. 
univel"aal eelt-consciouane.S. It rAises in acute t0l'ill1 there-
fore, one of the .vital issues in t his present work. 
1., SGlt-consciousrie~UJ and Nature 
· Bi'Uti'ly stated, the background against which Hegel. ot• 
fers his argument ie as follows. In its !91mpletJt, and hence most 
immediate, fora self•conscioUaness ia "die BegierdeffS4 directed 
toward some external object,. l:hU:e at the same time a subjectiTe 
experience. The ind1rldual consciousness :realises, t..lleret'ore .• 
that it is implicit within the object toward which one• s apo-
petite is attracted, The indiri.dual know&r that the external ob-. 
ject is his, seeing it can otter no resistance. The net result 
ot the experience ie that the ego realiS$8 its .at111faction and 
53. In EZ:W, sect. 437, Hegel refers to Rea19on as "das 
allgemeine Selbst'bewsetsein." PP, II., aeot. 40, defines it as 
ttd!e h8ehste Vereinigung des Bewusstaeins lUld des Selbst.bewusst-
selns." $4.. }3(1, 13!). 
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thus eotablisbes itself.'. Iudj.vid.UAJ.ity is maintained at t."le ex-
pet se of the physical thing. Hegel ob$erves that '"die f>egieroo 
ist ao in ihrer p,efriedigung tiberhaupt zerst8rend1 wie '2-~m 
Inhal te na.eh selbst~i!chtig. "'5 Moreover, in so far ns satis--
faction is as private an ezcpertenee as one can k"now ~ t _e very 
act of satisfaction gives r i se to a continUal. repetition of the 
process. Hegel is m.erely saying that desire i$ never t:o.tisfied. 
!he sense of selthood 'Which individt1a.li ty ae.'lieves as 
a result of this satisfaction, however_, doos not end in. 100re in• 
diVidual.ity,. 011 the contrary, argues Hegel,. the negation of m -
mediacy and individuality results in the recognition o£ another 
seJ.f.oconsciou.s individual so that "das Selbstbe"'lU.s$tseitl crreicht 
seine Befriedigung nu:t- in einem andern Selb3tbe'mlsstsein.a tt56 The 
. aignU'ieant 'tJ."ling impl,ied hare is the presence of a eecond indi-
vidual con'b:-ibutes to. the developnent of another phas& ot the 
first individual~ s EP>.'})er:l.ence . 
ii. '!he Sigrti£1canee of other Selves 
In 'fiLe presence of another person an i ndiVidual 
recognizes :tmselt, even though the other is independent of and 
even opppsed to him. The experience involved here is that of 
"die Beooeung des Ane:rkennens. n57 '!he process• howver,. involves 
a battle~ since one cannot be made &'n'Sl"E! of himeelt in another 
individual so 1 ne as that other is $9en as an immediate existence 
'ffhich must ~ somehow suppressed. Hegel is persuaded that "der 
' . . 
Kampf' des Anerkennens eeht elao auf tsben und '!'od,..,sa But wey-
. ' .' ' . 
the stluggl.e mat be so eatastrophie is not made cl~ar unless 
it be to sharpen Up the prineiple ot negativity nthin the dia· 
leotic. Furthermore, 
jede.s de~ beiden Selbatbe'wu.esta&in bringt das 
Leben dea. anderen in Ge.fa.bX' und beg.ibt sieh 
lelbst darein1 aber nur als in Gefahrt denn ebenso 
iet jades au.f . die · ErhaJ.tung. seines I!'_Le · ·bene als des 
Daseins seiner Freiheit g$rl.Ch:tet.;J9 
'1he death of one through the abstract negation of im.Inadiaey• (a. 
fortunate bloodless solution) handles,. to be sure, the contra-
diction .from one point of vie-w but rai~es a nnr and greater eon-
tradiction. one ot the eombatante, pref~ning lif~ to death, 
eurrendera his ·claim. to recogni t.ion; 1vhi1e the other by asserting 
his ind;iv1duali ty is recognized l)y the· former as his superior. 
Thus Hegel accounts for the presence of master and sla-ve, an 
aeute form o£ the contrasts b$ttleen individualities. It 'f'd.ll be 
eeen that the above explanation of the master--slave relationship 
has a bearing on Hegelis lateX" analysis o£ rnan"s social life and 
the emergence of political authority. It is interesting to note, 
however, that he does not favor · the view that torce {which is in• 
valved in the above relationship) constitu~s a basis or right. 
!>ie Gewalt, weldle in dteser ~scheinung 
Grund ist, ist daruin ni.cht Grund dee Recll't$1 
cbgl$1ch dae notwendige und bereohtigte Moment 
im tfbex~gange des Zustan®s dee in die Begterde 
...._._ ____ _. _________ ____ 
58. · EPW,; sect. 432. 
59. EP.I1 ooct. 432. 
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un•i Einzelheit vel'senkten Selbst~wusstaeins 
1n den zustand des allr,emeinen fielbs·' 'evmsst,seins. 
Ea ist der Husserliehe oder ersehe1.nende .Antang. 
delr Staaten~ . nieht ihr stibstant:tclles t~inzip. oO 
'lh:Ls relationship of individuali t"~· on a naster- elav""fJ 
basis sugges·t;s that the lrS.ster sees in t he slo.v: the S'<.lpremn.cy 
of his cmn ilrtdividual selfhoodg vmlle the slave, cctincr i:1 the 
.eapaci -ty of ;ser'lta.nt,. divests himself' of' selt, thus paving the 
way1 as Hegel holds; to universal sel.f•consciousness. 
Individualit".Y as depicted here by calling attention to 
a reciprocal developnent and influence, points to a very signifi.,.. 
cant truth. Ordinarily we t hink .of Ats et:tect upon B as t hough 
the l atter "a~are neutral, or, at most, a passive recipient. The 
truth is, ho,•ver, that the action Qstensibly initia~d by A h:as., 
i n effect* b~en persistently influenced by the ver.y presence o! 
B. , tpf3 pro~esa . ~~ .a dual one. Each doe a 'What tP.e other demands 
or him. Thtll!i action i'tom both individuals mu:et be present if 
the deSired :result is to be achieved. Ind.i'Viduallty i~ at the 
basis of all signitieant aetiviW• . Even bondage is built upon 
it. certa11ily treedom cannot exist rdthout it. Thether he 
reoogn:iz~s i·~ or not, Hegel is anticipating tJle importance of 
indiv.tduallt:r w:tt.hin the network ot inter-personsl relationships. 
iii. 1ndividu811ty and universal Self ... conflcious:ness 
A synthesis of instinctive desire on the part of the 
individual o1~ the one. hand, am his i ·rwolvement with other 
6o. EPif# ~ect. h)).. This state•nt is relEWant to the sub-
sequent treat.ment o.f the- IndiVidual and socie.l Freedom. See ibid., 
Chap. 1V1 $el~t. 4. 
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individuals em t he ot 1er , i s achieved, so ~agel claim.s, in u;n1 ... 
ve s 1 sel£--)onsciousness to :1hich he give.~ tlle na.:ue nea.son. He 
defines uniVlJrsal aelf•consciou.sness ao 11das atfirma:~ve '"issen 
seiner selbs·t; im andere:n Selbst."61 I~diacy or .:l.t.Jpe-ti.te ha.n 
be(ln negated• making each individual universal w!d o·)jcctive,. 
Each has roa:'" unirersali t y as a result of l"eciprocity. Tl e sig.. 
ni.f:icance ~hich Hegel ntto..ched t o S'Jc!l 'Wliversal self -conscious ... 
neos may be ,gleaned .t':ror.. his statei:Bnt that it is, · 
die . .,.arm de$ Btw;usstseins der Substanz jeder 
wesentlichen Geistiglooit , der Fam:U:i.e, dee. 
Vaterlandes, des s·taats, · sowie iller 'fugenden1 
dev Liebe,
6
!l'reundacha£t, Tap£erlmit, del" Ft.re; 
des 1\t.lhms • . 2 
Upon the importa.nco. o universal self-eonsciousness1 'ther efore,· 
in i t .s rE-lationship to indi viduali i:i,v ld.ll depend marq ot the 
f indings of the present rk~ ltle releva.nt;e of: Hegel •s vie"; o£ 
universal self-consciousness tor philosophical ps,rcholo~~ is now 
to be examined in material which ta!res up the question of th~ 
unity ot consciousness and soli-consciousness of Reason. 
!) • l ncl.ividuali t y · t.l-tin the T.,imi ts of Reason 
That the concept o£ Reason, which is defined a:l ttdie Gew.issheit 
des Bo'WUsstEtei ns, alle Reali~t zu seinn,63 is fundamental to the 
whole Hegel:i.an JJY&tem or philosophy is 1!!6ll known. Some idea of 
1 ts iwportmJ:ce 1s ~en .t:rom the tact that, for Hegel, all history 
61. El)i., soet. 436. 
62. El , sect. 436. 
63. l'Ci, 176. 
i s neee~sar~.r for its compl ete cnactn-ant . n~nsm:, c nsequen"Uy, 
is ot be int-erpreted ~e c n.f'imd t the arena of i as only~ 
but a~ posaeasin'; all the dync1J!lic dlmensionv of l i f i sel ,. 
ReD. ... on at this sta.~e of the dialectic envisages t 1e ~orld or r-
aniaed seH~consciousress s over ngainot t he e ~ res sions c 
self-conacicrusnes!'J prosonted previousl y . In so f£tr , thel"efore., 
as ason h~t to fu 'l"!it tho soeial relations or man, i ts relevancy 
r or the pre1:tent p;roblen of t he indiVidual io quite apparent. 
Furt arm.ol"e :• ace rding to a 11-def:tned Ieeelian po.tter n1 the 
cato ry of individtmlity is about to be analyzed in terms of 
yet another phnse or. its deve otment. 
1 . The .tavJ of Individuality 
egel concei~s the la\'1 of individuality a. .... tr.e out-
~om 1 of tho laws o ... ··hou . .., t. (logic ) and the p sychological la is.64 
'!he 1.e:Yr cor.tsists of indiv:1.dual1 ty itself on t he one hand, a .d the 
given spec:tf'ic cl.rcumstancen attached to it on t_.e ot.her.. Sueh 
circumstan<!eS ·nclude habits, custon , religion~ etc., and ind:j. ... 
viduallt y j~o t o be understood in terms of these . They contain 
:rn pr:u-ticular ' t he la: . or individuality den-::>tez the 
i nfluence that specific circumstances exert upon individuilit-.r 
throu a ·:liateetic process • '"i ch mnltes possible t he principle 
of ne ativlty-. Heeel observes that the given situation merely 
6t.t• ~e 1\'1~ 221-227. Hegel is not impressed by formal 1ogio 
in its ~1ie·t' :tc ~J. expression. cr EW, sect. U!). 
J.OO 
Cust oms, 14•acl:l Uons, · tc .• ,. contribute 1eavily to the con ..,er~t of 
t1 at ·tr-16 · orld i tself bas it.s o,·m specific character merolJ :e-
eause it has u.rreO"'V:ed the g: ven individual in pa.rticula;r .65 It 
this ex;t,.ernal element is constituted as it. appears in lndividuoJ. ... 
i ty, then tb.e nat-u;.."C of t l.e latter may be ascertained by inspecting 
the natw:-o o.., ·i:.he £orme:r.. Hegel conceives this process an giving us 
ein~a gedoppel te C-alerie von Blldern1 deren eine 
der 1 !iderschein der andern w!re; die eine diG 
C!al,~rie dor v8lligert . Bestimmthe1 t . und U~nzung liu~merer umst£nde, die andel'e dieeelbe ubersetzt 
in die ~":eise, vde sie in detn 1$ aaten .'eoon sind; 
jeru~ die Kugeltliehe, dieses ~r . ~ittelpunkt• 
well~her si~· :tn sich voratell t • ..,, 
'rae world at-ound. us ea.rries this two- old meaning £or 
cgel . It is the ac~J.al orld ttan und i\Yr siehff as ~11 as the 
'orld o.f t e :Lndividual . t.ooked at in either way , it 1s still. 
the orld of ~~he individtta1 1 whether the individual is merely 
fused or bleruted 't'dth it., Md hence constituting his veey nature, 
or, on the other hand, it hae been transformed in part at least 
by that indivtduaJ. • 
.~.1· · twofold meanin , of reality , ar;l.sea as a result o£ 
t his .freedom <,f the individuaJ. .67 The world o.f the .individual. 
is to be undel•stood, eoneeqoontly~ from t he standpoint .of the 
_______ . ______ , __________ _ 
65 .. ro, 226. 
66. ro, 2:?6 .. 
67 . m., '226. 
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1ndivi.dual.1 and the innuence or reality upon him may be directed 
or not by hilll1 as the case .uray be. Hegel states the process as 
f'oUowen 
Da um dieser Freiheit wlllen die Wi:rkliehkeit 
dieaer gedoppel ten Bea.ntung fllhig 1$t1 so 1st 
d1e Vielt des Indl:vi&xums nur aus dieeein selbat· su 
beg:reifenJ und der Eintlues der Wirkl.ichkeit, 
•lehe ale an un.d fur· sie.b seiend ve.rgeeteUt 
wird., aut das I nd1v1du:wn erhh t durch dieees 
abaol\lt ~n entgegengesetzten Sinn, daas ee 
entweder den Stroll. cter eintl.iessenden. .irkli.·chk:eit 
an ibm =ft liset .. oder da·ss e$ ibn abbricht 
und. ver. . . · t. · 
'l'be concluei.on reached that "die lndividualitlt iat, 
was 1hre Welt ala die ihrige isttt169 isslirtld.ng4" monistic as to 
both meaning and existence especially 'When he goes on to state 
that. individuality is "der Kreis ihx"$s TU.ns",70 me:re}¥ a unity' 
of what is given and lthat is constructed. 
ii. IndiViduality ae Act 
Individuality now manitests itsell as deed thr~ the 
uEJe or the will. 'lhe practical is set over against, the theoretical 
to express bldi vidllali t.r in terms ot general action. Intention 
and act form the t1t0 essential aapeota ot the practical mind. 
Intention re1ers to the meaning ot an act, Whil~ the act has 
reference to the form in llhieh the individual is embodied.71 
As over against an;r outward bodily expre$Sion., Regel 
asserts that the true expre&Ja1on of a man is his deed. "Das wanre 
l \ 2 
Sein des ~nachen it;Jt Vielmehr .Sine Ta tJ 1n 1hr 1at die 
Individualitllt w1Fkl1ch.ft72 It 1a to be noted in this connect:lon1 
ho"Wever, that the deed c:an mean behaVior and 1n modem pqcholo-
a usual.ly' does. Ho,;ewr, it $1\0\Ud. be . noted that Hegel under-
lines the importance o£ an aot pl;"imarily betlB.u~ ~£ its Universal 
nature. "Die Tat ist ein eintach Bes·t.l.zn:nates1 A.Ugeme:tnes, in 
einer Abott'aktion zu Betae$etidea.nl3 1be reall.ty ot an act 1.& 
no mere s.Y!DboJ..~ It j.s the tact 1 tselr and "del' individueU~ 
MenSCh iat, 11~s eie (die Tat) tat. n74 
It may be oblJ$l"ftd1 hov.evet-1 that . e~n though an act 
has univeraal iaplieations ottentU'les, it still rezne.ins peculia.rUy 
ind1v1du.al1s1•ie and one or the surest .signS: ot real indi:ddua.l.• 
lty.. Hegel J~aUs to giv~ this suff1e1ent weight. 
ill. Subjective Ind11'idua)J.a 
A J;urther manifestation or individuality, according to 
Hegel, is to 'be found in moral sentitilentalism1 or, "daa Geeet• 
des Herzens.•t7S But in order toJ: the dialectic to do its work, 
Hegel discoVEtre the reall t,y t)f th~ Begrltt oppodng the emo-
tionalilllll ot the beai."t.. He:oe1 in brie.t1 1& the dialeotie eon-
atruetiont 
Dieeem Re:rzen ateht eine W~klichkeit 
gegenilbe~J denn 1m tle:N.Sen 1at das a.aeta nux" er~~t ~ sieh, noeh nicbt veTrdrklicht und 
al~10 zugie.iQh etwaa Anderes, · ale tier !egrt.ft 
1a11. nteaea Andere besti.mmt eieh dadureh al.s 
l CJ 
eine Wirklicllkei t.- die das Entgegengeeetzte 
des su Vendl"kl~chenden• h1em1 t der WidM"spruch 
de~ Geeetzes und der E1n:selhe1t ist.. Sie 1$t 
alao einereeite ein aeeett, van d81l die einzelne 
ndiVidU.aU.tllt ge~ckt 'Wird• eine· gnalttitige 
ordnung del" \~elt .t welche deln Gesetze des Hexozena 
w.tderspr1cht, und a~l"seits eine u.nter ·ibl' 
l$1.dend0 J&enschheit, welche nicht. dem aesetze 
des 1-Iereens f'olgt, $ondern e~ner £%'emden 
Notwendigkei t untel"tan 1st. 76 
. . 
The· obvious objective here is for the indiVidual to 
transcend. this struggle. "Diese dern Gesetze des Rerzens· 
widereprecher.de Notwe.ndigkei t so'fd.e. das durch sie vorhandene teiden 
au.tzuheben1 dtar.au£ 1st .aJ.so diese Indirtdual.itlt gericlltet.. n77 
It is a.aserte~d that the motiva~ng aim 1$ simply the welfare of 
mankind.. PlEtasure and help£ulneas are achieved at one .and the 
same time,. since pleasure is 'What all h.ea:r\s teel., hence univel"saJ.. 
"Das IndividlJrum vollb~ingt alf.JO das Geseu aeines He:rsensJ es Wird 
allgemeine Ql•d:mulg; tu:t.d die Iust ~u ei;mr an un.d rllr sich 
gesetzmlstd.gt1n 'd,irkliehkeit. tt76 '!'buB, in realising the law of 
the heart, t he individual diecovmot~ the 18.1.1' to be not simply his 
own but at tt.1e same time a universal lmt• The individual belongs 
to this uniwrrsal made possible by h!m e~n though hie act wa:e 
intended to 'be that of an indivl.dual heart and not necessarily a 
univerliral resUJ.ty., ·negel distinguishe.a sharply between \IDat he 
... 
regards as tl:e reality of an individUal fs aet ·and the content of 
the act. "&i1ine Tat geh8rt ale Wirklichkeit delll Allgemsinen an) 
ibr Inhal.t aber 1st die eigene Individualltit, wlche sich ala 
dieae eirlael.ne dem All.gemeinen entgegengesetzte erhal ten will.. rt79 
He unites the individual heart tdth uniVel"aal1ty by proclaiJlling 
"class in dem, was C'tesetz ist, jedes Herz sich eelbst erkennen 
muss. "ao But.· the re8ul t, ho11ever, is simply t he form or uni• 
veraality. '?.hat looked like the welta:re of mankind turned out 
to be but sel£-<onceit. nnae Belluestsein epriObt 1n die.ser seiner 
Ver:n.lcktheit die IndividualJ.tllt aie das Vemckende und Verkebrte 
aus, aber eille tremde rind 1uthlige • ttSl The Qontent ot uni• 
versality as herein examimd reveaJ.e. "die unruhige Individualitlt, 
f'llr Vtelche die Jl.eil1ung oder die Einzelheit Oeeetz, das Wirkliche 
umdrklich UXl:d das Umrirkliehe das Wirkliche iet. K82 
To· follow Hegel through his anaJ.Yais ot subjective in-
dividualism i.s to be unduly eilposed to. an umri.ae use ol the dia-
lectic in a r-ealm which 1e exceedingly dttf1cul t of anaJ.ysi$. 
It is highly questionable as to 'Whether the m1.:red motives ot the 
individual ca.n be etf'ectively unravelled by the application or 
dialectic principles. '!he dialectic is least impressive when 
iv. Individuality as the Good 
'!he su.bjeoti"fe individuall.sm which, according to Hegel, 
is the sine gua non or t he law ot the heart ie yet to be superseded. 
IndividualiSil: now claims a hearing through anotMr attitude whiob;. 
on the sur£ac:e at least, appears to give .f'uller expression to 
the universnl.1ty under~g rational self•reali~ation. The Good 
becomes the rnedium through \'llhieh these universal purposes now 
make their app9a:ra.nce. Individualism. grasps t bis newly found 
vehicle, not only as an essential prerequisite in carrying out 
the Good_. ancl then proeeeds to boast (JVer its proxim1 ty to that 
(',ood. The eJcte:rnal realm seM'ing as a vehicle tor this type ot 
individuallsaa Hegel ealls; "d.er WeltJ.auttt,.83 a realm supposedly 
containing n•> goodness within itsel£. '1lateVQr goodneae is mani-
fested in th;:1t external :realm, consequently, is thought to be the 
1t0rk of ind:11ridu.als. It is i!bown, on the cont.toa.ry1 that goodness 
does ·.not dep!nd ;upon the efforts ot the indiVidual, that, in 
reality, the world is good at heart and its soul is righteous. 
One lt'Onders, holfever, what goodness ·could ponibly means apart 
frolll the e-::llperiences of indivicmal persons. .Elnpirically considered, 
goodness is rooard.ngless apart !rom individuals. 
Hegel's disparagement ot this i'oJ"m of indiTiduali ty may 'be 
seen !rom the roUOWin oommenttu 0 Das andere Moment des WEtltlauf's 
ist die Indirldual.itlt, wel.ehe an and rGr sich Gesets sein w1ll 
und in d1esE!Ir Einblldung dio bestehende Ordnung e~rt.n84 Again; 
he claims that the universal receives its true reality tran 
virtue "durc:h dae Aut"heben der Individnalitlt, des P.rl.nzips der 
Verkehrung. 116S But he demands a reformed and refined indi'Vidual.ity 
8). Ftl, 274· 
84. POt 275. 
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and re sees its importance m en he declares that;t 
sie (die Tu:eend) wall te darin bestehen, c urch 
Au.f'·opferung der Individu$lit£t das Gute zur 
<rirklichkeit zu bringen, abe.r die Seite dar 
flirkl.1chkeit 1st selbst niQhts an:lers ala die 
f.eite der Individu.alit!t~ 66 
Yet be seems solici taus £or tbe tu ture wel!'are of indirldualism 
in spite of its present deficiencies by pointing out that, 
die Inlividualit£t des ~ltlau.f's mag· wohl nur 
fur sic.~ od.er eigennlitzig au handeln meinenJ 
Sie 1st PeS~r als &e meint, il.lr 'tun iat 
zug:te1ch atl$ic.h~tendes, allgem.eines 'J.'un,. 
V:enri sie eigennllt.zig haildelt1 so weisa aie 1'ltl.'r 
nieltlt was e:te tut; unci wenn sie Vot'sichert, alle 
n.achen handelll e1g$nrJltzig1 so beh:auptet sie 
nur;l alle Mensehen haben ~in Be1ftisetse1n 
darilber, was dae TUn 1st. 7 . . 
Indlvidual.ity on this .lem of the d1alectie* however1 
is disqua:U.r~,d according to Hegel because "ee ist also das Tun 
und Treiben &'r !mividualitlt Zlfeck an sich aelbst.n88 A higher 
staee of indi,riduality,, it is argued;, is yet to appear. 
PUrporting, there.tore , . to act from hie sole, personal 
interest, the individual late1" discove~s that all along he has 
been lfOl'king :tn the interests ot the common or univer~ ~ood. 
Thus, the actjlon ot the individual becomes significant in that. 
it is, at the same tixne, an expresaion ot the universal. Here, 
aga1n1 is a 1\:trther manifestation of the dangers inherent ill 
Hegel's orgarulc phUosophy. ~at troubles t he interpreter t:J£ 
Hegel at this point is that no matte:r how the individual thinks 
~ · . . .. • ...,... r ··' ·· 
lO'i' 
or acts, he doee '80 within the context of the uni:versal, and 
hence his aetton must eventuate ill the goOd. Hegel fa.Us to 
recognize the devastating results or evil in the parts, in indi-
vidUals. 
Her·~~ as elsewhere;, within H'-ellelian thought any -r.orth-
wh:U.e evaluation ot the matter undei" consideration is largely de-
pendent on tb~ meaeure to which one believes in the validity ot 
the dialectic l!lethod. ts t:ru th present in the final ca:tegoey 
only, or does each stage represent some .mea.aure of trut..'l? It 
one takee the rormer view of the dialectic 1 then individuality 
on arq laTel ·t.a.kes on the natut;"e of !!Ul instrumental value. lts 
value is oont1d.bu tory to a final synthesis in Which alone truth 
is faund. 1\l:ls view seems t-o dominate tiegelte thinldng as ex• 
pounded on pr1ecedi.ng pages. I£' the latter view is ~lected,. then 
individuality on the higher levels or the dialectic assumes in-
creasing s:tgn;lticS..'l¢e. Basic to on~f' s ev.:l,uation of (JJ:IJ{ Hegelian 
concept. t~~tore1 is the question whether each stage contains 
some 100asure ot truth or whethf#' .truth may be found onl.y in the 
final stage. 
T• Indivi~lity as Self-expression in CO!II'minity 
Inctlv1duali. ttY in ita evolutionary journey has now reached 
the ve'ry' threuhold of a free spirl.tual c01Dmlllity,.. a mode of ex-
istence in 'Wldch the indiVidUal .is univ~ealiaed, so to speak, 
by virtue of his union with the whole,. and the -.hole is partieu• 
lariz.ed in thEt individual. The Hegelian conception or. individual· 
ity stands or falls on the outcome ot this union. In order to 
lOt 
determine the va:U.dity of this claim" Hegel• s definition of con-
crete individuality nm,st be clearly stated. 
Selt•consciou.sness hieh is, o:t course. the underlying 
ground at this c:xpress:i.on of indiv.iduality1 haa no grasped its 
own inner principle, stated ~Y He~"el. asJ nnJku.ich in der Gewis.sheit 
seiner selbst alle Rea.Ut~t zu. sein,.n89 The purpose and na ture 
ot selt'....eonsc:iousnesa from this !Y.)int fol"l''Ud consist in the in. 
terpenetration of the u.-uversal and individ\lality)Xl It is a 
process of "complete concrete penneation"1 a thorougboogoing 
"coalescence", language• incidentally,. which is unmistakablY 
He~l.ian in it,s mea.ninth The a.bstra.etiona ot the types ot indi-
viduall-ty ana.lyaed on the preeeding pages are eonoretized by the 
ever-present d.ialectic. Consciousness has at last become liberated. 
Says Hegel: 
Das Bewsst.se1n hat hie:mit allen acgensatz und 
allie Bedingung seines Tun~ abgeworten; es geht 
fri:seh von sich aus, und nicht aut &in a.nderes1 
sondern auf aich selbst. Indem die Individual! tit 
die ""firklichkei t an 1hr selbst ,ist, ist der Stoff' 
des ·iz~ns und der etreck &us Tuns an dam Tun 
selbst. 
In 1n'der to bring out the elar.i ty of this expreaa1on 
of individual;Lty# Hegel identities it as follower 
Das Flement, worin die Individual.itAt ihre 
Ges·~t darstellt., hat die Dedentung eines r.einen 
Auf'uehmens dieses GeataltJ es ist dar Tag iJ.'ber .... 
haupt, dem da.s :Be11Usstsein sich zeigen vdll.. Das 
Tun verHndert nichts und geht gegen nichts; es 
69. PG, 283. 
90. PG, 283. 
91. R!, 284. 
ist die rciM orm des flbe:rsetzens aus dem 
Nichtge:eehemrerden in das ·nesehermer®n, :und 
dor In."lal t, de:r au Ta6 e aus ,ebra.cht wird und 
eich da.rstellt, nichts an:lera·> als was diesee 
Tun schon nn sieh ist.. Es ist an sieh: dies ist 
aei·ne Form als gedachte Einhei tJ und es t.st 
'Wirklich1 - dies 1st soi.11e Form als seiends EinheitJ es selbst .1st Inhalt rmr in dieser 
BestiJ:mll.mg der Einfachhe.i t ge.gen die DeotinllJTilne' 
=atnes flbergehens und seine~ DEmegung.92 
lnd1vidu.a.li ty in co:amuni ty~ a a on each of the preceding 
levels, presents itself fi~st in its immediae,y, as something 
purely implicit, denoti ng that the reality of individuality ia 
not yet set .t'orth. 
. Die Individualitlit t.Jtitt dah~ al$ 
ureprlingliche bestimmte lfa~ aut., - ala 
ursprfing!.iehe. Nature., d&nn sie ist an sioh1 -
ale urs~lieh bestim:mte, denn das ~Tegat:tve 
ist am . Ansich, und dieeee 1st dadU:roh eine Qualitlt,93 
This original na tu.re o£ o-on.sciousness appears as the 
proper and only content of the 1ndiv1dualts purpose. Hegel ob-
serves that «in 'tlthrheit aber ist er die von der Individualitltt 
durc drungene ea:u.tlt .• "9h In true dialeot1e fashion, he ~es 
the moments o:mtai oocl 'Within the sitilple original nature.95 
O£ :nore than passing interest in Hegel's treat.mnt ot 
individuality at this juncture, is his interpretation or action. 
"Das 'lun 1st :o&nlich nur reines ifhersetzan a.us der Form des noeh, 
nicbt dareestell ten in die des dargestell ten Seins. n96 Again• 
----~------~------·~ 
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11das Randeln :let eben <IDs ~\'erden ttes .teistes als P..ewsstsein. n97 
~\6 cannot kno1r1 the i mplicit natut'e of consciousness, therefore, 
u..'1til it is at~tually r ealized. Uegel seems unduly· concerned about 
action. Re pays aU too li .tle attention to intention. gain; 
hOTJ is consciousness realized? 
The principle, t hinks Hegel,. is appltcable to the indi-
vidual_. . sine~ "das Individuum kann daher nicht wissen, wns es ist1 
ehe ee sich durch das Thn zur i:rklichkeit gebracht hat .u98 
The maeter of t he dialectic is· convinced that everything 
in connection ·with individuality is accounted for, and an adequate 
account o£ it is no-w at hand. 'Ihe following would appear to be an 
exceeding,l.y dt:>finitive statement. 
Es 1st niehts tth- die tndividualit!t; wa.s 
n:l,el!lt dureh sie1 oder es gibt k$lne 'ffl.rklichkeit, 
die nicht ihre Natur und ibr TunJI und kein Tu.n 
r.oeb. Ansich dereelben, dao nicht '1'1irklicb. ist.99 
Moreover-, Heg.3l finds the original nature of the individual scarce-
ly possessing one Spot or blemil!!lh He find$ no occasion for la,..o 
ment, regret tlr even for repentance. His ;position at this point 
is unu.sually :L-ucid: 
~ :tindet daher {lbf.trbaupt lieder b'hebung1 
noch Klage, noeh Rene stattJ denn derglelcllen 
allies konunt aus dem C',edanken her, dar sioh 
einan andern Inhal t und ein andere s Ansich 
ein1:>ildet, als die ursprtlngliche Natur des :rn-
di V:lduUlllS und ihre in dar . ·;trkli.chke1 t vorhandene 
91" ro ... 287. 98. ro; 287. 
99. PG~ 290. 
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Ausr.Bh.rune 1st. "'f s es sei, da-- es tut un ihm 
'Widertlibrt, dies hat es getan, und ist ~s aelbstJ 
es kann rntr ru s r.u"'stsein d~? s r ei nen trbereetzens 
seioor selbst aus der Nacht der .lSglicln:ei t in 
den Ta!t der Qegemmrt; dee abotrakten Ansi ch in 
die Bedeutung des wirklichen Seine, und die 
n is~heit ha.ben., dass, was in diesem ibm 
vorkommt! nichte andere iet, ale was in j.ener 
soh lief. 00 
'lhere can be little doubt as to the interpretation nf 
individual! ty to 'Whi ch t he dialectic process has be.en leading 
Hegel . It ian a view higl"UY colored by a determinism made po&-
sible by the pureuit of the ditllectic. It is l.ristotle sm.mg 
.full circle. No matter llhat the development,. it was al'WaYtl po-
tent1ally SO<i It. is too suegestive or the potential becoming 
actualized m~ t h a veneeanee. Hesel cannot retrain .:f'rom declaring 
that "dies i:!t der Begl"iff', Tl'elchen das Bewsstsein, das sieh 
seiner al.s ahsoluter Durchdrineu,ng der Individual! tit und des 
Seine gewilll 1st,. von s:tch macht."lOl He clAims, moreover, that 
the view ot :lndividuali ty outlined above is col'l.f'imed and supported 
by its exper:tenee, and its reality ae;reee with ite .Bet;rif'f.l02 
flelt-eoneeio·uenees gets a true conception or 1 teelf' hen the stage 
or the real intent has been reaehed1 and the true conception ot 
sel.f~onseioueness is, as Hegel persistently o.ftime, the inter-
penetration or 1miv1duallty <1nd objecti"Vity, an interpenetration 
which hae becooe objective. 
The in epa.rabllity of individuality and univer88lity 
100. PO, 290. 
101.. F'G, 290. 
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112 
is clear seen~ s Y S 1cgel> in th.~.; e:xrJ ricnce of "cce~ tion. 
Havin'J once nitiated a ~roeram o.- activ·ity, t _1e individual <lp-
pears t o be pursu.ing so1-:-.e clearly defined end. .thcrs aBsurnc 
t hat all act:l.on 'is .... ein~ directed toward this end. :·.'hen, however, 
t hey express concern over tr.e pro j ect, even t the extent O.i. or-
fering assisi•ance • t 1ey then see i was t e individual ' s O'ffil in-
terests and. concerns Wl:ic.1. motivated his actions . They i'eel cle-. 
ceived~ Upon examination of their orm motives, ho'lever, t..'ley now 
admit that s:l.mil.ar private i nt.Elrests and not concern ·.-rith distant 
plans w.'ld pui•poses form the basis o£ their action. · Thus, sug. 
gests Hegel, there is. dee()ption all around. The tl·uth, he argues.; 
is plain: each indiviwal acta for himself i a ay indicative 
of his own nuture. But, tortuna.te:cy, he thinks1 the vet·y activity 
1 tself publicU.zes the act; thus bringing it lli thin the scope or 
universal consciousne·ss and'maldrg participation posai le on the 
part of all. .A.ctualiaation, . he cleverly suggests, is 11eine 
Ausstellung des Seinigen in das all~ine :EJ.elll:lnt. ul03 
Indiv-idual. ho.ving thus led us to a consideration of the 
real intent, also includes eonte recognition o£ substance. 
Sie ist vielmebr die von der Individuali tit 
dulrchdrunge~ aibetaniJ daa ::Ubjekt1 worin die 
ln:!ividualitat ebenso als Sl.e selbst oder al.s 
clli:~se, wie al s alle Individuen ist,. und das Allgetooinei' 
da1s nur als dies · Tun Al.ler und Jeder ein ~in 1st, 
eil:le WiJoklic it darin, das• dieeea Bewu88teein sie 
al;s eeine eim,lne irklicbkeit und al.s ·irkUchkBit 
Aller wei sa .104 
103. :83, 299--300'. 
lOll. Pl, .300-.301.. 
113 
doubtless .'le't.ivP:te the a.ormant poter.tial:t ties of the indi-ttidual1 
Hegel tails o-n t he other l:and 7 to reckon ri t b. tt.e lJr csence of 
mutual aid and t.he place or aJ. truism. in co.'llr.luni ty 1 fe . Dia~ 
leotically this latter emphasis coul~ well e lncluded ,. i thin 
the range of hie thou¢,1t.. 'that self-interest ie pl:'csent is psy ... 
cholodeallt trr1e; t}"\-.at a1. truiem is absent is sociologically 
£al.se . 
vi. Universal cond1 tions of :tndividwll.i ty 
'!he present step in the developnent ot individu.ali ty 
is to ascertain, according t o t he Hegelian ~ a.ii ver111 t he universal 
cond:i tions under which all ind.i vi duals must live in society. 
These conditions &.."""C many, yet they contribute to th.e oreness of 
individuAlity. Someho''1 t heir plurality must be unified, since 
no ultilnate s~sparation is po '"'sible Within dialectic thought. The 
l aws germane to the guidance o! hwns.n co.nduot must be ma.intained 
"tdthin the un:tty of udie absolute Sache11105 lmich is, for Regel, 
"die sitUichc Substanz._nl06 
lhe.,se laws -of the ethical lite are directly recognized 
and aeknowledi~• 1heir origin and just.U'ioation are rooted in 
self-conaciou;:;ness itsel.r.l07 Hegel cites t1vo of these laws. 
"Jeder soll d:Le Wahrheit sprechen. nl08 "Liebe deinen Nlehs~n 
------·---... - · 
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ru.s dich ~elbst. nl09 
kind have 1:1 ttl e if any un:Ucrsal C;)nte.-& a.11d fail ... ina'.llarly -'~:~o 
ex_pre~s anyth..:.nn; objectively real in i1:Lld for itself, a ,.-·oessary 
condition if sue .. la s a:r 
He criticize~; 'thel"' oocaus.e, "solche Gcsetzo bleiben nur beim Sollen 
stehen, haber1 aber l'..eine \';it' u1chke1t; s:le ~in.d r-.J.c .. t Ges .tz.e 1 
sondern nur (lebot . • nlll For l~eeol, these so-cal_ed et ictl.l lr..ws 
are disqunl:U~ed on the groun th t they ro1=r eno. t fo ,, ::itl oat 
content., and anythinr; sue; .estive of lJare form o ... universality 
is quite un~wcepta le t o t he dialectic . .. e forn:I\.tlation oi: ethical 
laVJs u_r1dcr ,., tic J ·· ndivld alit-.7 mus·t; operate is t.he ·17o1,k r x·e:ason, 
ej.nce reaoon alon"3 can t cs \'Jh t is laid o , and can pass judg-
ment on the validity ,;f t..hcse l aws. 
It is not at all apparent -.y Hegel contines the uni-
versal cond11;ions of ethical in ividuality to the aboYe- :nentioned 
la e or coo:mnnde of the morr.u life as llo calls t..hem. Rational 
morality for the al:ert indi vidlal rar aurpasse s nere. moral com-
mands even' .ten giv-en under the auspices of an institution. Fl'om 
the days of Jl.ristotle it aG been recognizedJ thou 1 not always 
practiced, tuat tnere cannot be .fol• •ithout content. Hegel makes 
no advance :twr e . 
6. Tcnmrds Concrete Individuality as Spirit 
He!!el mnkee the transi ti.on from what ~ y 
109. ·;., 304. 
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tel'Md abatract 
to concrete ~~ndi'Vi.dUaliV atter h1s presentation of ethical. lawa 
1n their ~~ly torul aaweot, and thus begins his eXpOs! tion or 
another pha~t ot indiViduality. He 11i suggesting that it these 
laws are me~•ly formal,. that 1s1 devoid o£ content, they a:ttord 
little meaning and leas motiva.tion tor the understanding and ·en-
l"ieblrlent ot human experience.. Content. i.e add.d b7 the concrete 
expreelion oj~ social. life.. Not untU this OCCUl's do such lmrt 
have reality~, To put the matter brie.tly, tbe position &SQUDied 
ia that real individuality can be realftu!!d oril1 within a social 
content, and no true universal content is present saft in an 
ordeJ'ed sqc1.4~ty. Here alone does individUality 'become tull.y eel.t-
consc:l.oue anci at the same time give.a concrete expression to un1• 
versal mind. The stage marking the full manifestation ot indi• 
viduallty isi, for Hegel• that ot spiritual ~eten04t• All the 
preceding stllgea· of indi'ridllall ty; we are as8U14ed* ~ preparatory 
to social Colrl&ciousne.e-.112 In reality; they wre absvaction• 
£rom the lifj:1 or concrete eptrit 1nto which indJ:Yiduality baa now 
entered.. 
'lhis trj~ition,; moreover, :tnal'ks the ••shed between "eub-
jecti.w" and "object1• ~i t• ,llJ the· .tormer treating ot the 
inward aapefrte ot 8pb-it1 whUe the lattel' relates it to the ex-
ternal world. Hegel views the social _structure as euppl.ying the 
. 112• F.or •n Qeeellent ~ in. Hegel '• own words, .- PG, 
3J.4.ll5; in ·llihloh he rela.tes Spirit to eonscioumees; Selt-
conseiousne.es and Reason. · 
w. H$gel reters to "'Objectift ep~1t"' as "der wabre 
Geist", PG• .ll7• 
means whereby spirit is to become effe-ctive :1n the actual world. 
Since, therej:ore, social institutions are spirit. actualized 1n 
the world, they .fall under the designation of objective apiri t. 
The concrete appears when the stage of ap11'1t has been reached. 
"Der Oeiat iutt die n ttl.iche '\'l.l.rklichkei t-. .n4 Ethieal reali VI 
according to Hegel, is an empty tormali.ilm apart trom society, a-
part trom ob;Jactive epirl.t. 'The l:!.ne be:twen abstract and con-
crete is dra,m, therotore, at that point in llhich individuality 
takes on soe:Lal relationsbip•· The diatinction is as clear-cut 
as it is .tun:tamental tor Hegelian thought. Prom now on1 urmaual. 
vigilance must be exercised 1n watching Hegel•s response to the 
elaims of ~B individual. '.the vital cornsi~ation is the part 
he plays in ·the evolution or objective apiri t.ll5 
1. Individuality 1Jl the Ethical World 
Spi.r1 t manifests 1 teelt on the concrete level or social 
lite in tho•e compcll1ng human adjustments which make organised 
society poeai'ble. The eocial tabrio takas- the pattel-n ot law and 
order, sign and 51Jilbol ot conventional lite. 
As al.lr&fa, the d.1alecticl8gina to operate on the material 
at hand to discover the eooial ayntheeie. Selt-conac1ousneaa1 
pivotal to all experience, Arxl a wealth ot material upon llhich 
the alembic Q-f -th& dialectic ~ "RRrk. The substance ot soCial. 
U£e at this sta-ge 1e made up ot human genus and specdea; race 
114• FG, 314. 
ll5. Her.l glvee a brief preview ot the ground to be covered 
1n ro, 31s-Jl • 
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and nat1onaljLt,y• on the one band, and the sexes on the other. 
lndividuali~r set MW be tJ-aced as it finds expression "Within 
this designa.'lied area of eocial lile. 
C01maon knowledge hae al ~· recognized the organic 
connections a.nd ineeparable features ot the above aspecta which 
are part and parcel ot the lite ot 8llY c~t;y. '!'hey con~tute, 
in Hegelian thought, integral aspeota of social consciousness. 
It is obvioll.a, however, that they 42!'e. at times a s.ource of con-o-
fiict in the1 lives of 1nd1v1dual.a comprising that community. 
1he ethical moments llhlch Hegel. ine'V'itably finds present 
assume the 1tiWC>!-fold torm ot a law o~ indi viduall ty and a law of 
universali~r,U6 but they are spj.ritual in nature, we are assured. 
IndividuaJ.i•t;y, however, aseumee the fOZ'IIl .of sel£..-consclousness 
in general. "Die Einselh.eit hat an~ Weacn, das 1dr bier 
betl'achten; die Bedeutung des Selbatbewuaetaeins tfberhaupt, nieht 
eines einaelnen suthugen Bewuseteeins.•U7 Jloreover, rtegel 
specifically states that indi"'-duals ~ presened 111. thin spirit 
at this staget 
Es 1st Geist, welcher tGr sich,. idem er 1m 
Ciegenacbe1n der Individuen sich1-und an aich 
c'der SUbstanz ist, indem er aie 1n aich erhh t. 
lQ.s die 'Wil-kl1che Substanz ist er ein Volk,8aJ. e 1drklichee Bewuasteein Barger dee Volkes.l.L 
~l'he author goes on to su.ggest that Spirit as conceived 
in 1 te univeraal. aspect gives rise to human law and customa.ry 
U6. PO; .)18. 
U7. PG, 316. 
118.. .PG.t lJ.9. 
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convention. . In the form or particularly 1 t is "die w:l.rkliche 
tt Oew.i.ssheit seiner selbst in dem Individuum uberhaupt, und die 
Gewiashei t. ~~iner als eintacher I ndj.viduall 'tlt ist er ala Regierung. nll9 
The family is listed as one o£ the moments in the ethical 
orde:r1 and, :in so tar as it is made up or individuals, its rele-
vanq here i!l apparent. But Hegel unfortunately' finds it prac-
tically lost 1n inmediacy and ~tanding in Sharp contrast to the 
nation, and E~ven the ethical order 1 tself. '!be ethical relation 
betwen mmbf1rs of the f'amUy is mt based on the :relationship 
of love but lll13t be found in the relationBhip ot the indi.Vicmal 
member to tht1 entire ta..'!dl.Y, to tamUy life as a whole.l20 How-
ever, tirl.s i:! not, he claims, to loae sight or the individual 
member. In one of those rather intrequent statements in 'Which 
the individual seems to come into his own, Hegel saya, ~r 
der Familie ~~igent:kJ.iche, positive Zwok ist du EinZelne ala 
solcher. nl21 But one wondars what he means by the individual as 
such. Obvio'llsly, there is no ret~nee here to true indiVidual-
ity as that 'llihieh represents the uniqueness or each individual 
member ot thje tamily.. This contention is in part validated 'bJr 
his obsenat:l.on that 1n or del" :fo:r the relationship w.i thin the 
:family to be ethical, it must be substantial and unive:raal, and 
the lndirt<il.al considered aa universal. 
Daae nur dieee Beziehung aittlic~ sei1 kann 
er nicht; weder dert Wlcher handelt• noch der1 
119. PG, )19. 
120. PO:, )20. 
121.. PG~ 320. 
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aut"1t'81Cben sich die Handlung .bes1eht, . nach einer 
IU!'liilligkeit a'Uf"treten; 1'1ie etiva ·in irgend einer 
HU:te oder Dienatleiatung geachieht. Der Inhalt 
der tti. ttliehen llandlung muss BU.bstantie.ll oder 
ganz und allgemein eeinJ sie k:ann Sich daher nur 
auf den gancen Einzeln.e~ oder aut ihn ale 
allgemeinen beziehen.l2~ . 
No cJ.eBftr statement as to the status or the individual. 
llhen cons1d.ered as a Illeltiber of a family only1 could be found any-
where than illl the foll01t'1ng1 "Weil er nur al.s Bllrger Wirk:lieb und 
wbstantiell 1st, eo :let der Eit$elne. wie er nieht Dt'irger ist, und 
der Fam;Uie Bi!lgeh3rt. nur de .. umdl-kliche marklose Seh.atten. ul23 
AgilLin,. the contribu.tion made to the ethical comtnuniv 
by the indiT.i.dual does little to enhan<» h1a value.,. ~s Hegel: 
J)i) .. · r . Tod 1st die VoU. · endung ~ •. L. h8chste Arbei t, 
weJ~che das. !ndi'd.du.ulll al§ solches Lur es (dae 
s11;tJ.iobe oeme. i.nwesen) ibe.rnimm.t. Ab~· 1. ne<)f.ern 
es wesentlicb einZel.ne$ 1st, i&tr e.a Zut · . ig1 da•• 
se:Ln Tod unm1 ttelba- mit seiner Arbe,:t t · . fJ .Allgemeine 
•u1sammenhing und Resul tat derse1ben Yar. · 4 
Th4~ 'l!'l"ite~ is so inastent that all tafDUY rel.ationtbips· 
have their l"l~ality in the universal., that all particulars a:re 
brushed a.sidle, .even to the point or absurdity. Here is a striking 
instance of ·llhe dialectic terminus 1t one insists upon applying 
it to all su'bjects t 
lm Hause der Stt.tliehkeit ist er nieht dieser 
Jlaon,. nicht dieaes Kind, aondern ein ltann, Kinder 
ubet'haupt11 - ntc.ht die Emp!indung1_ sondet'n das Allgel1l8itlfii1 ltGl"!lllf aicb dieae Verh4J. tnisee de a 
Weibea grunden"l.25 . 
122. iG,. 320-)21.. 
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He concludes his account of the ethical life or the 
wife as a member of the family by noting that 
idem al.eo in dies verhlh tnis der Frau die 
Einzelhe1 ~ eingemisoht ist, 1st seine 
SittJJ.chkeit nicht reinJ insofern sie aber 
dies ist, tst die Einzelbeit gl.eichglhtig, und 
die Frau entbehrt das Koment,1s!ch aJ.s dieses Selbst 1m a.ndern zu erkennen. · 
Hegel laude the role o£ t.~ brotheJ.oi becau~ he 
"ist die Seite, nach welQber ihr Geist zur Individual.it.Rt wird, 
die gegen anders si.eh kehrt und 1n das Bewusstsein der All,gemeinhei t 
ttbe ht nl27 'lhe brother makes a si "!"'~ 4"4 cant contribution. there-u rge • . t,.......... ,
fore, to the concrete ethical order and hence meets Hegel ts ap-
proval. "&' geht au a dem gfJttlichen Gesetz, in dessen Sphlre er 
lebt.e, zu denl menechlichen llber,. ttl28 
In a conclud1ng statement on society written from the 
standpoint of justice, Hegel notes that the purpose of justi ce 
.is to bring 'back to the 'Whole the independent olaeses and indi-
-viduaJ.s which have broken . away .t'rom the harmony and equilibrium 
of the wbol.e •. l29 J\lstioe, he claims is "die Reg:Lerung des Volks, 
welche die e:i.ch gegerrdrtige Individualitlt dee allgemeinen 
·~~oens und <h:ir eigne selbatbeTfusste Willen Aller ist.nl30 'l'hua 
he .gives to govenllOOnt t he expression of individuality. The in-
dividual pernon as · we know him must be subdued, sinee justice 
demands mast.E!ry over h1m.l)l 
126. R~, 3~. 
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11. Individuality as Ethical oti on 
The limitation T..tdch individuality faces in the realm 
just reviewed., argues Hegel, is that 
da~: ~:elbstbe'wusstsein noeh nieht 1n se1Mm 
Rechte aJ.s einzelne IndividualitHt a.ui'getreten; 
sie, gilt in ibm auf der einen 'i te nur ale 
alJ.gemeiner \'~len, auf der a.ndern als m.ut 
der· Familie; dieeer Eiooelne gilt nur als der 
umr.irkliche Schatwn.l.32 
Action is not yet present. !t is not until the act is 
perforoed th~~t the self' is realized, because, as he says, ,;die 
Tat aber ist das mrkliche Selbst. nl3l Action ae described here 
l'DE.lrke the tr1msi tion from thought to real1 ty-1.34 - an exceedinely 
important consideration in Hegelian philosophy but not taken up 
by Hegel at this point. 
ti'tJlin the content of ge.ooral ethica ... action, 1 t is 
quite natural to consider features such as guilt and crime, ®eds 
and actions. ' ere, again, Hegel appears :to minimize the serious-
neScs of acts ~rtormed b'J single, l'artieula.r ind1viwals. He 
anticipates future cowoont on the subject by declaring thAt 
ei erhellt utlnittelbar so viel, dase es nieht 
dieoer Einzel.ne 1st, der handel t und sehuldig 
iet.J denri er a~s dieses ..:,~lbet ist nur der 
utJ:wirldiehe 5ehatten, oder er 1st l'JU' ala 
allgemei,nes Sclb~t, und die Indi~dualitlit 
n~:i.n daa fc>rmal.e Uonaent des Tuns Uberhaupt, 
urud dar I nlJalt die Gesetze und Sitten und, 
bestimmt tur den einzelnen, die seines S'tandeaJ 
er ist die ~bstanz ala Oattung, die durch ihre 
Bf!,stimllltheit zwar zur ut 'td.rd, aber die Art 
bleibt zugleich das .Allgemeine · der {'Iattung.l35 
--------.-------------
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HeQ!elto position with respect to the place o£ the in-
dividual in national life is even moJ:"e articulate, especially in 
his assertion. ·!:.hat 
da~1 8elbstbewusstsei n steigt innerhalb des 
Volks vom Allgemeinen nur bis zur Besonderhei t, 
ni~:ht bis zur e l.rmolnen lndivid~litllt herab1 
welchs ein ausschliesaendes <:!elbst, eine sich 
ne .;ative 'arkliChke!,t in seinem, Tun setzt; 
sondern seinem Handel.n liegt daa aichre Vertrauem 
zuxn aanzen zu Grun.de, worim . sich. niohts li'rendes, 
ke:Lne Furcht noch .Feindsohatt einmischt . l36 
on Hegel :returns to ttsittlichen Gesinnung"137 a""ter 
the dialecti·~ has r.1n ito course, the agent is £ound to SUTI'end:er 
his characte:r 8nd the reality of' his eelu1.38 
'l'he adherence of the individual to ethical la;w estab-
lishes his very sub6tance·. .'h1le this substance appears as the 
controlling element in his life and destiey1 it is, a . the same 
time.t claim~' Hegel, his character, so that ethical individuality 
is inherently one with t.~e univel'Oal and .. indeed, exists alone in 
1t.l39 
DJ~aw:l.ng heavily on Greek drama, and taklng the life of 
the ancient Greek ci. cy•state as his model, Hegel proceeds t o pit 
tJ:e individual against the community in an attempt to shmv that 
the opposition between the two,. thou~h perhaps inevitable, is 
never final. On its formal side, he aaye, the .struggle is that 
of aelf-conseiousneee nth unconscious natureJ ..mue as to content, 
1.36. PG, 335. 
137. ro, .336. 
1.38. PG, .3.36. 
1.39. ro,. 337. 
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1 t flimply repres&nt s t e rt pture of d:!.vine and human law.l.40 He 
has the youth emerge from the unconscious life ot the family to 
be the real :tndividuali ty o., the cormm.mi ty, namely, the ruler. 
But there stjLll remain the clairn.fl o.... the other members of the 
family l'bo, i:;oo, have a stake in society.. D'lequality is present, 
but government, 'Whi ch Hegel summarily catalogues as ttdie einfache 
Seele oder daa Selbst des Vollalgeiates",l!al cannot permit a duality 
of individ\Ullity, Of two brothers, declares Hegel, the one li1.o 
attacks the coumunity headed by his olfil brother, colii'Dits the crime . 
Hi a only jue;titication for attacking hi s brother is to oppose him 
as a particu~ar individual detaehed from the eommuni ty. Hegel 
justitiee t his on the basis that 11er hat nur das Individuum als 
solehea, ni(:ht jenes, nicht das Wesen des menechl1chen Rechts. 
angetastet. nl42 t wauld be difficult to i~nd in all Hegelian 
· phUosophy a more trenchant statement on the necesai ty o! eon-
fornd ty to ·~he eOllii!Uni t;r than the follo'ld.ng a 
term die I nd.1v1dU.aJ.itRt, wlehe an 1hr 
Flirstchaein die Oetahr des lanze.n knHpft, hat 
sich selbat vom Ge89inwesen auageatossent und 
18st aich in sich auf'. n;,n einen a.'!:)er, d:er auf 
seiner Sei te s ich £and, w.ird es ·ehren; den 
andern hit-.gegen, der sehon auf' den ll.auern 
e:eine verdstung auspraoh, wird die Regierung1 die 'Wieherhergestel! te E1nfachhei t des ·· ~lbsts 
des Gemeinwesene, wn die letzte Ehre bestr £en; 
'tlleX" an dem h&:hsten rteiste dee Bewuestseine, 
dar Oerneine, sich zu vergrei.f'en kam, muss der 
Illre seines ganzen vollendeten · ·. eens, der ~e 
des abgeschiedenen Geistes, beraubt weren.l43 
140, PG, 3)8. 
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1 egol discovers uthe ~ave wisdom of ll".&turit.ynl!lh to 
consist in l')j~t s indi£.feronce to particular aims, personal satis-
faction and y.xr'ivate pleasure, to an awareness o£ n!J.at is universal. 
The com.-wnity, he nrgues:t must suppress ~his spirit of indi~WU.iem 
if it wants to pre~rve itoolt,l45 ~ven though it has brought this 
spirit of individua.lisn. into e::dstenoo. :·,~ a..~ led to believe 
:finally, 1£ v.e follow Hegel·' s train of thought1 that i ndividual.• 
ity in its mc•st :rreaningful form ~~to 'be tound in the coornunity' 
i tsel£, 2ayEt he concerning the community 
ee 1st ein Volk, es 1st .flelbst Indi'v.idual.itllt 
und \'tesenthlich nur so rllr sich, dass ande:ce 
Iruti "Viduali tHten .f."{ir es eind, daas e::s sie von 
sic:h atlf!Ocblies.s t und sich unabh1lngig von ihnon 
... :lss,l40 
In reviewing the material llhich Hegel offers under the 
rubri~ of et11lieal. action, it would .appeat~ that the ep1ri tua.l ex-. 
iatence o£ t:ne indivirual is t~ closely bound up with the esto.~ 
l ished social order.. 'lbe destiny of t.~e individual and the com-
munity are too indisaolubly one. The on':cy' true indi:viduality is 
the individuality represented by the community. Individuality is 
assuming mor·e and more the nature of the social whole. His ap.-
pt"oa.ch to et•hical questions is t .oo mti.eh \lilder the influence o£ 
..,di .... e...,· ..,..Si .... t tl-.i.,c...,h~it by llhich he meane social e thics. Die J!;O:rilltlt 
Which features the ethical life o£ the individual, though not 
necessarily apart from society, as Hegel seems to su~gest1 is not 
. t . • . 111,........ ... 
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euffieiently '" '""lor.ed nor Zull y nppr ciated. 
7. Imi·ri.duali ty and CUlture 
Selt..-eonsoioueness; it is once more asserted, must seek the 
univerAl t..'lrough a process or alienation . !ts clc.im t c validity 
rests, theref'ore, on ito conformi.ty to the uni versal, a univer-
sality 1th1eh has undergone sufficient development to enable it 
to beoome cotJ.crete and actual. 
ow the me&als whereby a.n individual achieves concrete actual-
ity in t his l"ealm is through the process lmovm as culture .141 
Heeel now pursues this phase of individuality. 'l'he inner nature 
of the indiv:i.dual. is revealed, moreover, in the estraP.gezoont o£ 
spirit from jLts natural e:xi8tence . Here Hegel recognizes the 
active part played. by individuality, for he declares that 
"diese Indiv:Ldualit.Ht bildet sich zu dem, was sie an ·sieh ist1 
und erst dad1li'ch ist si.e an sic.~ und hat lrl.rkliches Da.aein. nl43 
Yet, \Yhile he~ goes on to sa:y that uz.ck und Inhal t abcr geh8rt 
allein der allge neinen Subst.ana ealbst an und kann nur ein 
Allge111eines· seiun, l49 he does not indicate whether purpose and 
content are ·merely greater in scope than the indiviwal 1 or tha.t 
the indi:"lidual ould. no.t lay claims to 8'..1eh things . I t is not 
at all apparent ~ "die Besonderheit einer Natur, die 3weck und 
Inhal t l'd.rd, ist etwas urmJlchtigea una lJmfirkl.ichee",l50 and that 
----- ------~------.-----
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it is enga ed 1.1:1 the n9eloss rroeeduro of bfvin!! l.1eaH.-tzy- to the 
bare particular, unless, <lS he says~ reality :ls iR._,o_facto~ - uni• 
versal~ It seems unquestionable that tor Iegel i ndividuality ::mst 
~o bey'ond re pnrticularity, and if it in ·to have ::my realiey at 
all, it muat t...ransee d the part' cular . H." s '~tieT4 is expreEmed 1n 
' nn daher dhechlicherv<eise die Individunlitllt 
diet Beeondorhei t der Nn.tur und des Charakters 
, E.etzt ird, so f:L'lden sich in der x-eal.en -:elt 
kej.ne Individ.uali titen und Ct.tarakt$re, son~ern 
diE• Individuen haben ein gleich@S Dasein fiireinanderJ 
jet vermeintliche lndividuaJ.itlit ist eben nur das 
geXJleinte Dasein, "'<'Jelches in dieaer ·.;el t, worin nur 
d :s SichselbstentBusaernde ~d darum nu:r dae . 
Allgemeine ~'!l.rkl.ic~-it erhii.lta ken Bleiben hat.l51 
That th.•~r is eatran~ment between the individual and his 
culture, Heg.~l.- of course, readily admits, but estrangement for 
him aenes tl.~e purpose of the dialeetic only too well. The 1ndi-
vidual. is estranged in order that he ndght :~hare in univers.'U ob-
jectiw bein ,:. I.ndtvidual dcvelopoont seems incidental to tho 
lattor, as is revealed in th follc::minc sta.ter.)entt 
Denn die Hacht des :tndirlduums besteht 
da.rin, dass es sich ihr genJlss macht, d. h., 
da.ss os sioh seines Selb.sts ntJiucsert, also 
si ch al(-!2dte r,egenstl!ndllche seiende ~bsta.nz SE:tzt.l.:> 
In tn cal dialectic develo'flllent, "das Selbst ist sich rrur aJ.$ 
aufgehobnec w:irl"J.ich . ,.15.3 
'n1e trail of· individuality i$ pursued throu@l the state and 
-------------~--------
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wen.J.t.ll., represent:i.n<-; af; they <: o o ,:io c'tive realitil~ s in co .crete 
cou"' .,i oua 1 _.c: .154 Individuals exr-re s s the i r c ... oont" al :ta t ' r · 
ti'lrouf!h the po·\'ter of t ' e s · .ate in which tJ1e consciousness or their 
o w.iversal:tt-y- consti tutes their pm~Ucruar e:xistenee~ It stands 
a s the absolu:·Ge b .. &i. s of all t .eir ac ,.ion. 1 .. . n i n . e case ·ot 
. alth, argueti Hegel, 'l.' l iJ:.e the enjoyr.- .nt of it calls attention to 
the aelf-exi.attence of individl.lals, yet t his very er1jo :1ent i a it.. 
self the result of universal aotion.l55 And so it turns out that 
in the r,ase of every individual., "sein Fllrsicheein ist dahor an 
eich allgettdn."l56 In these spiritual powers of wealth and the 
state, self-J:ontciousness, in the form ol inui·ndllala, i"inds its 
substance, c~:mtent and purpose.l57 
Thb oolf' .... contained individual, hO'k18V9l:'.t P..egel proceeds to 
poi t out, does not regard the siia.te in the t1~e light of tho a-
bo"le . The individual sees all action denied and rejected und 
fi~ discovers himseli' subdued into obedience. Little v.onder~ 
argues Regel , that he recoils before this power and turns back 
into himself . '!bus, he has the feeling that instead of hia in-
terests being identical 'fd th those of the state , the state is 
sonething qcdte discordant 1dth individuality. A.s over against 
this mistakE:n view, ea,ys Hegel, t he pOiover of the state, 
iut tells ruhemcs Geaetz, tells Regicrung und 
E~!fehl, Vleleher die einzelnen BeTtegungen des 
aJ.lcemeinen 1\ms anordnetJ das eina die eintache 
, .... 4 .::-~ Ill J~ 354 .. 
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~b.stana selbst, das andere :l.hr sich aelbat und 
Allie belebendss und erhal.tende.s run. Z.s 
lndlviduum tindet also darin seinen Grund und 
sen ausgedn'lcktt o:rgan1siert und betltigt.lS8 
Again, in his analy'sie of aenice~ Hegel takes the universal, 
not the individual as the point o£ departure. He conceives service 
in terms o! ~ ·die Tugend, welche das einzeltle Sein dem .A.ll.geme1nen 
au.top.t'ert, .... die Person, welche dem J3es.:l.tze und Oenuaae von selbat 
entsagt und J~ die Vorbandene Macht handel t und wirkl:!ch 1st. ttl59 
Ria insisteli1~ claim is that the itldividllal w.Ul1 ae ld.ll, must be 
surrerxlered1 .eince in order to p:resene iteel!'• individuality must 
go t.lll"ough the 8Xperienee or .!'enunciation. 
Die 'Wahre Autopterung des 18raicheeins ist 
daner allein die,. ..orin es eich so Yollkommen ala 
1m 'Ibde h1!lg1b!1 aber in die8EtJi Entiusserung aich 
ebenaoaehr erhllltJ es w.1.rd dadureh ala das wirklich, 
was es an sioh 1st, ale die identiache Einheit 
seiner aelbst und aei~r ale des Entgegengeeetzten.l60 
Individ:uali ty, it is clear f'raa the above, must undergo, in 
each succeet:ive stage of ita develo}:lllent1 this process o:f tran-
scendence in order that its t\111 potential1 ty may be actualiaed. 
The self, an such, must be abrogated. No an aicb can remain un-
touched by ~!ihe ale.Blbic Qt the dialectic - not even the eel!. 
In his diecus~f~n of absolute lreedom and terrcr 116l another 
rutile ~'aaion or the individual• 8 struggle tor a substantial 
spiritual J.;lfe ~ Hegel 1ntro~cea apiri t aa abaolute A-ee.d.om. 'lhe 
material preeanted is relevant to too argument irt t his chapter 
mainly because he relates t he universal t o the individual will 
and_, in so doing, identities the one institution in society which 
constitutes the ind1v1dnal embodiment of the univereal will, namely, 
the atate. 
Spirit ns absolute treedom• he tells ue, is assured of its 
omt pure perjsonaJ.ity and contequently of all spiritual reality. 
It rega.rd1 the world as its own Will, and this 'Will is universal 
will., not thta emp~ thought ot will 'Which is at best but a r.ere 
symbol of 1dll1 but the concretely embodied universal will, the 
w1ll. of all individuals as such.162 ! t ii!J etrik111{",l.7 obVious• 
however, th.GLt Hegel asSOCiates 1d.ll an s10h 'With single individuals. 
'lhe tollowitsg paasage1 t herefore, which appears to magnify the ~ 
dividual by virtue or the fact that he actualisel!J will, must be 
read in the light or this Qb·servation. 
Denn der ~me ist an sich -das Bnusataein 
. dsr ~a8nlichke1t o&tr eines Jeden1 und aJ.s: dLeser wabrhatte wirklJ.che Wille soll er sein, 
ala selbertbe'lnlsstes Weaen aller und jeder Per-
s8Jllichke1 t, ., daas jeder · inlier ungeteU t Alles 
t11t, und was al.s Tun des GanSen au.ttri tt1 das 
umi ttelbare und bewusete Tun eines Jeden ist.l63 
Moreav-er, Hegel's disparagement of this type of i'reedom is 
cleu-J.y inelicated in his cCIIIII8nt that "dieee ungeteUte SUbat.ams 
der abaolu1;en Freiheit erhebt sieh aut den Thron der Welt, ohne dasa 
irgend einu Macht 1hr Wideretand au leiaten ~chte."l6k 
In the courMl of t he dialectie developnent of t he universal 
wi.ll.1 the var·ioue distinct apiri tual spheres • ae well na the 
rest.J'icted ar.d eontined life o:t individuals, a.re transcendbd. 
Speciticall.y statedl 
ner allgemeine W1ll.e geht in aich, und ist 
eit~elner ~;Ule 1 dem daa aJ.lgemeine Oeaets und 
'\'Tei'k gegenG.bersteht. Aber dies einzelne Bewussteein 
is1; sioh seiner ebenao unmi. ttelbar ale aJ.l.gemeinen 
W!Jlena bewuast .. , .. macht es also nichtg/inzelnes, 
sondel"il nur oesetse, uM Staateaktionen.l 
Hegel nc•tea, furthermore, that deeds aleo do not take on the 
dimeneion of real univereal aelt..eonsciousneea in eo far as they 
must be exprt)saed 1n single individuale. 
nasa das Allgemeine zu e1ner Tat komme, mutra 
es sieh in das E:t.ns del" Individual.i tit .ZUe&!llmeunehmen 
und ein einzelnee Selbst.bews tee in an die Spi tze 
seJLlenJ denn. der allgemeine Wille i -st nur in eil'lem 
Selbat, das Eines ist, wirkl1cher Wille. Dadurch 
abcn- l!d.nd alle andern Einzelmen von dem Gansen 
di•~ser Tat ausgeachlossen und haben nur einen 
beJ:~chrlnkten Antell an ihr, so dass die Tat ni.ch 
Ta·~ dea. ldrklichen allgemeinen Selbstbnu.astseina 
ee:Ln w8rde _166 
UniverS<u freedom, therefore, produces neither deed nor for 
that matter :my positive achie~t. It t\ll'1'18 out upon examination 
to be 'Wholly negative, merely "die FUwri.e dee Verschwinders.nl67 
Bu.t in the H'egelian economy 1 it is necessary, since i t performs 
the negative function just mentioned, a fu:nct4.on which Hegel re-
fers to as death 1tselt.l68 
It 1 e at this :point th t the wisdom or gov~nt representing 
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the inteJ.lige,nce ot the universal will is introduced. Hegel ts 
words are expliei t enourji as to the na. tu:re ot tba t wisdom;, "Die 
Regierung 1st, selbst nichts andere als de~ '~ieh testsetzende . 
Pu.nkt oder die Individualitlt des aJ.lgemeinen WUlens, • .:L69 Thus 
it is ;tn uni1'er'Sal 'Will as it expresses itself' through government 
that Hegel fi.nds genuine ind1Vidual11:\)i'.l70 
This re::iult 1s1 moreover, · in keeping 1'Jitb hie observation 
. . 
on the state in the Enezs9.o$!• His comment. there is as follO'l'lst 
O:le Ind1v1dnali tl.t 1st die erste und die 
h8cihste durchdrlngeride Bestiimmu'lg in ch# 
O:re:ardaation des Staates.. Nur durch d1ti! 
Ree~erungsgewalt und dadurch• dass sie die 
bea10nc'ieren Gtscha.f'te1 'WOZU auc)'l das selbet 
be!ron~e, ·.rur s1ch abevakte Geeretz~bungs 
geEtehltt geh8rt, in sieh begreitt, 1st der 
a~~&t Einer .171 · 
It is a;t:•parent that any .f'orm or individuality which laolca 
organic total.it;y is not ae~a1 ind:S.Vidual1tq. t.tbere must be a 
un1 ty ot the un1 vwsaJ. and the particu.lar dialectically aehiewd 
to give actwl:l. or re$1 individua.:U.ty. 
8. Fact;ore in l~ral · In<:li vidual.i ty. . 
IndivldmaJ.ity1 eoneeived as Spit-it, reaches its dialectic 
eynthesis in moral individuality or eonseienee. It m~ks the tinal. 
expression o1' finite spiritual $:.11.-perience as realized within the 
scope of a gi.ven historical society. 1.'hus the Uegelian pattern 
of ~ating c·no phase or expression c>t '-ndi.Vidual.it"-J" at one time 
169. l'Cif, 419· . 
. 170. It; isnto be noted. that tJle occaeione in 'Which Hegel uses 
die Indiv1dusJ.1tat rather than die Einaelbeit are much more infre-
quent. -· '!be l'Ormer is a.FP_ . arent:Ly eie more concrete tens. 
171. mw, eect. Slal. 
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and a ditferent phase at another ts· faithfully. carried out. 
, .. :·, · .. egel f s statement runD as follows~ The substance of any 
o o • '.•T• " 
o¢.~ .order constitu.tes at the same time the content of all aelt-
nscioue 1M1viduali1:.w in so far as i is actualized in individual 
:f'orm. IMividuality eo eontrt.rued means spiritual indiViduality'. 
'I'he 1nd1.viduaJ. is so £ai tht\ll a replica of the total social life 
that his aetton is but the tlCtion of the vthole in miniature. lllen 
thil! stage of ~oraJ.ity has been reached, finite spirit is expressed 
throUW1 indl~·iduality. The univereality 'ldlich serves as the basis 
of the mul tiJile relationships existing .between individuals is 
epitomized in eaCh indivi.dlal. '.ftds developnent or imi:viduallty 
as in the cane of all other stages ot the dialectic has 1 ta 
peculiar stage$. !he se aspects or t p0 of sp1r1 tual self' Hegel 
identifies au 2 l) duty 1 2) hypocri sy, 172 J J conscience. We &!hall 
now a.ssees their contri'bu tion towards the categor;y of individual• 
ity.. 
1. Duty 
Hegel establishee the eXistence at morality by meana ot 
a series o£ J;>OStulatee~ incidentally, an approach uaed sparingly 
elsewhere in his phiJ.os~.. 1M harmony existi:ng between nature 
and moralii:w 1o postulatea.l7.3 Ed.stenoe as postulated is implied 
within the ~~vu.r ot morality.l74 He finds, moreover, not just 
one postulat•3 but many. ttJ:ene erste Erfahrung UDd dies PQstulat 
172. Dle V~etellut]tt ro,. 434-444. It i.e suggested that the 
choice or nta Versteli~ ie a verbal pl.ay on Heeel•e part. 
17 .3.. P. .t .li26. 
174. ~l, . 426. 
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1st nieht dae eillZcice, sondem es t~t. sich ein ganzen !rei$ von 
Postulaten aut.nl7S :re proceeds to find unity betTTeen nature and 
duty by claimihtt that nature lies..,,.:_ " ... ·d.n eonseiouene:ea.l76 Reg$1; 
however, fails to do justice t.o the gulf that often exists between 
nat'!.U'e a:'l.d duty. Part ot the ditf'ieul ty lie. a tn his anxiety to 
establish the toms or the dialectic. tis ia ·'lfby he regarda 
morality as i1nur oralisehes PA'Wtu;stsein ala die negative eeen11 nl77 
He appears Ulltduly c:o-ncerned. le et morau ty ehould contain any Qot'l-
tradiction which :might i."'apUgn tne validity of the dialectic, al• 
though the acrtual claim is tbat the saorednese . ot moral tt-uth YOUld 
be seriou&ly af.tected, and unoondi tional ®ty 'WOuld lose ito re-
al1ty.l.78 
In ords:t to ha:rmont.ze the plura.li t.y of duties, Hegel 
postulates "Eiin anderes Be'VN:•atsein welc:h$8 sie heiligt; oder 
welches sie als P.tl.ichten weiss und w1.U,.Jtl79 This cGnseioume as 
is such, we tu:e aesured, that in it "dae Ulgemaine und das B6sondere 
schleQhthin •~ins ist, sein Begr:lff also de:r~lbe als der Begrit£ der 
Harmonie der MoraJ.it£t und Gl,{lc;,ksel1gke1t."l80 
Hegel t a dissatisfaction 111 th the result aehieved by duty 
is• in the m;g,in, a dial~ctic dissatisfaction. He believes duty 
to be disqualified on the basis or ite onesidedneee• In hie view, 
it fails, tl1j;lre!'ore, to do justice to the f\1ll meaning or moral.ity • 
.... .. 4 
13h 
One may add that Hegel over.tormalizes duty .in his desire to make 
it contribute to hie interpretation of the dia.le.ctic development 
of experience·. 
11~ H1,POcri5Y' 
· Du1;y produces its ne-gative-as every theeis does. Hegel 
names die Vm•stellg, or what might be called hypocrisy, the prin-
ciple of ne~Ltivity llithin moral individuality¥ 
In the e:ouree of the argwoont that die Verstflllung con-
etitutes the anti theeis t o duty, Hegel has recourse to the place 
and .function of action as a featux-e of mo!Pal experience. ¥bile 
action does l!!eem to be taken seriously, he goes on to point out 
that 
abi!r in der Tat ist die 1drkli che Han(Jlung nur 
Ha:ndlune des e~elnen Be'Wil$stBeina, f(lao tMlbst 
mr etwas El.nzelnes und das Werk zui'hlig. rm-
Z'weck der Vernunf't aber als der allgemeine, alles 
umf'assende Zweek 1st niohts gerin~res al.s die 
.,an~e Wel tJ oin F.ndl'tfeek, der wat !be:r den Inha.lt 
dj.aser eintelnen Handlung Hinausgeht und daher 
tlberha!lpt uber alles wirklic.~e Randeln hinauszu.stellen. 
iat~ltU 
The basic c:r1 ticiem wh1eh Hegel offers on hypocrisy 1 as 
in the preceding aection on duty1 is its incompleteness. But all 
antithesis, one might add, are inevitably incomplete, and whUe 
deceit is reprehensible, it is so not because of its dialectie 
l1m1tationj but tol" a deeper reasonp Morality, he declares, is 
ehown to be incomplete. This bas been established beyond doubt, 
he thinks. But its essence is Qompleteness, hence pure moralUq. 
161. l'G, 436. 
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Since, aceorcti~ t o this type or :ren~oning., incomplate morality-
is impure morality, it is, in substa.nce, itnmoral1ty.l82 This un-
fortunate TeHult, says Hogel1 leads ··s t.o the conclusion that 
morality itsHl.f mst exist in anot.her being than the actual eon-
crete conaciousneu. R-& is n.ein heUiger moralieoher C'~setzgeber.nl83 
Fi:tlal.l:y', '\'Ve are informed, that a.ttm:- all "diese !'elt der 
Verstellung nichts anderl! ala die Entwiokl:ung des moralischen Selbat-
bnu.sstseins in seinen Momenten und hiemt t seine Reali tAt 1st. tt184 
The above expression or hypocriey clearly indicates that 
Hegel has ~:a~!1entted its plaee 1n the eXperience or the indi'Vidual.. 
Its place irt the development of individuality is stressed out of 
all proportton to its place in human life. 
111.. Conscience 
.wn moral consciouoness assumes the attitude of' con• 
·Science, cl.airls P..egel, then the one•sidedness o£ both preceding 
expresaiona o£ the self ie removed. The sel:t-.deeeption, accounted 
for on the 'basis o£ the :trinciple of negativity, !!lUst have no place 
wi~~in cone~iencc, even though dialectically contributory to it. 
Conacierme, it is held, r epresents t he u.tU.ty i n the entire content 
of moral individ.uo.lity. This constitutes its certainty. Thus, 
t.~e type oj~ self represented herG appears as the supreme achieve-
mnt of finite spiritual ext stenee. 
nut rret;el ~~s a danger in so ttpertect" an individu.aJ... 
. ,•' 
So complete i:s rl.s mrld and so full his life that thie t-.i}'e or 
individual seri.ously que st1ons the advisabUi t y of his participa.ting 
in actual social life at all• But, Pccordi.ng to Hegel, the ex-. 
iatenec or cc·nscience 1.s made possible only throucrh social life. 
Her e the stage is ret for the entrance of an individual who lft)uld 
cultivate fP<l·dnesa in iso~at.ion from his fellows. '.lhis is c3l.led 
the attitude ot ''die sch8ne 5eelen,185 a type of ind1Vidual1tho 
rejects objec:tivity by escaping from concrete moral action. Fiegel 
o:ffers severtt criticism for sue.}} an expression of goodness; and 
indeed identlties it as the direct al~"' of moral evn.l86 !nci-
dentally, hifl disapproval or this type of individual is cast 1n a 
more e!llpiricc:Ll form than is true in preceding instances. Hegel 
censm-es ind:J.viduality here because ita refusal to act n:oans in• 
difference u• all action, good and. bad alike, and for anothet-
t..'l11ng, its. dE:fiant isolation destroys the universali~J of the will 
hich he regnrds ao essential to all true morality. 
In this instance, as elseTlhere in the precedin , pa . s, 
t11e subject under examination (in this ease conscience), is shown 
to have a dil~ect bearing on the relationship oet-ween univ~rsal 
consciousnes1; and individu l consciouenese. Broad);· spea~in..z, 
much o.f ege1' s p .ilosophy arises out of the relationship oet .een 
the t11o. Conscience is claimed tc be the reSUlt of the trtu'l-
scendenoe oi the individual sel"!. ttAllein dieser Unterschied des 
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allgemeinen Belft111Steeins und des einzelnen Selbats i.st es eben, d.r 
sich autgehoben• und des sen Aufheben dae oewissen iet. ltl87 Tbue, 
vre are led to see, Regel might add., "die notwendi~ AUgemeiilhei t 
des Selbste.nl88 If, therefore, indtvidU4l.ity is to be given 
serious consideration within the Hegelian view of morality,. it 
must shaw clear evidence of this necessary- universali-cy-. 1he type 
of self represented by ttthe 'bEJauti.t\ll eoul111 t.heretore, is dia-
qu8Uf1ed because it lacks this essential basis o:f' universality. 
9 .. . A critique of Hegel's treatment of I nt.U.vidllality 
The developing pattern of the category ot ind1vidual1 ty as 
Hegel pereeiv·eB 1t, })as been traced within t 1 e ambit o£ hurt1an ex-
perience t o cover t he sp~ci:f'io areas of consciousness, self•con-
seiouanese, :reaeon and spirit. Here mthin the scope of this dE:-
tailed material should be found tha 100ruung and truth of i ndi-
viduality1 its natw;e and reeessity. \hat haa the i.nvestigation 
disclosed? 
I t would be d:J.;f'ficult to deny the fact that on the most -con.-
c~te level of his massive contributiorJ to philosophical thought 
Regd p;-esents a hi~ debatable wnthesi~, Curiously eno~t: in-
stead of offering d;l.e S.?..ttli chkeit, the a:JJ.eged apex ci' t he moral 
pyra.ntd as the s-.:rnthesia, . he establishes it as a thesis out of 
which evolves die 1klrl.IJJ .. t£t regarded by him as the most inco:m.plete1 
,A_., ......, 15,., 
...... , • .1;' ~. , i , • 
. 188. ro, 46o. 
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inadequa-te and one-sided e~ 1.- ~ssion o:f tho .mor<.ti consciousness 
possible tt Since no explanation is g:iv"Eln for t..l-ti s rev~rsal of 
moral terminoloc::r, it l eaves the reade:.· ~ome'fllhat beWildered ns 
to .~is purpose. ·rn any e~nt, the pre!!Snt writer feels it serves 
to aisqualii.')· the autonomy' o.r the morallY Jrt..e.tul"e in<'Iividua11 whether 
He!!el can be aecuee1 o£ d.eli'berately f osteri."'lg thi s or not. :'-.hy 
an over-tonnalized de-scription of duty1 an exaggerated aecount of 
hypocrisy and an exceedingly adVanced stage of Ilzy"stical salt-
absor-ption ure m.ngled out a£ the inevitable e.."tpressione of morality 
in its ind:ivi<f..1al phase is twne too apparent .. !s it a neces$a:ry 
dialectic preparation for re~igion \'fuich £ollar:s i:'imediat.ely in 
the r-dlr.omen.olo~ie?l89 ·r:::Jre $pecifically • l':h:Ue the dialectic 
supplies the necessary tension~ a~ nega.tivi ty 1 to guarantee the 
movement of thought and tr.o achieving o-: grcate1· truth1 l.:.ttle., 
if anything, is nade o£ the principle o£ equilibrium between t. e 
individUal and society in a tmy advantageous to the individual. 
The ten&lion betmten socie·ty and the ~dividua.l is resolved, to be 
sure1 but only to produce die Sittlich.keit ~dth all its cuetottiElr'J" 
connotation. 
Again, 'While the uat'u.re of the cat.egor.r of individuality i s 
reasonably clear i n Hegel f s writings, his usage . or tel"l!ls by :nea.ns 
oi' whi oh ind:i. viduali·ty i s ana.J.yzed, is strild.ng. Places in 1"1hich 
he .is plagued. by the pre~ence o;f the abstl"'act-. are marked by the 
139.. Eepeoia:ly in view of the tact that in EPN and FR1 the 
transition is from subjective morality to a concrete rational order 




prevalance of the t.arn die i...Melheit,. uood ,~omethes 3J.most as 
detached inmvi _al is das Einzel.m, :,hn only redempt.ion for wwm 
ll . . u. 1· 
lies in t he ~rr~edy appl.icatio~ . o~~·i~~ · dialectic. Hegel's positi.on 
on this . poin1; · is unmistakable. ~a Mnzel ne tlir sich ent·s:pricht 
. ' 
seinem negrif !'e n5.cht; diese Pes.chrlnktheit se1.11es Daseina toacht 
seine Endlichl<eit und seinen Untel"gang au.e ... l90 1hcn.,. hot:rever._ 
he is descrtl )ing indiViduality in and ~or it.self' (an und rlir atch}, 
he '~'.lSE:S the n1or e philosop leal expression, dte _ !ndividu..alitltt., 
ltoreover, -crhe!re does he disaqver its most Fu:te~3te e~xpression? 
. In addi M .. on ·to this treatment of 1ndirlduali t y as found in 
the lb&nanerw!,o i~.t it miEJ:bt be mll to eall. attention tQ the usage 
. .irt t.Jla f.in&oJ.oe "e . Several reforonees to i ndividttalitv" appear 
in !~:tprlt'11losopt'·ri.~;191 all r!W.rked, by ·an underlying e!Tlpha.ais on 
totality. ,Indivlduality is vieV~ed as organic. indiViduality , a,_ 
an organic whole .. ~hen one turn a, moreover, to FhilosoJ?N.e de.~ 
C..ej,stes-192 the result again confirms t .e eont ent:i.:on o! t his chapter, 
that ind:i.viCI:uality is best construed a.s all or ganic 1-mol e . IegeJ. 
ci ·-e s living ort;w..isms and a monarchic;U form or Government as 
suitable illustrations._193 Individuality follows thE\ 1-1ame structural. 




EJm, ooct. 21.3 . 
Si!e EPW1 sect. 273, and ~S&cte. 274-3)6 for an extended 
192:• lll ~PW, sect. 40~, Hegel uses c.U.e. Indtviduall.tlt under 
the capM.on, "Dit: · rBhlende Seele in ibrex- uiiiiili'liibark81 t"."w See 
alao "I~'J, s(mts. )hl, 5h2, 1n Wbi.ch monarchy represents real incli.-
vidu.all t;y. 
19.3.. S.te · m. aeets. 7 and 1$3 .tor similar expresoione. 
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~£he only unic;~ezwss wi1. en the .eatego "'Y· o:t indi,ridualit~· woulcl ap-
pear t o have in Hegelian thou.~ht consists in the fa.ct that it un-
folds d.:tnleci;ically as an ot·zanic 10 c . Ft.trtherr,'~.ore, t .ere is 
s tron evidence for believinG that HeJel T1as not at. all clear i _ 
his own r.U.nd as to the exact vel"'tionship be~en the vm-ious ex-
pressions ot individnality on itr. many level~ . It ma.y nl'3!m at 
t~s, for c~ mple, any td.ngle ht~mn E1elf as ov.!Jr a e.inst other 
selves. At other times, he is deeply en~oss~d in a consideration 
of the relat:Lons of thf~ .sinr;le self to other selves an -the develoP-
ment o.f that self under t .e stimulus of n.nother. Further, .and most 
essential, h1:1 r-.ay ha•1e i .n .mind L"ldivJ..dual:tty as an attribute of 
t e social u·Jlf (o.r o ject i1'.re mind)~ Finally, there is alvmys 
the possibll:ity- O.i mdividual:tty a.s an aspect of the Absolute 
Spirit. It 'riould app€al" i'3:•om tho pi.:·ese ·r~ation offered in this 
chapter t at Hegel has all these pl:.l.ases o£ individuality :Ln tu:i.nd 
all · the time.> nov· ett'.phasiZillg one expressi on., now another, It is 
quite a.PJ>arent thut ·c:l ehology and meta-physics s..i.ade L11to one an-
ot:ner., a fact tthio 1 never secr.w tc disturb H:=ge1 in tho l east. 
INmvlDUALl'l'!' AND PERSONALIT! 
1. The Relationship betwe•n Individuality and Personality 
l.n the pre~d1ng chapter 1 t •s establish!ld that individual-
ity; as diSC:losed within Hegel te logical anaJ.yeia1 becomes in-
creasingly s:Lgniticant to the degree in, whiCh it. is defined 1n 
terms ot a structural whole. 1bere is dialectic developmnt arul 
continuity in the category of individuality until aonS~mDation is 
reached in an organic whole. 'the probleJ!t of the present chapter 
is to ascel"tain whether or not Hegel's conception ot the nature 
ot personali.ty tollow the same 41alectic ·pattern, and to determine 
1t the View that personality ie the highest pos$1ble expression ot 
1ndiV1dllall1;y can be sustained w1. thin Hegelian thought. An attempt 
tdll be rna.&• to elbow that insofar as the Hegelian view f'alls short 
or these nt»1'Jill!l1 it is to that extent unsatietacrtory. 
Modern pJYChology by and large makes a dieoernable distinction 
between i.nctlviduality and person&lity. Individuality, it is 
argued,l displays the follOWing teaturest 1. !t may. refer to any 
organism possess1ng a sufficiently complex structure to . warrant 
investigation. 2. It ie applicable to any quality or trait ot be-
havior ~ree.sive ot such an organism. l• It JII&Y be ua&ci in a 
ao•t t . looee sense to denote JJJS" dUfet:"entiation among indi-
vidual entities ldth 1tli.n!lllUla attetttion beiJlg given to a standard 
ot judgment. Per80nality-, according to the author ot this article, 
beare unmistakable testimony to the tollowing reaturest 1. The 
term upersonslity"., it is held, ie applice. le to human organians. 
2. It refers, in part at least, to tl'l$. whole complex ot charac-
teristics wd.eh identit,y apparently the human indi:ri.dual,.. 3. It 
can-tea with it. ideae freighted 'With zaeaning~ ~ calling tor 
' . . . 
eTaluation. 2 
In view ot the above description o£ personal.! ty, it might 
prove instruc:t1ve to present Hegel t s rln ot pel"aonali ty as· over 
against this rather q:ternal approach given above. 'l'he question 
or the naturt! and eooi:al deeticy of personality in Hegel. becomes 
highly relev;mt in Vie1r of the alleged organic nature of society. 
F;qually inJ:poJ~tant, but perhaps outtdde the scope of the present 
work, is to ~~olllplll"e and contrast. Hegelts. view ot persona.l.i'\1 'With-
in the satti:llg of subjective 1ldnd 1f1 th the best modern pf.Y'cho-
logical &c.eollJlt of personality.) It "flill suttioe to observe here 
that in his exposition of personality within subjective mind, 
Hegel lists se'V'el".al features au."h as thoee ot oonaciousnees. m1nd, 
.teeline1 activity and the like employed by modern psyahologl.sts 
in their treatment ot the hlDD8n Belt. tJnlike the modern pq-
cholGgl.st, however, Regel. proce.eds to tranecend mere ~scription 
2. Not.iceably absent from the aboft treatment is aey specific 
reference to tm ethical aapect of personality. But aee Baldwin• 
DPP, I.t S39, in which this d&tect is •me'lfbat remedied by the ill-
eert1on ot material bearing a high ethical incidence • 
.3. Fori an excellent ln.lrVe1' ot modern psychological tindings• 
see Art. by Peter A. Bertoeci on "P&reonality"" in EOP, Harriman 
(ed .. ); l6S.L~7S. . 
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by tackling the J>l"Oblem of t he met.aphysical self. In Hegel t $ 
philosophical l'$Ychology, oonsequan'Uy, there arise the inevitable 
speculative i.asues which, 2lthough rust emerging within the lim1ted 
scope o£ sub~iective min~, have much broader epistemological and 
metaphysical ramifications. Some of t11ese iss\los center around 
the structuro o£ the self, the pature of the unity or personality', 
tbe relation:9hip ~tween unity and multiplicity and the meta-
physics of th.~ 1dll. 4. 
• 1he Account of Personal! ty u thin the fhlnoaenol.og:\e 
. ' 
tlo signU'1cant reference. to personali.ty appears in the 
lblnanenolosf! until the leftl o! s --,trt t hu been reached,. llhere 
it forms a synthesis to objective spirit under the caption of 
Reeht-ustan~.5 'to this statement lllU.St be added the tact, however;. 
that trom tllte beginning Hegel' e account of individuality lead$ up 
to the devel.opaent ot personality. In vin of this signiticant 
fact, the tAtm.ptation is exceedinglY strong to qgue that, since 
for Hegel roal.ity is essentiall.y spirit, it is dUf1oul.t to eee 
how he coulci perceive :spirit apart from persona, in view of the 
raet that they QOnet1tute the moat meaningtul dif-ferentiations of 
epir1t. 
i. Personal.i tq as Legal 
It is a baac Hegelian tenet that, through a dialectic 
4. 'l'heae Will constitute the eseential content ot Chapter 
IV on the ~:pec-..Uati"ore probl:em. tU-ising out of He~l• s phUosopbical 
peychology ot the indiVidual. See ibid., l.84.f't. 
s. f\'Jf, 342·31t6. 
proce•• the social atibstance is particularized to proQ.uee a 
total1 ty ot persol\e, eaCh. bearing .the true lineaments ot u.."li .... 
versality.. . ~~ted !Dlre epecittcally* 1ndividuallty is aade po .. 
Sible at thie1 stage throUgh .a SfStem ot rights, thua constituting 
what is iiel'llllld l~gal pe"sonaJJ:w-.6 li..,..eey de.veloped society makee 
possible thin exp!'$eeion of personality • . 
'lho treatment attorded pert!e!nali't\1 . he:-e is both brief 
and pointed. ftegelh!! def•nee simply consists· in the Claim that 
since thie i 1!J the f'ormal stage of pe¥"sonal1ty1 its inadequacy is 
thus aceountlad tor. Say-e he I in. desor:Lbil'lg the origin and nature 
ot persons,. "da.s AllgetJ):eiM in die A tome der absolut Vielen In-
dividuen z.-spli.ttert1 . die~ ges~bene Geist ist ein Gleichheit, 
worin AUe als Jede1 als ~sonen gelten.-.7 
1'htlfl1 personality: pre$'lppoa.es, and indeed requires, the 
lite .and act,i'V'ity of this ethical $\lbstance tw its emergence, 
since this I!:Ubltance makes poesible the actual concrete validity 
ot 1ndepen£~e,nt coMciouaneu Which Hegel previously disouuee under 
the title o1~ eeit•conaciousnes•.8 But per.,nalit:r as conceived 
here lacks1 according to Hegel~ the rich eth1cal content J!J8..dft pos-
sible th:r.ounh the presence or social .institutions.. Perhaps hif$ 
clearest ac•=aunt ot personality in thia abstract stage is contained 
in the follcndnga 
6. Sei~ alao Hii sects. 35, 36~ in which the same develoP"' 
ment ia ootJad. 
1. Fat .342-JIU. 
8. C-e•a pq, llA•l50J and PP, Part II, sects. 22•39» in which 
Hegel outU:nes the main features of self....oonse1ousness. 
Die Pera&nlichkeit 1st also bier aue dem 
Leben der :.i ttJ.ichen SUbstanz hera.Usgetreten; · 
eie iat d;S.e Wirklich gel tende Selbstlndigke1 t 
®e: Bewuestseins. :o&r unwit'kliche Cle.danke 
der·selben, der sich dureh Verzic·:r~tun auf' die 
Yfil'·ld.iehkcit wird, 1st .trflher als stOieches 
Sel,bstbewueatsein vorgekonmen; wie dieaes aue 
dez· Herrscha£t und Knechtschatt, als dem un. 
~ 1;telbaren tp.aein . &!Is Selbetbtwusstseins,. eo 
is1; die Personliehke.it aus dem unmittelb8l•1 
Qej,ste, det- der allgemeine herrechende Wille 
,Uler und ebenso ihJ' dienender Gehorsam 1st, 
hel~gegangf3P..9. . 
. ' .;.!;J: 
'J;'h•~ concept of per~nal.itq;, ae is true of' all lkee1i ru1 
categories, :La placed within the cogniti"'& patte~n, only to see 
its earlier taxpression, :first embedded within the 1mrn9dia.te, t?.-w 
place to ;1 later and more adequate deVelopment. A prior f'orm, 
typified, $0 Hegel thinks, in Stc;d.eisnj ia at best but the empQ' 
unit of the per:!Ort devoid of' spiritual. qualities. It is a slae1e-
toni.Sed manife·station ot personality signlt)in.g little more than 
the empty ti.tle to posaeasf,.on. "Dise leere Eins dar Person iat 
daher in se:t~ Reali tit ein ltlltaJJ.igee Dilae.in und 11eeenloaea 
Bewegen und Tun. alches zu ke1nem Be stand kommt. "10 But the mere 
eonseiousneus of right offel"s no inherent wbstant1ality so that 
"ein Individuum als eine Person bezeichnen ist der Ausdruek der 
Veraehtung. nll But the legal staee must be tr'Macended, sinee it 
represents but one phase of personality. 
11,. Personality as Ruler 
Hc~gel observes that this type ot personal.i ty loses no 
_... ___ .... ------
9. PO, 343~ 
10. m, Jhh. 
u. ro, .316. 
time in announcing hilnaelf as "the 119;ster ot the WOrld" 112 by 
laying tull claint to abeoluteness. His greatest detect is that 
he has parmi t .ted himeelf to become l.oosed from hi a anchorage w1 th-
in universal personality• 
Er ist t:erson1. aber die einsame Person, 
welehe Allen ~~nu.bertritt; di$se Alle mao.'lon 
din· ~ltende ~inhe1 t der Person aUsJ denn 
da1! Einzelne als ,SQJ.ches ist wahr mu- als all .. 
ge1os~ Vielhei t der Einselhe1tJ von die ear 
ab1setrennt 1st das e1naame selbst in der Tat 
das umdrkliche laattl.ocse Selbst. Zugleieh ist 
es daa Bewu.sstaein. des Inhalte, dar jener All ... . 
getUe:inen Pere8nl1chkeit gegenltbel'getreten 1st.l3 
Hegel permits the dialectic to run its course until. the 
person erect,s a pyramid out of his own selt•importance and power 
so challene:i.ng that -. ;er.. _ "sich ale den w.irl.c11Qhen Gott weiss.nlh 
While Hegel vi,ewa this type of person as eXpressive of a fox"mSl. 
sell, yet in aociety as we know it there actu.al.ly appear such 
people from tLone to time. Hia sel.f'...enjoymen\ ultimately becomes 
untenable b:u::au~ he overreaches himself. 1lat is pOrtrayed here 
is the perv·ersion ot the self, the loss of its eea<mtial being. 
Hegel ta near contempt for abstract personality is revealed in his 
statement that "die in der sittlichen Welt nicht vorhandne 
'lrk1ichkei.t des Selbst ist durch ihr zurilckgehen in di~ :?erson 
gewonne • ·rden. nlS Personality at this level or the dialectic 
represents a thorough-going estrangement trom univeraral personality". 
In thia :w~r Hegel accounts tor the person possessing uncontrolled 
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powezo, the use o£ which leaves much to be desired. Here the 
dominant wUl asSlliiles e;;reat px"Ollli:oonce. Du.t \T.Ul. moans mo?:e than 
sUent as~n1; or even executing one's 'Wish throug..~ a repreoentative. 
It imrolves ithe universal Will. The tenor or Hegel ts remarks it1"* 
tlioates that he is describing the autocratic type o£ l eader who,; 
pos'"ssed of enormous powe:-, represents absolute .troodoLI, Un. 
doubtedly his chief aim i s to disqu.ali±'y any such aberration ot 
personali V• 
He•gelrs treatment o.£ : pe~$0nal1tQ in this his grea·t.est 
expository s~count of the dertelopnent of hUJaan eXperience is e"'"" 
tremel;r brint and ,enmeshed 'td thin the tt'ammel• of property, The 
system of r :Lghts and duties, while erueial to the developmnt ot 
peraonal1 ty 1 does not exhaust it. In t hi$ work, Hegel f'aUs to 
do justice to the rich empirical variety- in personal.ity. Else-
Where, moreover, the same ~neral pattern prevau.s.l6 
,). HE: gel ts Psychology of Pereona.Uty 
:L. '!he Doctrine Gf the Soul 
Jl'n the J=bilos~ or_ Mil'¥1 Hegel Viewe subjective mind 
as !Jmnediate or implicit, and represents it by using the tel'm 
. . 
11 soul 11 by mich he means the Spirit in nature.17 It is obvious, 
on Hegelt ! , view, that intelligent~ volitional personality is not 
pre !!Sent a.1; this stage of t he c!evelopnent, hottewr neceesary these 
16. !n P?, Part I) sects. 1•21, for example. personality is 
si.m.Uarl.y exbau8ted 't1lldel" the caption of r.s Recht. But Hegel ob-
serves t t11sre, however, that "die Menschen ha'&in <Il:irch ihre geistige 
Natur Per:s8nl1chkeit." PP, Part !, sect. 4. 
17. E~ , aeot. 387. · 
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two ea6ential features of intelligence and 't'li.ll are in. concrete 
personality. Indirtdualiv as spirit in nature does not qualit)' 
ae person partly because subjecti-v--e consci usnoss is not yet diJ' .. 
ferentiated 11"01'!1 the consciousness of another.. Thus, all purely 
aensttive li.f'e, l'Vh11e re-t..-'"lining nond.nal. eonsciousne·ss, represent• 
a form or :b'!u!ediaey devoid o£ t he subse(fllent distinction o£ eu.~ 
jective ap.d cbjective, or the intelligent person and t he objective 
world.· 
Hetl~l introduces teel1ng i n the soUl at thi.s early sta!J$ 
1n the develclp!lent of subjective mind~ 1tteaning thereby that the 
soul enters :i.nto correlation with it.s i.nmlted.iata be1ngl8-an ob-
vious reference to the priooiple of negativi'l;y. . Vhatever truth 
there is in j~eeling is immediate, hence absia'act. lt ie to be 
observed1. honever, that Hegel does not ignore feeling. l!."'en though 
hi., account ot personality• as w shall see later,. is highly cog-
nitive, thia doea, not necessarily mean a purely intelle-ctual ac-
count of it. Here H~gel hae been improperly interpreted. To be 
sure,. it is ctuite cle~ that the relationship be'tmeen nature and 
feeling JlllSt 'be close, since mind at this stage is not. yet mind 
but soul, meittely "der Sehlat dee Oeis:tes.nl9 
Fei~ing, which; pre$UJDa.bl.y1 Regel regards as 'Wider than 
sensation ( stLnce man has !eeling in common wi t.h the beasts) ia 
1mpprtant to him because ot its f -oundational nature. ·ttAUes iat 
18. · P., sect~ 390 • . 
19. EPri_. sect. 388. 
in der mptindung,n20 Aga..i.n; even more specitically• "Alles, w.aa 
1m geistigen Be1nu•stee:Ln und ill der VernUn.ft h~ortritt. hat. seine 
QueUe und UJ'~ in der·selbenAP n2l · HO.ver • the inadequaey of 
feeling lies in :1 t s unconsciaufi am ·unintelligent ind:ividuali t;jr 
wlth the reSlaltant i.nlmediaey of any distinctive f:eatures. Feeling 
is prior be.~LUse it is irtlmediate~ Hegel ~all• that it is onl.y 
by vi:r~e of the tran8oendence of the feelu,.ge that man hn"' )fi~en 
raised above the beasts, yet) at the same time, he possesses 
teelings in <:ammon 'W:i:th them.22 'lhu.s• the groundtrork is being 
laid .f'or the eventuation of the thinking self. 
11. The Feeling Soul 
'lbEt transition frota sen~ibili:ty to the reeling or sentient 
soul is achie'ved dlalectically by diffel"$ntiating between feeling 
and sensation. '1he latt&l' Bllgge$ts pae.s1vity. 
'ihEt eenttent soul is defined as "die e1ntache !dealitlt, 
Subject1vitR1; des ~ntt1 23 thus underscoring tb.e element of 
ideality. HEtgel points out that the feeling goul is an inward in-
dividual.it,.2l~ in 1Vhieh ideality 1$ perhaps 'best illustrated by 
c lling atter.1tion to our ideas and to taemory-.25 '!he reterenee to 
memory 8\lgge:llts the unity or the self, although Hegel does not 
speei!'ie~ mention it. ln aey event, howe.ver~ arr:r uni "tW a:ppearing 
on this level ia to be regarded as a unity ot f-eeling. 'fhe 
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observation tl:tat '~ie:t" i st die se Einfachhei,t 1 . der Heeh) zunach.st 
als fllhlende''',26 'WQUld .lend credence t c .this· c1airn, t his soul is.t 
or eouroo, ilrmediat e , hence n~ .. t \ll'al a.:nd cor·.,oreaJ.. It is cle~ly 
enmeshed Ttithin t..lJe l ife of teeling, and~ as· a eonaequ~nee , BU.b-
jeet to the tt~any biol.ofP.,cal pr essures. llegol • s de sCl.•i ption o£ 
the soul as ~.he totality o.f' nature ha.s an i mportant 'bearing on 
the problea ct! this dissertation sii'lce he ~iterates i ts ore.~anie 
nature. 
. Die Seele ist an si oh die 'l'otalitlt der l!atur; 
al~: indiViduelle Seele ist si.e Mo:n.a®t sie sel hst 
1s11 die geeetzte '!'Otal1tlt .ihrer beso:n®ren \\9~t:~. 
so daae diese in sie einge.schlossen, ihre · 
Et-Jfu.lung ist.27 
ThE1 ::.oul~ as ind1v1dual.t is always exclusive . Sentient 
totality is 1;he basic eonsideratJ.on~ Tt.e underlying su.betance 
correctly in1~erpreted met be vie'fJied as nrnhatt der indirlduellen1 
von mtlptindung ert.lluten_ ~le.,tt28 Mind a~ displayed hero 
''ist t.llr· sich die . Stufe sei ne!" Dunkelbei t• 1ndem SiCl"l 1hre 
Best~n nicht zu bewusstem und verstandigem l nhel t entidclrelr.1. tt29 
Obviously, tl:Le stage of' mind referred t o here is content or.J:.y-,. 
without foJ"m~, or pure· potentiality,. Sen$i.tiv~ indiViduality' is 
monadistic·, j.mmediate1 and hence :abatract and passive. Th$ dia-
lectical deVEtlopment is e10arly present . when he declares that 
"somit 1st dEtseen selbstisehe IndiVidual1tlt ein wn 1hm 
26. EP'l~, sect. 40).. 
27. E~f~ so.ct-. 40). 
28 ~ EP~~, s~et. 4o4. 
29. EPYf, sect . 404. 
versohiedenes &lbjekt1 da.s auch ala anderes Inciividullla se;Ltt kar..n•")O 
In fairness to Hegal1 bowevar, it ®st be noted that he cites the · 
pre-natal individual as a sui table illustration in t his instance, 
to be .followe·d later by introducing ·the somna.ni1>ulist as a furthe1• 
illustrative :possibility·• Ha is speaking of a lli6rely nominal. ~lf 
l'fholly dependent on another £or it.s sen$&tions as ?.ell .-:ts its 
ideae. In conclusion, the purely senSitive life,. even ~. ~.l.e re-
taining nominal conseiouaness, is disqualified on the ground• 
that tr~re is no di stinct.ion :ruade bet•en -ij1e sub jecti ve ·and · the 
objective, between intelligent personality anc:l the worl;d about 
it • .Jl regel thus vi-ewe the soul ae a som&'Rhat vague wrperian.co 
of feeling too indefinite to be kno'rm adequatelY or ana.lyzed sat-
isfa.etol'ily. It ~ans -essentially 'the principle of life considered 
in the Aristo,telian sense, t.hm\gb he does not eay so . 
iii., 1be Actual Soul 
In pu1"$Uing the developmental advance J Hegel .argues that 
the s()Ul achi.eves sufficient mastery over the biological to be 
called a single mbject-a stx-uggJ.e S'l.lggestive of a moral dualism.. 
Here the body represents the soul, of ~hich it is iixleed the sign. 
I n its bodily e:xpreesion~ the soul feels itself and makes itselt 
ielt. 32 It :i.s apparent. that the ])'!vsiological organiem is the 
instrument ttil"ough 'llhich the soul man:lfeats itseli'1 or beeomea 
aetual, as I-!E~gel says.. l?henomena au.oh &$ the upright position 
JO. E~~, ~ct. 405'. 
,31 . EPU1 sect. ~~ 32. EFJr1. sect. lAl.. 
ot .an, ·the f orm.ati n of.' li. b , esJ.-ecialJ.:;r the lw.n . , and the 
~ 
presance of l~Kmtru.it-.r · re cited as e .:.dences of eo rging human 
mind h ... s appeared to d t.c . -_t<Jgol de scribes t he pr cess Tihereb 
t he actual soul a.p m-s as a synthesis of t he ph~ ::;ical a .d the 
teelinf: in t he following Treys 
Die wirkliche Seele in der {lewohnhei t des 
Dnptindens und ihros konkreten selbetee.r&u.s 1st 
an nch di.e rGr sic..'-1 sei.ende Idealitlt 1.~er 
P..e,:~timlltheitenj in ihrer luss~liehkeit erinnert 
in sich und unendliohe zi,ehune au£ aich. Di s 
?{f.. sichsein der freicn Allgemeinhei t ist dae 
hobere Er\mehen der seele ~um .. Ich, der abatrakten 
Al lgemeinhei t, inso.f'ern sie tur di~ abstrakte 
Allgemeinhei t ist, 1Yelehe so l,'lenken und Subje.kt 
!'8:r lrl.ch und Zlfar bestimmt Subjekt eeines 
Urtella ist, in ~lche..tn es die n-atflrlie' ,e 
Totalit£t 11seiner I?estimrm1ngen _als ein Objekt1 
eine ihza ll"J.ssere rel t, von sioh auesehl1eest 
und . ·eich darau£ bez:Leht, eo dass os in deraelben 
unr.nittelbar in sieh reflekt:tert ist,-das 
Bewusatsein.J3 · 
The vi tal thin to note in Hegel• s discussion ot ·the 
soul is to eee that mind has emer.ged as the. supreme product or 
result of the natural vtorld, the truth of nature. iegel never 
sugeest a .for on& moment 'tho:.t soul is somethin,.., over and beyond 
the life of ... ich it forms tl e principle. !n his or anic system, 
the principle cannot be removed !'rom the entity under examination. 
Hegel claime, that in the living organism all variety ·and di£-
f'ersntia tiol'.i. of parts llJllst somehow .fit i nto a pattern of unity and 
ident1 y or ideal.i ty. For . egel, the real tooaning of the soul 
represents t . e intelligible unity of the organ:h m. It does more 
'· 33. El , sect. 412. 
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than ·merely erxplain how it is possible to .havc ~uch a un·t~. It 
is the unity,, a."l.d in t his sense, it. exprcsaos the Begri££ even . 
though quite inadequately at t'1is s-t;ag~~ ;ls I3e!p-~ifi' :;:.t m~ans th~ 
real possibi:Li t y of intQlli -;enc€1 m bo: realized subsequently . It 
of ml;m'ti:ll li.t'e in i ts org.:l..."lic environment.- But in order to beegme 
what in prospect it contains, i t must ;e'tec its<ll£ from its limita• 
tions. All this is irt1olved 1n Hagolfs statemen-t that "in der 
Seale enraeht das Bewusstsein .. ,,34 · 
4. The Forms of Mental Activi 1.jy 
In Hege11•s logical analysis of experience, . mind emerges 1n 
its individual cxgreosion as the truth of soul and eon$ciousness,JS 
the forruer, as we have just seen, cc:msti tuting a simple :tmmediatt 
t-otality, the latter e~rging out of soul as tne principle of nega-
t i Vi tr.v.. OW:- imli.lediate task is to studY the general £oms of :m.ental 
aetivi. t y to W!ich Her;el gives the ~ peyeholog36 in his ana.l,ysi$ 
of subjecti·iTe oind. Accordingly'. an a.ccou.nt o£ the nature of the 
individual self utll disclose mental vision, ideation, .tnemory-1 
d<Jsires and the like. The basic:: accomplishlnent of mind is that 
o .. "ca!.i~:Lng its ~mjft or freedom and to tr$-nseend all forl!l~ ot 
:immediacy. 
The ~eareflt indication o£ .U.nite mind is its aubjectivlty. 
:U: t~c Bog:·iff ot m;Uld bp $p$Qi.fied as objective l"eason., then ita 
~--~----,-----.~------
raaJ.i·'y _s kno ledge or intellie:e~ ~~ If, on ~ e other hand1 
knowled"}"' "Je ident.if'ied as i1i $ !l<::&.::t!.£, then its ren.lity is ob• 
jective r~aa->n and kno'tVledge is rea :i.zed y using l'eanon, 31 '!'hue, 
reality of its reason~ and, (l-CpaJ.l:y; the f ailu.""C of reason to ctt,... 
tain its Ml manifestation in kno;;:le ge, are both .ndica.tiw of 
the fini t11de of' mind, 
Mind, tli.outth not in its individual form, develops in so .i'ar 
as knowledge keeps rattcmality as its intrinsic purpos&. Tho goal 
which mir..d SEtte up,. Heeel d~sor1bes as tollowen · 
Insof'ern das issen n1 t seine;r ersten 
Be~ttimn1theit behaftet, nur erst aba~akt oder. · 
i'oi'llleU i~t, ist das Ziel des c"!l(Jistes, die 
ob~lektive FJ.-tlh.lung U.."ld , dami t eugleicll die 
FrE~iheit seines "~ise.em~ hervorzubringen ,. Jts 
It is s1;ated in addition 'that if tha actiVities of the mind 
are expressed in terms of' thei;r utility or sui.tabil:l.ty for eume 
stated pr1va1~ interest, then the true and f.'inal. aim may be quite 
f orgotten. Hegel defines the true ,aim ot mind as its intelligible 
un:J.ty1 bu.t ru!¢ess1tating all inlr.-sediate and eubjective elements if 
tru.a liberat:Lon ie to be achieved·. This liberation calls for t."::e 
so-cal.J.ed racml ties o£ the mind £'or its con$l!ll.n)at1on. This, we 
at-e emplmtically in.fornsd, is the only right procedure in studying 
the mind and i.te varioue a.etiVS.ti~te.l9 
--·-
I . i ..• . ,,r • .. J .... 
37· E~'f, sect . 441. 
y...,.. EP1, , ooct~ Lk'' . . (:. a 
39f 3PiV, sect. 442. 
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consclcu ness, ·whereas em "1.1he e~lie::." leval c:!: consciousness the 
eJo and to o'bjec"t '.'Jere sca:rcely ind,is·binr;u.ishable . hO 'lne pre sent 
sesses t , .is · two-fold ~spent, ().r be~ne on the one sic1e1 and + le 
. se o.~- :ttsel· 1 on t.he d'h ~m·,ltl !ler; ·.l 'i.:.:races the develo~ 
me.nt of ind t'P..rouah a dla.lect:c course consisti:ttz of reason,. -'-.dll 
and ft.ee m .... 111 other \'lOrds' tbeoreti'c&l :mind,. practical mind 
free m;tnd:. U2 Here t in s:u.bst,ance ,. nre the essent,i~ 
features of mind, ol;" '\'7hat ma~r be termed r:eeel •s dc"e:t""lption o:t th 
self.. It is a rational) wlll:tng1 Zreedom-saekl.ng 
all one-sidedr~ess must eventually he transcended. 
includes some or the most empirical · eler.J.ents of in-. 
it \"TJ.ll be seen, howeve:r;, t..bat his prim21'7 emphasis 
falls on inrmir uni.t'y"'.Lllg principles Within personality. 
1., Human Intelligence 
Attention is directed to the vielr that intelligence is 
t he more inimE~diate fonn of theot"eti cal. mind; 11hel"Et<ls intelligence 
O'Wll.L.J 
d~ consists in t1 .. eating •mat has bean d:i.Elcovered as its 
e aim of intelligence i s tho :-eci.U.zation of its Be~-1(! 
~lie aetiv1.'t;y pertaining thereto, r-iegel daSCl"ibes as 
"Das Tun der :rnte1ligel'$ als thec.retischen r:relstes 
en gena.nnt mrden.n44 The point i~ made, moreover, t.llat 
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inteUi oe irwolYee: more than the ability to know, even in ad-
dition. ~cth Valuable activities as intuiting, eonc«ti'rin£b ~ 
memberin , 1Dtagi.n1.ng, $te. tntelli~nee deals with the ta:r deepei" 
que.-tion as t.o 'Whether ·OJ" not true knowledge is .even possible. 
Hegel, o ousl:y.; has tar surpassed. the mere psychological 
on c1£ the prooee.as ot knowing:- 'rhia is what makes hi• 
t kr10wledge stiatulating and .t.ruittul. He is anticipating 
metapbTa cal eogni tion. In typical faeh.ton, he casts hi a net 1n 
a broad .1aJ.t,otical ·~· ttWa.briiatt aber iet du Erkennen,. ebem 
i.naotern e:te es ~klioht, d.:t. den ~E:U:t denelben rlJr sich · 
Cc;gni.tion includes the etagee o£ intuition" conception, 
the Uke" !here i .fJ no purpo$$ in theee atages sa"Ve 
he !~f.21tt ot eogn:ttir.m. To t:rea~ them in isolation is 
to cut em l.ooae trom their anchorage W1. thin knolrledge and thtur 
to subje t them to all the exagger.ated delights or intuition1 
. illaaginat1on.46 ·!he cogni\iTe is required. Says he, 
n:te wahre BetriedigUng aber, gibt man 1u1 gewrlhre nur ein von . Ver$tand und Cteiat durebdr\lngenes 
Anncll$.u.en, wrnlnttilf!s Vot"steUen, •on Venlunft 
dul"Chdl"ungene, Ideen da:rst.eUende Produkti®en 
det• Fbant&$1e1 uat ... d. i. et-kel'ill$ndeil Arurcbauen1 
VOl•eteUen U$t. Das 'Wahre, daa eolcher Befriedigung 
su~:esebrl.eben wird,. Ut;gt dartn1 daaa das: Ansohauen, 
Vcn•stel.len uat' ·'!~!> n:tcbt 1eol1ert1 eond.ern nu:r ala 
tm•nt de~ TotJllitlt, des ~kennan• selbet, 
VOl'handen ist.47 
u.. Intuition 
To quality for dialectical development• intuition sat 
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be inte 1gertt.. Intuition is unthinkable apart from mi,nd, e-ten 
though . _ at r,dnd be embedded within .reeling and the soul on tpe 
ye1~ taking the form ot attention, on the other.4B Hegel 
expree s 1 t in the following way't 
Die In~UigeM &ls · dieee kon'krete Einbei t 
del~ belden Komente, u.nd nar ul'IJlitwlbar 1ft 
dinsem lusaeJ>JJ.chseien&=n Sto.t£ in aicb erinnert 
uncl in .:llli'eF Erinnerung in sich in daa 
Auli:Mi'sichaein vereenkt ·zu •in, is" .Anscbauung.49 
Qwl t8 apart !rom the method 'Whereby Hegel arrives at . 
ot intuition,· its oognitive aepeot is cle&l:'ly indi~ated. 
1 Re1~1 re-.fers to it ae a Tal.id~sult aehiev.d by the 
ild.nd on its pilg:rimage to truth. Although he i't\troduces it on 
th$ 1 1 ot &ubjective mind only•- !%laY note its relevance for 
me~:~.p~td.eal eonside)!'atione or the e:.U$ience ot other 
minds, e e:ttertlal Wot'ld, values) universals and the Absolute 
16.ndt 
tu. Mental Il?lagel"1' 
Jlel:ttal Ideas or re,re•nttttion, . as he calls it, are 
hea"i'Uy .frei1ghted tr.Lth trubjectivity. lt may. be dettned a• "-die 
Anschauung. nSO 'lhe purpose of inteUigenoe at thie 
junct . is ·~ rid itselt ot eubjeativ.t.ty:• to ~pare itself tor 
er dJ've~pn1Qnt represented. b.r thought. :But ;ihe material 
· 1 t ·rro~k• has a high .teeling content; not too inappl'opri .... 
a~ . acril~ as illage or plctlU"e•Sl a.pl regards the 1m.agtJ 
. 1)8 
as some quite transient and stox-ed up out of conscioue:nesa.52 
This mo asuuredly resembles the modern psye..~olog1cal theory ot 
the unco ious. His description of it is higl':U..y suggestive for 
reepect 
oJ: the concrete De¢tt 1 and his general position ?d. th 
the universal. 
· Die Intelllgenz ale die:aen l'llchtlichen 
SChacht, in elcbem eine Welt Ul'l0r1dl1ch vieler 
Bilder und VOl"atellungon auf'bewa.brt 1st} ohne 
dane sie 1m Bew\J,ast•in wlren, su tapen., iat 
einereei te d1.e allgemeine Fol"de:rung iiberhaupt1 
den Begritt ala konkret• w1e den Ireim z. B. eo 
su rassen, dasa er al.le Destinlntheiten, welohe 
in der Entwieklung dee ~'WDBS erst ·~ Existenz 
koleen in Virtuell_. uodichkei t attirmativ en,~ t Die Unt.ihigkeit, die a in aich konkrete 
un<l doch ,einfach bleibende Allgemeine zu lassen, 
1a 1~ ••• wlche daa Autbewahren diar besondel-en 
VOl~stellungen in besonderen Fiber.n und PJJltzen 
'Vel:-anlaaat. hatJ das Versch1eclene eoll wesent.l.1ch 
nw~ eine auoh vereinsel te rlumliche EICi.lteni 
hallen. Der 181m a'ber koniat aus ~n exiatierenden 
Be:ttimtheit.en nur in ei:nem Anderen, dem Keime 
del~ Frucht, s~ Rlehkehr in eeine ~aehhei t, 
winder zur FXtstema. d.ea Auaichseins. Es iet 
aliJO al'l<h"ereeita die Intelligena als dieaer 
bg,ruutlose Schacht_, d. o. ala dae existierende 
AlJLgemeine1 in_ wlohea daa Ver,achie&tne noch n1~mt als dislcret geaetzt iet, au tae.r;en.. Und 
nn.r ist dieaes Ans1cb die erste Form der 
AlJLgemeinheit, die sioh 1m Voretellen darb1etet.S.l 
iv. Imagination 
Sta.ted br.tetly, imagination is the intell1eenoe at work 
s. :rt is thus "die rep:roduktive EinbUdungakratt.nS4 
Hegel cogn:Laes quite clearly the creative act1v:lty i.molved 
allJlng attention to the f'act that it is only within the 
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conscious subject that the features compo~g the image are con-
joined, The process is especi.ally indicated when he speaks of 
"der reprodulsierte Inhalt1t55 as belonging to der "eieh identischen 
Einhei t der Intel ligeD$. nS6 The VieTt is that there is a general 
idea (Vorste:Uuni) "fthioh · supplies the linkage tor these i.ma.gas.57 
It is to be observed that in this discussion o£ the 
ilDagination, Hegel makBs a vital distinction between ldeas, prop. 
erl.y' eo-ealled, and ideas as repreeentations. The former is tb.e 
more concreteJ the latter being given and immediate., Mental 
representat:!.on, or an idea; is the link between being and uni-
veroality1 1;he two vital aspects of self•relatedness. Productive 
imagination is the center around which the internal and the e~ 
ternal revoJ:ve. Its rol.e is elearly qeen in :Hegel' a comment that 
erst in dar ?hantasie ist die IntelligeM nieht 
a:J.e d.er unbestimmte Schacht und das Allgemeine, 
1ondem ale Eimselheit, d. 1. al,s konkrete Subjektivitlt, 
in welcher die Beaiehung aut s1ch eb.entJO zum Se1n 
a:Ls zur AUgemeinbei t bes.timmt iat.SB 
H'~l notes the .1\miamental importance ot t.l!e productive 
imagination, the implication being that the ooneeieus is more con-
crete than the unc.onsoicus. Yet the a~ed unconscious is re-
lated to the conscious processes which take place within the human 
organ1Sil. The important .fact is that we call them conscious 
S$. EP\'f, sect. 455. 
56.. E:PW. aect. 455. 
57. ls an aside, Hegel noted the tlourUh caused by the so-
called law o:£ the assoeia tion ot ideas during the outburst o£ em-
pirical psychology contemporaneous w1 th the decline o£ phUosoplv'. 
see EPW, 111ct. 45$. 
$8., E:m, aect. 457 • 
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processes u.r Virtue of the tact t..itat they seem to be proceese.e 
o£ sensation1 desire and even reasoning,. our knowledge o£ the 
unconseioue,,; ho-wever 1 is entirely in.ferentiaJ.. 
Xm.agination in thie unifying o~paci.tQr is toeaeon in it' 
nominal form, si-nce rea&.)n ~s rea~n also deals with the truth ot 
its content. He~l1 there tore, ha:s called atte·ntion to the im-
agination. as a mentat process ~ieh works over the ir:Ja.ge& derived 
fr.om earlier. perceptions and eo.lltline~ them. into ne"v unities. 'l'hie1 
of course, is tl;e wo:-k o£ the creative · or reproductive iaagination. 
His .contribo. tion here is . psyeh~logieal sound. 
v. 1S9mor.1 
Again, ae~oX'ding to Hegel• memory ie still another stage 
in the ~eloplOOnt or intelligenlle. to 1fuich one mi~t add that 
i.ntelligenee could. hardly develop othei'Tdse. Hei"e, we are told, 
' . 
name and neaning are objectively uni~d.~9 Sf memory • recognize 
the thing by ita nall1G, Thlle1 . at the same tillle1 the name givee 
existence to the intelligent content• '11Es ist in Narp,en1 dase 
111r denke!l.u6D Hegel,.. howe"Ver• is distressed 'by the Pl'ooess 
Whereby names are trMs.t~d into illlages as an aid to improving 
the memory • It is merely 11ein Tableau der Einbildungskraft. n61 
~btlesa his oriticism is l~veled at any suggeation ot mechanical. 
memory~ bo:ry cannot be e~1ned by ~course to mechanism. 
Hcmever', ho .e.mnot -u deny such me(!ilianical. features as aigna;, 
59. ~. sect. 461~ 60. EPW;t sect. 461. 
·61. Etw,, sect. 46~. 
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tones, etc., which are associated With memory in one way or another. 
He is suggesting that Wl.ate'Ter role these features may play it 
should be a subordinate one. 
True objcctivi ty requires that all names be interpreted 
by the representing intelle:ct.62 Memory 1$ praserved oriJ.:y men 
it passes ovex-· into thought, and ·subjectivity and objectiVity are 
no longer s&pal"ated. But Hegel notes the ditticr..Uty inherent in 
the organic relationship ot memory with thought. Tr..e problem of 
their interco~ctioJ}a i$ otwn absent ·from theories or the mind. 
flemory as too 'e~terna.llOIOae · of thought needs to be su.pplemente • 
The pa$84~ .ftolll memory to th-ought leads Hegel to obeen-e that 
"die Vernunft, rmr iJ:l Subjekte en atie.rt, · al.e seine Tltigkei t 
1st1 - so ie.t Sic . ~nken . u63 , . · ·. 
vi. The Process o£ Th:1.nld.ng 
Thinking means active reason, a !ao.t already implied 
in the ata~rnent that int.elli~nce is explicitly eogn1tive.64 
Intelligence is thuG the plain identi t"tJ o£ the subjective Td th 
the objective, a View Clearly ltecelian in nature. Hegel notes 
that inteJ~i!!ence :reassures us that 'Mat is t hought about i.s the 
0 0 
eXistent" and anythi~ ·exists o:r is only in so .far as it is thought 
ot. His idealistic position is cle~ly appanmt when he declares 
that 
62. El'\l , sect .. 464. 
6J. m11 .~ct. 464. 
64. EPWI sect. 46$. 
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ist:.; Ulld dass1 tfGS ist, · nur is.t,. msoi"orn es 
Gedanke 1st ..... .tiir sicb t das Denken der. In-
telligenz j.st C-eda11ken 6h. a.ben; si·e sind ala ihl' Itlhal t und oegenstand. · 5 
5. The Ja t,ure o£ the ill 
ftill is a:n expression ot .mind. As mind it ".eiss., sich als 
sich 1n sich beac:hiessend und ·sich aus sieh er.t'lhlsnd."66 Hecel 
hol.ds.t there.f'ore, that mind becomes actual throuGh rlll; and thus 
achieves a greater degree or cone~eteness than wao :9ossible 1lndet' . 
the limitations o£ the catego,.-y of cognition. In so far as the 
\'till supplies· it.s own content, it :i.e aelf'•IX>BS'OS$1ed and !'.rea 1n 
tl;.e widest sense. Tlt1s1 argue13 Hegel., ·is i te characteristic 
trait.67 He sees the function o£ the essential 1111 ao that of 
. bringing liberty to· exist ·in the. formal mu.. !n other norda,. 
the aim o.f' the f'o~l will 3.s. to make li~y i te; bas.:.c aim. and 
eonten-t. The cognitive ehar~o~r of the will is e~eely stated 
by Hegel. Says he t ttDieser Beg:ri:t£ ~· die l!reibei t, ist wesentl.ieh 
nur als Denken; der Ueg des . Ulens,_ sieh ~um objektiven Oeiate ZU 
machen, '-at, eieh ~ d~nkenden Willen zu erhe'b.en.1'68 Thought is 
necesS<lry iio. give content to will. · lt is. hard to soe aey d:J.f'• 
te.reno~ between . thought and vd.ll as Hegel. describes them. . . 
Thus,. there is underseo1,-ed .once wore ·the essential nature ot 
o£ though:~. In this instance the lfil.l as thoUght tinds its ~ 
liberty,. and hence its dol!\inant pll):p0$l_, . in ~ome univeraal content 
6,. E ; sect. 46$. 
66. E~, sec·t. 4~. 
67. EPrl', sect. h69. 
68. E:Ft,,. 8eot. 469~ 
which coes berond a.v purely subjecti va interest.. e l is 
phatic that n solcher I nhal t ist aber nur im. Denken un" durch.s 
Dcnken."69 Speaking of the moral and religious life, he deolarea 
t.~at "es ist nichts :roringercs ale absurd" au.s der Sitt11chke1t, 
Religiositllt, Rechtlichk~it uatp da.s Ianken auDsc!Iliesoen zu 
ollen. tt70 'Ihe question arises;~. however, as to l'lhat extent Hegel 
makes the moraJ. lif'e, for example, merely a matter or the intel• 
lect, or, is his view of mind inclusive enough to do just.iee to . 
both t..'1e volitional and e noti or...sl aspects of personality? His 
lot.,ical analysis, containing as it does the ent:tre dial ectic ~ep, 
does prov-lde for .comr.ll'Elhensi.veness. Psychologically, his view ot 
personal ity m y appear somewr.at ove:r-intellectu.ali~ed but alwaye 
concrete, never a stract. ~oreover, lvill as Regel describes it 
is about equivalent to moral cot .  nition. . . e tails to bring in the 
ele.!!letlt of choice, and eonsequen·tJ.y omits that nhich ie probably 
moat distinctive abc.m:'u a meaningfUl doctrine of the will. 
The qu.e~1tion ol the a.utonor:V OJ~ the will or practical reason 
receives careful exposition a.t Hegel's hands. He starts as alway-s 
1 th t 1e .fo al, t he innediate. By moodiaC"'J' o£ the 1'T.i.ll he meane 
that 11er sic.h finde t als in seiner innorlic..l}en llatur besti.mmte 
Einz.alheit."?l This guarantees its "1)14aktisches oe.tlihltt, 72 or 
operational a speQt. 'l'he r ational content of the will involved 
here is limited, henc~ subjective !l.nd contingent. 
6?. EPtr, sect. 46?. 
70. E ! scot. 469. , 
n. E~', sect~ 471~ 
72. ERr, sect. 47l. 
egel dc·es not deny that nn a peal ..... o practical f eelings .... s 
never ju,stif'3.able . Under t T:o conditions t h appeaL may o tlt:d. r 
(1) ~.en t he r emD.tant ideas are ir.J:nanent in onet s self, an (2) 
Vlhcn f'celine may bEl t he tota .... i t y • 73 'lbe problem \vi t_h prnctical 
f eeling, a s Hegol seea 1. , is t he ques t i on of its t ruth and ob-
j ectivit y . 
fna Vern{lnrt i ge , das in de:r Clectalt der 
VernUnttigkei t als C'tedaehtes ist~ i §.t deraelbe 
Innal. t, den cbs gute praktische Oei'6hl • at, 
ab~r. in sei ner All~inheit und Not"nd1gkeit1 
i n seiner 0 je ctivitB.t und VTa.hr heit. 7U 
It ia , 111oreover, e transition .tron t eli __ , to l aw end dutl"' 
t 1 t enabl ee teelin t c reac . it,a truth • . Ree;e. :re1ter t es gain 
and again tht~ il'ljttry oone m en intellect i s rega.rded a s harmful 
t.o feel:tn~, 1rdll and heart . Say£ he : 
D'le ahrheit und, was d.esselbe :5.st, die 
wtrkliebe VernGn~tigkei t ~s ltersena und V.illene 
ka:nn .aJ.l.ein i n der Allgemeinheit der Intelli enz, 
ni·cht in dei-.,F..:lnzelheit dee r~tBhle-s ale eolchen 
stattf'inden . r5 
'l'hue, it seems clear that feeling must be univ·ersal a nd have 
1 t s source ~n the t..'1inldng mind i n order t o enter t he Hegelian 
economy, · must co e to seo, he roys1 that ,,1 . ~nsehen m'IT 
eine Vernunft_, iln Cle~, T:bllGn und Denken i.nt. u76 1'e~l is 
speakin out t he concret e Vernuntt here and stresser- the fact 
t hat me.cy o! our l"'llst i raportant ideas mny be· and actually are 
also felt. He cites 't,he ideas of Crod, l m-: and moral i t y as 
73.. Ef ; eeet. 471. 
74. EF ·, eeet. h71 .• 
75, Ef 1 scet. 471. 
76, E~ 1 eeet. 471. 
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suitable illt:Ls tratio.ns of this truth, even thou@1 he adolit.o t hat 
sue .. ideas ax·e ften xpcriencc in t h form o t he · ·:sdia·te in-
dividuaJ.ity eli' t he subje ct.. The conclusion to be drawn is that 
while I:egel. do..:-s not deey ·"he ~·esenoe of !eelin ., he neverthele-ss 
insists that it 1ust be .uediated t.U"oU:gh dialect ~ c process in 
order to achieve its essential objectivity. one nders., honever 1 
how feeling c~n be objec·t i ve if i t l acks cognitive content . The 
point is plaln: feeling apart i'l•om the J.'a.ticnaJ.ity of la 1 right, 
uty and the lil!:e contains oo niUc..'-1 su .jectivity, with all the 
attendant vanity and caprice. Feeling, sci entif'icall.y treutedt 
he t hinlts, w:tll emphasize the i'ol'lD. r a ther than t 1e content, sinee 
t he lat ter dHals very largely with rights and duties . 77 nut 
Hegel's posit.:i.on can scai·cely be sustained 'When he decla:res that 
practical .fe~3linge and disposiuioils a:re inevit able indications 
o the selfi1sh1 bod and eVil . 78 They ~re bad in hio vie\".1 since 
they belong ·&o that expi>essi,.on or individuality which sets it-
self up in o;;>position ·Ghe universal and refuses to become trans-
formed throu,gh the dialectic pt"oeees.. In sho:t•tt true pcrsonali ty 
develops, 
6.. '1h Problem of Choioe 
To uniV~ersa.lize the 11il.l there must be conformity or ita i.n-
nel:' requiremant m.. th the existent thin • Formally,. the lrl~l is 
i!t:t..ll ~ natural Tdll, i~ntical with 'Whatever special1110de it take.,. 
77. .?1'1, sect •• h71 . 
78. Er -·~ sec"..;, h?l . 
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Obviously., 'l:i'hP. reference hel c :ts to natura._ i mpulse a d i :r!cll ... 
(passion) . Ue dra"Ufs no sharp distinction betv.e-en practical 
f eeling -a. d pas-s.ion1 since the t;GUne features are e;,bodied in both . 
Vhile passions .aJ. .. e based on t 1e :rational nature.t t hey ;;ossess1 
ho.«:lver1 roa~r signs of t he contingent a.:n<l subj.ectivo. Thie sub-
jectivity nlalc(;ls for bondage ., 80 
is its et. ic1~l implications • . Tl:e co 1tention of' the ·, iter is that 
even if nese:L' s analysis of choice is an entixel.y logical 
t his .,l1oul :i 1:1ot preclude et hi cal qua.stions. 
e . 
• 
is restricted to o~ special mode of the ;rill in :hich the indi-
Vidual has pt~rmitted himself to beco ne subme;rged - This subjectivity 
make. imposa;lble arr:1 question as to whether the pas$ion purt:r~.ted 1& 
either good (>r bad• and hence the ethical question is dism;i.ssod. 
'.rhe best that can be said, argues Hegel• is to say that the indi ... 
V".i.dual baa iJumersed himself in the advancement of sor11e aicr or p'lll"'-
poae. But i:cl spite of the noble statement th.at 11es ist niehte 
•lr'o-sses oh:ne teidenachaf'·t vollbracht worden, noch kann es ohne 
sole."s.e vollblt"acht we}'denu,8l Hegel is far . too al'bitl-ary vrhen he 
suggeats that subjectiVity oocessar:Uy rules out ·W:W considoration 
• . J t .-... 
79. sect. 473~ 
av .. sect. 47·4~ 
81 . se~t. h74-. 
::,u jcctive .nd by anticipat;i.ng t·ha criteria of obj · c 'bive mirJ.d;. 
Ac;ain, i .. _. is clear to 'th, reader t 1at impulses o.ppear i mportant 
to T:..egc;Jl only in so !3Z' as t he mind carries t hem beyo d ·the ~ar-
ticular and 1;he i nr..ediate to t heir ereate o jectivity and. truth 
that it is n<n, until im,t.>ulses are tlJ.us objectified, that .... heir 
objective minch ·Hegel states his iindil'JtO ao .follows~ 
llie Jibhandlung der · Triebe, l~igungcn und 
te:l.denechatten naoh ihrsla. ftbl"hatten. Oehal te 
isi; daher 1vesen'\il.i.ch die U;lhre von den 
reclhtl1.eheD.t moraUechen und si ttliohen 
Pf'J.icht.en. (}' 
After l"'E1!'lective 'Will has dor e its work diale:cticalJ.r 'nth 
impulse,. the time ·of' decision among incl.inations ha$ arrived~ 
Wlll is now .; ~nalyzed as choice. In teros of l ogical &1'1alysia1 
choioe means that the principle of negativity has carried 1dll be-
yond its immetdiate autonomy., although it is c..1.s yet possessad o£ 
su.bjootiv and continp-ent elements. 8,:3 Hegel solve a the dilei!U&ii 
of corr.petir.-e desires by appealing to the universal which he ba-
Ueve$ the thillldl1g 1111 adopts under the category o.f happi 1ess.a4 
But the unive ,rsall"epre~nted by happines.s turns out to be upon 
examination a.n imagined, . hence abstract:. universality of the thil'gs 
desil"ed1 a w::iv~sal.ity 'Whic i merely ought t o be.05 Ch.otce.t 
02 . E!jW, sect .. h74. 
OJ. ft·· r . ... 47•3. ..:!..l' ., seo·v • 
84, r;p,· ~ .. sect. 47~ · 85. JPW, sect. 480. 
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Free all is described. as the synthesis o£ the theoretical 
and practical mini. 86 It is :i:n e!fect an expression of individUaliV 
purU'ied or all tho~e .teatures 'Which Hegel toeJ.e constitute a 
barrier to its universali~J• As tree intelligence, the will ailllS 
at ur,J.veJ>salism .• 67 But., one may add, is 1d.ll tree and not uni• 
veraal? 
Hegel achieves the· transition to objeeti ve mind by meane of 
the rational ·wUl ~ich he interprets in tens o£ the ~E~f~. 68 
Thie rational general ld.U is "die I dee an siob"• 89 and since it 
is as yet im.pli.cit, it is "nur· der Beg:riff ~JS abeoluten Ge1stes.n90 
Hegel thus br:i.ngu together the general will and the 'Will of the 
indiVidual by means of a dialectic process in lfhich he makes the 
'Will of' the i:lldividual discow.l' it8 own true aim 1n the universal.. 
But to explain the individa.al will as th$ fwmal actiVity of the 
general w1111 is to call into question its indiVidua.l autonoDV• 
The relationship betfteen particular and universal 1& shown by 
asserting tba·&.. the finite will is merely the act of develOping 
the :11eE!=£!,• 1!0-'MJTer, if as Hee-1 cla!Jna, 11i i .s in the will that 
.86. ~ect., 481. 
87 . sect. !;82. 
88. sect- 482. 
89 ~ ~ct, ?.~82 . 
90p sect. 462. 
the BE)f!i.~~ :i.s developed and its contents given ~ssion ~11~ 
hence actuaJ.j.ty, then the will. of the :l.ndividual sho lid com3 in 
for more eoru~ideration than Hegel ooel'!!s to etve lt. 
Again, .fl-eedom as He~l interprets 1.t is not si:m:p1y a matter 
o£ speculatic'n onl.YJ it is in .fa.et the aC"t;uel;i t y of i ndivianale 
themselves "nicht die ste darum haben, soooern sie sind, 1191 He 
claims that t.his lfill w liberty' i .s oo longer an impulse demanding: 
satie£action, but the surest indieat:i.on of' permanent cha.raeter.n-
The obvious c:~onclusion to be dram from Hegel's rer:w.rk is that, 
defined 1..l'l tE~rrns of a. eonerete ~ole, a !lesta.lt, Fttrt.hernore . .,_ 
the Werencet ie that individuals are a'l'!!'are of freedom. even be.'f'qre-
the stage of obje<:t.ive m.i.nd has been reached, !3ut the crJX ot the 
mat~ tor HEtgel is that ·individual .treedorn !s not t n e and ade uate 
freedom until it undergoes the soeiallzing precess of' objecM.ve 
mind, While eonseiausness (and henee freedom) exists as pt1rsoruU 
experunc., Hegel argues for the necees:tty- of society for it.s 
fullest development. 1'o be sure, one. cttnnet, der:tr the .fact i;.ha.t 
there ie a pl!'OriOu.nced emphasis all t.hroughout b.:'U di$ouss:ton on 
the abstraetJ, incomplete nature· o£ individual treedor.1, Th:ts is 
llhy he underJ.ie.s the need of l egal, moral and religious in~ti t utioxua 
tor the eomp1etion of !':1:-eedora.. \'h:Ue 5.t is tJ'ue tht?ro i s 'lU1Quee-
tionably the leveling influence of objective mind , the social 
eituat.ion ma~r enlm•r:e es ~ll a$ limit. Hegel is right 'llh$11 he 
91. EPV1 sect . h82. 
92. EP1'!, .sect. L.82 • 
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argues that a eooial environment is easential to full and concrete 
freedcm.. 
8. An J!!Yaluation ot PsychOlogical Personality 
'1he .tinclinge o! aJ.bjective mind are now before us. What. may 
be called, nc>t too inappropriately, Hegel's perychology ot personality, 
receives· its fullest and moet articmla.te expression under the rubric 
of subjectiVta mind. The distinguishing feature of mind throughout 
the entire eJtposition has been its cognit.1Te aspect, undoubtedly' 
the dalinant theme in all. Hegelian thought. But cognition as por-
trayed here, however, is no mere logieallty. It includes within 
it all the o~ertonee of feeling .and will1 and :tanure to recognize 
this tDBans an incc:xrt"eot reading of Hegel's wbjective mind. Hegel 
believes, ha~rever, that both teeling and will are diaqu.alif'ied on 
the grounds or their subjectivity. He aesumee that since the 
natural will is subject to caprice and delllre, :l.t is therefore 
too subjective, hence too irrational, in its immedi.ate stage to 
qualUy for serious consideration. 'Jhere ie great temptation as 
a coneequence to establlah a gUlf between the inherent nature of 
will on the one aide, and its explicit manU'eatat1on on the other. 
One ot the pivatal. points in Hegel 1·s conce-ption of personality 
is hi.s treatment ot freedom. This is true for all ranges ot mind '-
subjective, objective, absolute. In the material presented above• 
1 t is highly questionable whether the ease tor individual freedom 





Wir wiesen, C\ass dae Individ:uton trei 1st, 
pe:c-&8nliCh trei iftt; so wissen wir unser se1n nur 
eo,, dass die personliche Freiheit die Grundbeclingung 
und · nichta vorhanden 1st., wodurch diesel. be verletzt 
und nicht anerkannt aein kSnnteJ di.esee :llseen 
macht unser sein, unaere Eltistenz· aua ••• Als 
die Grundlage unaeres Seine Wislien 1d:r nur die 
Freiheit,. Alle anderen Beet~ uneeres 
seine, Alter 1 Berut us£. sind fl.!chtig und 
verlnderlich; nur die der ~eihe1t bleibt~9l 
The entire question or treedo• as it pertains to personality 
is clO\lded by the way in which rorm and. content coalesce in Hegel. 
This is inet~ICapable since both are moments of the 'Begx;'!ff. Hie 
logical analysis of personality., therefore, leads h1l!l to a position 
in which peJ•eonality is east too exclusively 'Within the mold of 
the uni verall.. This result is undoubtedly influenced by his in-
sistence that form and content must correspond, hence if the f'orm 
is immediato., then the content m:u.st be 1tlmecliate likewise. Here 
is ept.atemo:Logical monism Wllietakably at work. This accounta 
for the inadequacies which be finds in subjective mind. So long 
as the indb·idu.al self is immediate, henee a unit, just so long 
will the dialectic deaand mediation. · And mediation leads to one 
inevitable result;: the indiv1dual is o£ neceasity a member ot a 
llhole,. in this inetance objeo:ti:ve 11Jind. 
9. Hegel ts Philosophy of ?ersonal1ty 
Objec1d. ve mind is the abeolute Be griff but existing merely 
as possibil.i ty.94 The presence of personal needs, the external 
things ot nature, and the relationship bet•en individUal 11ills. 
93. HP1 233. 
94. 1~, sect. 483. 
172 
eerve as the ·!Ribodiment ot the will.. 1lt.e tree will thus operates 
'Within this .comprehensive frame110rk. It is to be noted• further, 
that in t his realm or objective mind lr$edom presents itself under 
the torm. ot ll,ece•ity,95 another indication of the inseparability 
of f'reedom and necessity' in Hegelian thought. 
i. '!be Realisation or Uberty 
!t is purported that the aim sought on this dialectic 
level is to J!ttO'W' how libert¥ is realize~ within the anbi t of 
society. .Bu·t; to accomplish this, it is claimed. that liberty must 
assume the fli>rm of necessity, the implication being that true 
.treedom requires colD!Ditment. "Die Freiheit, zur "";1;rk:lichke1t 
einer Welt {l~etaltet. erhht die Form -,on Nomnctigkeit."96 Regel. 
discovers the inner reality of Ubert¥ to rest in the eystem or 
organization ot its pr1ncip1es, wbUe externally it is eeen in 
the mc:preestons of power and authority necessitating obedience. 
The etage i :1 eat for the advent or social inst.itutiona. 
G:Lven the dialectic pattern, then,. the resul. t can but 
mean the un:l v ot the rational 1d. th the single 11'1ll, or, in other 
wrds1 the . ~ctual.isation ot l1ber,tq.97 IJ.berV is so intel• 
lectualied that even its contents are !!leal'dnglees unless they 
f'al.lwithill. the eanpass of a logical category. It !e to be ob-
served tha-t. Hegel does not establish liberty empirically' and then 
proQeed to hazard its logical development. Rather he establishes 
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its place tu-st tdthin the logical qstem and then goes on to de-
tine its nature str.1ctJ.y by .means ot its maniteetation as a uni- ' 
-.eraalwithitl. the institutions of society!' In other words, the 
true charactE1r of Uberty is unknown until it expresses itself in 
the form of 1aniversa11ty. 
Ill eie die Freiheit \1M ihr !nhal t dem 
Denken ~h!rt und dae an sich Allgemeine ist1 
eo hat Inhalt seine wahrhatte ~stimmtheit nur 
in der Form der Allgemeinheit,9 
ta·• is tha reault of this universaliz:ing or liberty., 
but Hegel insiets it must be invested 'With authoritative power.99 
Law ie defined.; however, in a broad seru.se to include the con-
ditions nece·qary for treedotlh Hegel• moreover, associates t hese 
conditione, although u:niverea1.1 with subjective will1 where1 he . 
argues, they ought to have,. indeed, can onl..y have, their existence.lOO 
'lhus the uru~versal require• the presenoe ot the particular. The 
individual person is important at least to this extent. Out or 
the toregoi;ng conditions arise our duties. I£1 one may add, duties 
are clearly the 81Jle e non or the individual, he may, in the .face 
ot an overly oppreseive m.anif'estation or objective mind, remind 
society or his righte, and in this he could cite Hegel as support,; 
since "was ein Recht ist, ist aueh eine ?tlicht1 und was eine 
pfl.ieht isi;, 1st auch e!n llecht•"lOl But Hegel answer& that one 




99. :E:IW, eect. h86. 
100. :~, sect. 486. 
101. )~. eect. 486. 
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expressed, and rights and duties as viewed in light or the Begr;if.f. 
The empirical approach places emphasis upon personal r elationship 
with the thought o£ individual rights being uppermost i n mindJ 
~as the ! :egri££ introduces the view ot legal pcrsonality.l02 
In the moral sP'lere, Hegel observes a breach between Slbjoetive 
duty and .the realization of that duty. Aga1n1 this contingent 
element rendf~s 11holly inadequate individual tnOral1ty. The gulf' 
can be bridgud on:Ly by the introduction ot social ethics. 
It is apparent frOJl\ the above paraphrase o.f the Hegelian 
argwr..ent; that · social et.hice is required in the dialectical dln'elop-
Jmnt or persoMli ty. Obviously it is Hegel'' s belief that the pro-
cedure here is not arbitrary or a priori but given in tte nature 
or QB.se, in der 5ache selbst. But groanted the pl"'blem ot realizing 
inward purp<,se, yet this is no reason for disqualifying individual 
moral attaiziJilents. Hegel assumes that no $Yllthee1s is possible 
for the eont;ente of' a }ilUosophy of :mind unleu indiv.l.dual .t"l"eedom 
and morall~r are transcended. Uowver, he declares that "alle 
Zwecke de;r !Je&ellschatt und d$s staats sind die eigenen der 
Privaten~" Tbe only sense in 1'1hich the aims ot the individual. 
and t he aiml!t of the state can possibly be identical 1e in terms 
or t he logical Begritr, since the aitn.S of the average indi:vidual 
as such are too private and subjective to be seriously coll8idered. 
The best that can be said ror tie above position is that while 
there is l!wme truth 1n the particular; there is greatex- truth 1n 
102. See ibid~ IJt'f. 
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the universal, while individual etf. ies is good, social ethics is 
better, whUe the self may not neeeasari.J.y be surrendered, 1 t 
would appear to be a1bDerged. 
11. Ethical Personality 
Ethical personality is not possible according to P'.egel 
until the 1Dclivicmal. person becomes thoroughly' integrated into 
so~iety 1 or unt:U he is permeawd by this ethieal social substance. 
This aubstant:e is differentiated into lattdlY';. civU society and 
the etate.l03 Hegel assures us, howeirel", he has nothing tra!'loo9 
scendent in ·IIJind lfhen he speaks of social substance. It is mt 
something of' which the individual. a are merely accidents, since it 
is through 1hese very indiVidqals. that this substance has achieved 
self.,conaciouaness. ·In a word, tnbstanee becomes actual.ised 
throu ,h itxljLviduala.l04 As al-.ye the· 'Whole i .s the unity ot sub-
ject and ob;jeet,. particular and universal. iJ:'he idea or social 
substance colora Regel's entire discussion of ethical personality-. 
Eaeh leTel is in reality a partial expression o£ the substantial• 
i ty of mind.. Hegel never departs from the principle laid down in 
the Vorrede~ of the .Fhlnomenoloee that 
E:e kommt nach meiner E1ns1cht, 11elche aich nur 
durch die D.lrsteU:ung des Systems aelbat 
l'echtte:rtigen muse, a.llea daraut an, das 'lib.hre 
Jdeht ale Substanz., aondern eben so sehr. ala 
au.bjekt autautasaen und auszudrilcken.lO~ 
103. EPW, eeot. 5171 and PRt sect. l$7. See also PG1 318-3.301 discussed in ibid. In PP,. Hegel observes that the tam11:7 re.-
lation:ship is the natural harmon.Y ot the individu.al... PP, Part In, 
eeot. 192. 
104. 'Ibis appears to be the thought expressed in FR,. eecta. 
146-147. 
105, PG, Vorrede, 19. 
As ulready noted, Hegel traces the evolution or ethieal 
personality through the dialectic levels or family 1 ciVil society 
and the state. It 1fill suffice here merely to point out that per-
8(>nali ty as expre'"d within th.e f'anlly relationShip is too immeraed 
within .feeliz:tg ·to be significantly intelligent. In t his Hegel may 
be eriticisecl, It may be questioned as to whether the i ndividual 
members of a tam1ly pursue . ethical ends solely under the impetus 
of teellng. Hegel discovers a pr-aiseworthy amount o£ unity with• 
in the tamil;y, but its members ~e accidents v:i~v;is that totality. 
He stresses the ru.bstanoe ot tl1e tamily1 or that bond ot unity which 
makes for totality of' purpose" 
Ol'l the level ot eiV.il society t however.t di.tferencos,_ 
while perhaps impUcit within the .t'amily as an organism, now be-
come apparent. Hegel has in l'Qim the thought or men a:; particu.-
l.ars, ot me:tt as men, ard not as distinct individuals. Thi .s is the 
sphere of the person as a member of civil societzy-. Here the 1n .. 
d1vidual ie1 in reality pursuing the universal but under the dis-
guise or tr.le particular. It is Hegel's claim the member of society 
cores gzoad:nally to recognize himeelf' tt.S aueh, and in order to at-
tain his O'lm rational ends he must cooperate With others. Through 
this social cooperation~ his so.ea.lled partieula.ri ty becomes 
mediated, He ceaees to be a mere unit and develops into a social.ly 
sensitive person~ a re~mlt achieved in the main as a result ot the 
educative .fot:"ce of social institutions. lJ.be process at work here 
is that of the med:tation of t.he particular through the un1versa.1.106· 
106, See its logical ~eition in EPW, sects. 183.f'f,, and 
referred ·oo in ibid,, Chapter 3. 
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ill. Personalit:l and .the state 
A s;rnthesia is reached in ·the highest. expreesion of 
social institutions_. namely,. the state. In this politieal or-
animation, t he substantial mind of the nation becomee objectitied. 
Hegel believEts thia stage to be more concrete by virtue of the 
.fact that ita laws and institutions are actualiaed in the mima 
ot t he e1 t1znns living under them. 'Ibe assumption is that t he 
members of fl1lOh a state exercise their 'Wills accordin to . ra tionaJ. 
enda. But it . is the state as BeFitr, the ratibnaJ. state, that 
Hegel has .in mind. The background for this conception or the 
state is his; theory of syllogism as outlined in the Logic, where 
the sy1log1~m stands for ever;rthing rat~ona1.,107 because it is 
the concre~l unit-.r of differences. His words at that poin·i:; are 
'WOrthy of incl. usion here because or the light "Which they throw 
on hie subs~ent analysis ot the state. 
Wie· das Sonnensystem1 eo 1st z. B. im Praktischen 
der staat ein ~stem von drei Sehlt'Iaeen. 1. Der 
Einzelne (die Person} $ehllesst s1ch durch seine 
Eesonderheit ••• mit dam Allgerneinen (der 
Clesellschatt, dem Rechte, Geset3 1. Regierung) 
:z1.ueammenJ 2. ist der Wille, Tatigkeit der. In-
clivicluen das .Vermit.telnde, welches den B@dllrtnissen 
e•n der Geeelleohaft_. dem Rechte ust. Ert6llung 
t~nd Vel"VVirldiOhung gibbJ 3 .. aber ist das 
1Lllgem&inc (Staat, Regie:rung, Recht) die 
1mbstantielle Ui tte, in de1• die Indi viduen und 
1leren Be.triedigung 1hJ;-e errllll te R.eali tU.t, 
·mrmittlung und Bestehen haben und erhalten.l08 
'l'he tunotions of the Begrif.t coaJ.esoe ae a :result ol 
the dialectic process of intermediation. Indeed, he claims that 
.--.... .. U OMit .. I-------
107. ~e E'PW, eeet •. 161. 
108~ EFrf, eect. 198. 
this is the Oinly ay me:reby each of the syllog1$ns is preserved. 
Says he: 
ta ist nur dureh die Natur dieses 
Zus~nsChliessens,. duroh diese Fr~ihElit von 
SChluasen derselben terminorum, dass ein Ganzee 
in seimr organisation wahrhatt verstanden 
w1rd.l09 . 
The state is concrete., consequently, sinoe its laws and 
institutions are actual in the minds of the citizens. Hegel as-
S'I.liOOS that tile members or such a state exerciee their Trills ao-
eordina to rtHtional ends. In the empiri~ state, Uer,el makes 
provision fot• free<Jom by means or parliamentary 1nstitut1ons.ll0 
'lhu.s t he extEtrnal organization is but the embodiment of the m1l 
in such a way that universality, particularity and indiViduality 
constitute an organic unity. In the State~ it is argued_, the 
ethical ordeJ~ is a.ctualized in and through the wil.l of individuals 
~0 are seeklng universal ends.. This is the basis for necel f s 
statenent that the eomptrlsive po-wer· of the st~te corresponds to 
mat the ind:lvidual wills, hence freedom is simply a circle of 
necessity,ll:L dialectically conceived. Neceseitq" obviously means 
that v.hieh :Col.larra logically .from the Degriff', that is, logical 
necessity, '!'here is no distinction made in H~eel between logical. 
and dialectical neceesi~ . 
The . relationship between personality and t he state may 
now be seen. Hegel argues that will is one of t.he basic omenta 
109. EP\1 1 sect . 198. 
110. See especially .. 1 sects. 298-)20, in which the 
legiel!itu..-e is discussed. 
lll. I 'R, sect. l LS. 
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of pereonalit;r. Be6.1nning simply as an abstract e.xpretsion ot 
immediate rights, the will achieve$ an increasing measure of 
maturity as it passes through the various subjective stages, un-
. . 
tU at last it reaches in the etat.e complete conc.r.ete obJecti71ty. 
When this stae-e ot selt-oerta.inty has been reaQhed, ·one may speak 
o£ t he persorality of the state. Here all particularity is a.b.. 
sorbed -withir:1 t.he Bingle sel.r o£ the state. Further, it is only 
in the person of the monarch that the personal! ty of the state 1t:J 
actuali~Sed. 
It is a~nt that, for Hegel, personality in its 
social setti.ne is t'he Beet£; an und rqr sich. It takes a per-
son to actualize the ~J!!ff, and only lllhen the Betp"iff is ex-. 
pressed as p~rson bas the truth ot r--ersonal.ity been reached. The 
State qual.if:les as the organic 'Whole in which the moments of the 
Bef!i.ff have achieved the actuality Cort'$sponding to their degree 
of t.ruth. The definition ot personality by which Hegel evaluates 
all possible expressions of personality is that of an inTtardly 
developed, genuinely organic whole. In t his sense an,y genuinely 
organic mole possesses personality. 
10. Pex·sonality and the AbsOlute 
Hegel G[ways represents the :.\bsolutell2 as the h1gl'eat ex-
pression o£ a unity which at the same time contains 1dthin it a 
variety of clifferenUations. 1he basic contention is that the 
parts; as pn.rts :~ have no meaning apart .t'r01%11 the unity of the llhole. 
112. ll{any references to the AbsW.ute are tound scattered 
thl_;O'll~out ·I:Jle Logic in partic:ular. see E- ·, sects. 85, 871 99, 1151 181 anti 21) • 
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Equal.ly imporbant, hOlteTer j is the taet that the l'fu.ole require a 
the :rarts to ~SUpply it~ content. ~oreover, s.inee on Hegel·'e 011!1 
Vier; the highest possible eJq,>ression of re3.li ty is es~n·jiilly 
spirit, the inference is that this ultimate unit<.r cal.led t..l1e ~b­
solute must aluo be of the nature ot spirit. ~t can spirit exist 
apart from per·sons? !'his is one ot the real problems in eon-. 
nection wl th neg l ' s Absolute. 
Since He:gelia."l thought is deeply eO'l!ln1itted to the reality 
of unity 1 it might be well to approach the problem .f.':rom this bas!o 
category. N(tn.liegeUans may well assert. the ·unity of the :t:a."ldly 1 
civil eociety or even the state 1'li thout necessarily commi tt~~ 
themselves 'to the view that each unity is a personality. As ·-we 
have seen ab(•ve1 the nearest riegel comes to identifying a:ny W'lolt:J 
with personality, is to sinp;le out an individual person •'f:lthin 
that whole who allegedly represents the rational will of t he in ... 
dividuals composing it- '!'he personality .of the state, for example, 
means the st•~te 's certainty or 1 tsel£ 1n ·its monarch. That and 
that alone eonstitutee its personality. 
If this detU,1t1on of per.sonaJ.tty be applied to the Abcolute, 
011e might logically e::tpect to .. .f'ind the Hegelian conception of 
personality actualized tn o. person, perhaps the Person. Eut Hegel 
nolihere 5a¥S eo. He seems eontEmt, when the realm of the Absolute 
has been reached, to tre~t . of .u..Tlity and its attandant relational 
categories, U the nature o.t the Absolute is to be. dedueed, ae 
it should, from Hegel's statenents in the Logi;c• t hen the AbSQlute 
ca.'l hardly 'l:e regarded as a pe:"Son. But on the basis of his argu-menta 
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on sovereignty· in the .eta te, there appears to be rw good reason 
1'lby Hegel could not have interpreted the ~bsolnte as personal. 
The present liJ•iter bel:levea: that Hegel identifies t..l:te monarch 
with porsona:U.ty as a matter of empirical expediency. '!here 1~ 
nothing in t!Mt ~-! to sustain it. Indeed, the inference thore 
is that one DULY talk about rJ(-)d and t~ Absolute Without raising 
the question c)f personality. 1he follmdng citation makes Hegel•s 
position quito cleart 
nae Sein selbst eow:t.e die . tolgenden 
BestJ.mmungen, nicht nur ·des Seins1. sondern die 
logleehen Beetitnmungen ~rhaup.t ic8nnen als 
De..t.lnitionen des Abs.ol.uten, als. die metc!P~Jeichen 
. tlet.ini tionen G<>ttes e .gesehen l'ler~nt . nlher 
jed:>ch ~:r nur die erste eir.i£acli.e Bestizmrung 
einar
11
Sphare und dann die dritte, als trelebs 
die Ri.ickkehr aue der DU'ferenz zur eintachen · 
Beziehung auf sich ist, Uen Gott metaphysisch 
defi.nieren heie~t.tt · a.asen Natur in Oitdanken 
als solcllen ausQrUcken; die Logik abe.r umtasst 
alla C..edanken, wie $i.e noeh in der Form von 
nedanlcen sind.llJ 
It is especially signif'ic.-nt that Hegel discovers the most 
adequate (metarllysiaal) expression of the nature of God in thoughts 
as su.ch, i n t:l·ther words, 111 thin the scope .of' logic. If such a 
cogn:l.tive aec:ount be adrr.itted, then the Absolute, as dotined1 
me~ns little more than an intell&etualization o£ the basic ur~ty 
underlying ru.l cosmic processes. This ie most essential, to be 
sure,. ~ince Hegel thereby makea p:rovision tor the basic inter:play 
of unity and identity v-ltbin plurality and chan~re. But one es-
sential aspet:t cf persona.li -ey, that of ~lf..,.consciousna s,. appears 
.. -.,. , .................. ------
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on a mueh earlier stage of the dialectic before the level o! 
spirit has been reached.. Will1 moreo'V'er, is abstract, hence wholly 
inadequate until embodied ldthin the arg~nic _ .. rtole. F5.na~ly, Hegel 
never extende1 his ethical disoues1on beyon1 t e li,, its of sooi ty .. 
On the basis of these observations, t.hereiore, t he Vie:\7 adopted 
1n this die~M..rtation is that the term "personality" c nnot be aP"" 
plied t Hegl!tl t a Absolute in any aignif'icant eence of the term. 
1. The n1ng and ~· ot a Rd.lo~ of . ' ind 
Tblt hiftt atm. of Heael' , phUo8C:JStkf ot mind 1t to 8H thin 
cmprebena1vraly 1n · n tntell:!etble unity rather than to eltplain 
elements by 1~an• or a more and -~ de'taUed ~·•·· 'lhia b:r 
no , ana inn~• the fact, holle~, that in the· Se1n. oectton or 
. -
the . !bs1o f 1 rooogn:lJae• both the, ne•ae1 tq and the inadequaey 
o£ analytta. Tba point ie tha-t que.tton• &r1·tlins: eut ot an:r 
p.vehologie,lil ~etl t1one ot the nature ot tnd are tru:cy-
philoaophict~l questions, l'iaot theY tum upon 1sauee that t.t-an.-
a, no ec1 '>fthene.ion ot minclie tortheomtn · it t proeedu:re 
ie .81mpl;;' that of Pl-~ a&11tional data. The taph)riJi¢1 
science of mind •• emplrieally kno'wn• 'the eo\,lrse which t l ~ 
pF&tat1on ot m:lnd takes in 11 • l't thought. 1$ &om .IOUJ. (a 1 ) 
~ llind or ~pbi~. The ccount con.ta.itled btre, oom~e~ent:cy, ia 
more then ~~ dtsoripU.ve reoitAl o .Pif/dd .. c nnta. nd rnan1~ sta 
iteelt diaXecti<Udl;v cr the vro•se ot reason. ·Tbi• ts He 1 • 
!.deal:1et1c. te..tenQT to_ ntla- eYOl"Jfthing to tr!.nd, and it 18 tb1 
:regard he :I.e in keeping with the 'beat ·1n _ J:"Jaan !deal1 and 
true. to t.'lt peat claaelcal 'badttiOft 1h Weate:rl\ philasopby. !1 a 
4 
baa otten been 1~ •• ~·,l but a . ...,.. aocut*ato 
dG~Uon mq bt that ot a nbUO~ ~~ ~t.2 
Th$ teno~ ot a. . l' • sr dl0191.Y · , · tr' Qe• the. mop-
•llt ot ln.ullarl experJen<~e i a epeoulaUw t.n t.he M.nll tbat it doaa 
I)Qt negJ.Mt tbe ~ tllote contained 11'1 the aocial soi.encos. 
·'b.tt adopts tb r:a aa a ba..O tor d.l~ the: uni'V'tllreal el .nt 
in tbeee IC1tnoe•.. 1ht• fJl)p.roacb .nco..-• tho ~ an4 de-
Wll.QPilOnt: or th butllrm mind, tho t.~ tion r:4 · · eait and th& 
l'e$l1uUon t.·f a .pa.reontaltt)".. b•• psyohologi<:al ~ aa 
emie10ll84 bel"G treat• not •reJ¥ ot wbat u atven; but pauea 
0'9tW iato tbet tt.ld• of ethicuJ and -~~&ice to -~ tbo .. 
}ililoeophtca.l 1naigbt• ..-hlob make the giwn 1nt0llig11>le. .it 
1·• lfl\1 U• lte ~~A! !.t a\~ a a~ption of the u.-
divtdQat pcsnton •ld of the hW.aan J"ace. It 1• ~tflniO\lelY a 
pf¥0holOfl'3' oJ~ the ~Yl.Wtll &tld a h:latol'y ot cp4.ture, :eo 1nt.er-
' r r ~r : ' 
~d that. ~ ~t t e ~tlitct• dltt.iO\ttt to -~ Wbic.'l F.e 
hU. Uft'.*l"tiJO~f ·in hilt rd.nd at. (IDJ· gtwn time. n-1."$ a a plothol'a 
ot dttalle in bie account or tltu1lan ~a:ienoe; · t cpl"ttiou ot 
tr1ttctpl.e ~· lllftl' loat ftlgbt ot. 
ae .1* tnw•tlgatton pt(lft.a truttt\.\1 u1~· oaWtO 'th* 
~cal .t.t te'VW' ab•nt ftr<>a hts t~teatQant. To ~t.R.te 
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on detaU.e .. , that littl~· fho\lgh\ is reaerftd t~ the ~- con-
Siderat1011f ar ·~ . am4 re1•ttmiab1~, la, at o11oe tb-. d1e-
t!tlgu1tfllnf! IUl~k elld the talwe ot ~ntal p.,-dlol · .. • 
.· · 1 abe ·~ a ~M «Jnco:pt. be:eauoe 1$ prellet\ta 
1t •• tbe $l"tte.D*Ua$<! ~~n tJt a tJln~le: ~t ~- · • 
0-y-; t.bat ct ts1nd. ap!X'!;t. R.ea· on · ~enoe · 
teleological unii;\t-. fhla _,. ·· hta p~ogy t.r · c~ a 
liMe• ~· O-f· _eneftl ·de~ptkma (:ba~et1i) of a ~• 
ot· typical .s.tua:tions.. ~;tthoot tM.• all.--~ co. ~ ot 
m.tnd, thent ~ .e &l.W1tJ the n.t ~ that but'Jln expRiene& .mtq 
be PQt'tr .· a tl · ~UftoUl product of a ~- ·t ab~.Oii 
~ di'fQrc!Od.ll'om the Qo~ta ~·or· -.n. n · ~t ­
phU.o.~ca.t ~ tmabl.&a h~- -to. •nvtd:on · . n. under all a . ·eta 
o.t GXiatet14t1,. and,. ccm•qwm\171 to ee. hbl •e: l»:th nat\IX'al ·· nd 
tree. _ .. !.• no -~td.tion to. .naturalia - · fJO a• to deny 
his ~b, W .t on: the other bUcl, to 11"'• hUt b edott 'Whlle 
deru:tne' that 1 ·_ ! -~. 
'l'he ln~~tation -ot ~ ~ wt or thtl abc:ave -ap;.~oach 
to t.~ probl1a= Utd.erlk!Or.e ~ nMd and nteftaaitu tor · t:A;byaic•• 
It is ineOntro~l-e. that ~ qur most •ttlcilnt .. tbctla ot 
~t and obeWftt!on hmt- plt.Oid bttbre ue tbe data ot 
storat.CG:t nat;ift 'tfith theU. l..IW• ot oatMl ~on, th• que#tiM 
u to how · •l".tan think losluUT and c~tly ot the 'Mli>ltt . 
real.til ot b latta 1a •tU.l 'beto.ro ua. It eo.··_ . · a<>.nabl~ to 
a . · . that · · · b 1ro%'d ' · $1Cbolo• · it: to be rot41ned at 4l.l 'llllde.ro 
the n<:I'JIIOncl.atuw. of the met&J.b3'&ct ot m.i.nd, tt ••t bo given the 
mmtteetat!.or~a ot .t.n.d. u · be toun4 t.n ·· tbio-, t;QOtolO§", .,... 
U on ant t tl 11~ 1 are tnc~ted 1Fi·tl'l!.b thl 1:$oadlr reach 
ot· ~olo~·, Fi&~ 1 ts ·<teeir.nattott. ot it cmtir. 
tt~oe.ophy t:tf tdr\d*t '111bU!d . · ~ to b6 Vindicc. -" . 1a 
~.iirolo&r t~&e tt01M. .-.n~ t:N.., ·tht). tt-a.ditl.omil · ·-· ot 
'*rattotal p~rcb0loev.1t · e ~ 
1!1iad1 Ntionnl ~t>logy dMlt ·w.t+.b t e 
tbe- jiQU). txr 1tht mind~~: ••• J!JUbt '. ntift t}'d.ng. 
It ~~~ ~· J'Oco .. una ... -, hO"HU~.. .. t. JhUo-
•opbll'lal. p ~)bl).l.Q ~ th1uld i n no eenso ·t-o obl.iv.t..· , ii,o 
~£ ~ . ~~tal ~ol.OtrJr tio t~ ~latA to t.ltO indiv'i ttoal. 
d the· ~~'GUlP• 1 .. l. may 
regards the . tri~ ·ftP~'Ob aa .na'l"o · iJ.t 0014mt1 to arad tb 
not ot. . en ·toftJ'd hie ~t adwnt~ ot . tt?D~12f,:u: . 
ot -~ and . nct.3 
f:ln tile &the:r band• the:re 111 the equall.y proaen\ danger o 
· vi. . ai:de .U or.ma~Uon ot met.-~io . at.mply beeau . it 
ottcwo not.'lin~ :tn the 11&1 of a:u.gme~ 1t otual .·. ta. d 1. ~ 
ter· ~.• all too ~•n ·. t n ~t own d.a:r and. baa lfXt to many· 
aupWtioial vitt'ft on 1~ · u4 net. Such 1# the ou . · . o~ tatd.ng 
.QUI' la1owlAI . ;te ot 'tho l~ •• tNtt'lcUmt. to-uplnan tbfl OXi.fltanoe 
r '. : 't tfftJe ,_ t _ · . 1 B.n r .t 
1 1 
ot the h .. • · r to .rever the Pl"'C)Ge 1 by clat•'lng 
t.ha\ nattu"o i.e potont.i.:L apiri.t. Sp-trlt oxpl.aint no.ture~ • t 
a • ·ta " .oo ih&t there ... 
.taota · ich not -1 ~ utal. 
ec1 · nee, but t ~ntal ~ 
doc not " ·-·~ 1 . . . t • !n the t 
or a . to 02~ · ta · ye!ee ot ph · «Je1 biolo ~ cr· 
haJJ ~ · u of a tuller ~ 
•tttrJU.1~.. or · o op ee ~nd $ and force, lito Olld 
tall .cious 1drmtU1oe.tton ot mS.ftcl 
p~holocical tate , or 
t1 e~ nt · · ·b in~ ··• l ted ' ·ture. I n 
ttM 
t.Ar'rJ~··d, b.Y 
<r o ·· ar U.o~ • s 1 it . ~ cle31"]3 
ta<:t.el" o, hi a '~'"~hilO!OP..V 1$ Vftl!'1' 1.""'"' ...... """ 
hi · , .n inttinl a . t this, be 
TIOUld ln no . . reearo it as a l d tati® in bii phUoeophiCill 
s,re • ~u~ rsiste ._ tmn i s th ·t ot , ru1 tift ttvity1 
t 1!ch a to t d nk lo ·, eaU ·rmd coheren\ly bout 
t t.1 tutioXl !e . a. d.ta~ the cotmoe 
to 1"J~eot ·w11o1 ., 'd intent is to .xplatn the · ta in re-
tio to the ole. ·r.r.~ri.fmce M,. olo . _· nd to l · an ·~ nlc 
olo · l ~ th _ acu..\I)WS ou. eo of thl· ~sitlon ot a 
na 1 
2. tetele Qt · .tid Q !II a ot 
gol •• phU.oaQpb¥ ot mind 1• a. pb1loeotf17 Which discovers 
1 
ol • . d.Jld, but si . 
Ue:velo nt. '· I 
· ot dualiot1c in 
' noao " 
D;lCW11r.J;.y. C:l~ in hi& 1t'!1:iflri:U"' 
!..tJ · t t til.r· une. di 
dami ' 
or at ti:ng the 
that 
the 
· nte, Z\1"' __ .. -.2,.,.. ... 
~11DI- m ~.. ·"' . o5 :. s- .. ¥. 






1' th1e1 d.ootrine of the leV.l ot tnil.nd1 l gQl 1 a. , a1l1 roo. 
1~at .. n~ ht o 1. ·sic oontontiot t.~ .t l"'N.litv 1 · a ma.-t.tmo 
· t adl 
tNth. Ao iLs .U known• t1 lo r 
ant cr 11¥ Rouel re tee t.J la'IOWJ.• 
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1, ~~ t · Doc 
J.kni : &o . a logic)al point of view, Hegel to tJ~ea 
'l " • ,JC... 
.etion 
0. ti.ght. 
~·· ,;."'· ............. n~ 
'""' " 1,14.! ....... .¢."""• '"'# 
·a! · ... OUt! 0 CO: . . 1 . ;t 
t l cone~ t. ; ;~:» e 
eo: · .. de ·u 
knmt1.4;!~e1 . o that tl o . ...,~.e n t • OOri C 
Uticnti 
t 
ot l."ne. s iB J!)()tdte ln i t . s :tt~ 
·. ll . lldil7 eee tbnt t.."l · aU•1'11po1"tl!nt rt'1; · t p!;e 
i s ir. plie-d htl!"e·• H c . ld .. ~ · ~m 1 ~. . 01"0 c1.r . .. 
. OVWlook, l!U:mn~J! !6, that no' t.O ~ D.t !s · -~ tJS$0n't1 
•s ture. Be .l 18 eal.Un~ o.t ntton ·() f, ·. M; lected t· 't! 
tJ en A WOUld. olearl,v not be tho t.'dn"' 1 1 ~ ~!nee i ~ · · u1 . . ot 
tb n be -dlt.t~'tnt ~ n 'ftb1<th l$ dmltted\ " othmt than ... . .tl#• 
ohan~n · t . 1; t.n ~ it lf. t'hlit i 
enti~ lat:!cal sy~ is b Md• 
n. -.hove arm . nt e, . n . rt;., rre . 1• C)~.e .1 m 
t• t doctr:!M t de , . · • ot 'tru· . • :~~.ted no! 1Y"1 ~ r- · w.. 
t Mt l'U1l li:• .t~U••• To t nk o:t e o .-jeet t e, at t • ~ 
,..r -t• • ,." · rr .. 1JI•J.I• 
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..... / t.o 
n~;.·l.y .fillil d t.o !..;n' 4-t. . 'l.~.;) .~aleet.io, o:· ooo -.J;l.rl.g1 calla. 
£r.t~ cvet-....e din~ gro.~ vh,~ ,.:le:-.~~lGl~lCnt und .i\lltill / ~nt. .-i.o ' l ~ .... 
on.;.j.,l ,;,>rJ..:r the.> cor · et :!i"'S 0£ the dis.J.ar;t:f.c · · t!)od. 
:i'fti'\'l ;.,..A ;&.- '"' . a-~',,_ ...... \4, """ ~ e 
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1mpote~. ~:+ 2: h 11 an •beolute,. etemal, uni~eal and 
neceaaU"J tr\l.th gatut 11h1oh aJ11 'ri.n ot the l"el&UY.l.ty ot uutb 
proteete in ,'lin,. ttnce the t~· blil.u S.ts rational ~ 
on the unbred' hle roo'~ ot pure logic r:~r tlle YtfiY natu:re ·Gf thlll 
l'lind. 
Bu1i evw.tn ·~dl tl'\ttbt •• 2 + 2 • b deri:w both their 
uee.tu:l.ne.- artd int..UigibiUty tzroa their oomwct.ion wt.th tM 
ent!re ..,.taa or DlJ11bertt~ Two hae s&ning be-.use ot i t a plaat 
.1n fl relational '"* ot otbw 'INII!bere. on& ~~ what 
aq aepan.te nut~~bar ld · t •an apart tram ite tbematical neighboJ'e •. 
The ning ut t + 2 : h ae betng true, tor e...-ple1 ie 1rlditeolubly 
tied up with the nafMoe ot th• vatAm ot • tice, ·eo that the. 
tru. th of the l*'Opold. tion is bound 1.;,) with t.be truth of tho eystem. 
i · t .tee 2 + 2 • ~ won& tor Q~.mpl.e,  ia that eJ.noe the re!Ult 
ie par\ ot • context ot ~. 5,.t tAil• to .t.lt ~1oall7;; lnto 
the et•tem ot matt.e•tiol:l. ta;.db•• 1:!".1·• pQ'ticular ~ thu 
chal.l.eneta t :I)J ...Ure system ot tbematical judgrJKmt.. m the 
ubiquity ot lll'atem then eeeznes to be no auroea•• 
It ght ·be ~ ad.1ud&ed that the theory or de · · · • 
14 in abarp conU.It to tho prooed.ures ot rQOdern •c16nce, and l.a 
thua the .-eat ot all ttme-teet.ed acient1t1o lau•• Dut even U 
the thaoey ot tbe Nl.at1~ t)" of truth 1ll8l"e aocepted aa tl' ~ng 
glory of' ecienoe, it 1f0Uld •change acilmt.ittc ~a~ 
llbit. ~ ier1oe bae not, at l.e.a.et to date,; co.utruct..d an.y dfttinitlw 
ep1$WQO~· or elaborated any -.peaS.ft.c tOl'r.l ot lQato be tore 1 t be-. 
ga::1 to «Kpl<1•ro the nature c4 tn. ;.h:reiaal unt,.... For t moet 
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pan, 1 t baa cade cel'ta1n ~ alll\tilpts.ou about the poeeibU! tq 
. 
and rat1onaljLtQr ot kncnrlAd(te., proa .. di ; •t the • t.1Jal, l'ritb 
lta ~It•• ~ phUoiSophl~ tb~ ot coherenQe hae not, 
i n spite ot j ~be tnelm.uddona ot it• wittc•, plaotd ant · arr!we 
1n t'be W¥ o;t the adftnoement or ectenoe • ·Tht oobeftnt ~ 
ot truth ie :BlOH a . tter tor epeOUlatlve phUoeopb:y than it ia 
tor- ~ntal 10:lenot. I t. ia to be noted 1n tegll·•• caeo that 
hia most incon"P1.ououa WOI"l( waa done 1.n thlt N8lm ot Ma!:t!mS0!2i&!!, 
Htgel '• en\l:N pbUo.ophlc~ pli'toholoey thu become.• a 
~t.arr (in the; taot t hat ta-u~ 1 real..1M4 in the deg:ree to 
wbich h'ullan experiellOe a in~ted Within tbt tr~ ot 
coherent eyutem. 'lbat V.Utb 1a found in «>heftntr I'Jitem1 ie the 
residue ot nl.l ewstained atu.U..• in Regeu.nte~~. I .t one 1ns1t*te 
on abeclute trutht ·then the onl.T plact to t'ind. 1 t a in a sratc 
·. trt:m'Wld.ch :U.tenll.T noth1~ hae been excluded. Bel&tt truth 
ie that whi•!lh • ·kl:low 'Within the ~ble. lim1tat1~ ot ·lnaan 
tinitudlt •net al.aye :tnamt ha~ 1dtb1n t OU'Cle ot an e....-. 
re~ 1ntelleotwll frontier. '!be ooh-.nre aocoU!it o£ truth, 
as H•eel <ru.tJ..S.naa it,. l"Ctats ultblately upon bitt~ ot ·the ..,.... 
lation of thought to rrealit,r, perbap• t he c.nwal. probl• 1n the 
entire n.el.d of ep1ttAHaolotJ7• Tl-uth ie the ap~tion ot thougi<t 
to l"$al1ty4 !be dltsree· ot truth ac te'Wd in our ~nee ae • 
whole·, ;Le dependent in large ~t on the extAmt to which haw 
been mcOI)tl8fol. in conetruoUnn a eyttAm ot thought. All ot th1e 
molt a~tdl7 :tinda i ta toUXttainbMCS in. • s-1. 
·4· !ht 1 a~ Cll'.d r . for a · te.pbro1C$• ot tbe llt •. 
The b.uto pWau~tion ~~ this entire phU.O.ph,.-
ot the huun nelr' 1e t tuit · 1-ta M.ture . \18 • . _._. dba.u•ted by f.n1 
... 0 H' .. ~>··,t 0 
a.nal.Jtioal de.tlori.ption; no uti'Atr h.()ll painlftak!.nn lllld ~-
~t ~Ilia _. be. 'lhe :torego!ng d1tt,...nt.tauon tween • 
pitt'1cal pi;Y.oholor.r1 •o-oo.ll.ed1 and philooophioal p81Chol.oro" aa 
1ntMpreted in th1 die~tion •ttempte· to. ·poiftt up 'thi·s l:'¢'e-
aup;pcut1\1on tn thO abarpeot poaotble tb®•• Doth oontrtbuUon. 
.-e ~ h~. 1m:11o.n1ns expo•it1on ot t;h& aelt t~~.tat 
be naither pcei'Cbolag1Qall.)" deteott• nor phUo80.,Pb1aal.l7 ~ 
wl.oped. one may q.tot«l with appstO'I'al. the attateraent ot ledger 
Wood that 
re.t;fr.tt41Jl& 'b relation betwaetl epiftemologr and 
psyoholoqs, • UJneh t.e ~~tb$ p~ 
ot t~l'eeptton,. lllmot7:~ eon-oept.tou and. or the 
oth,,.. eoentttw probe#tOa of mind rd'tordt tbe· 
iJ'XIjLepiJniAble· .da-ta or the tbctor-t o~ lltlm•dll 
arxt 1n7 epie.temologlcal tl~ca'7 Wbiob io ·cotza-
ad t1:.H to paydtologleal.lY tal · aetumptiona ie 
to 1~t dagfee .taJ. .. ~llT"' . 
It 1!1W!it he noted, . .t'ur~n,, that m&tapbyaic boQomst in-· 
oreaai~ eit~111<nmt.· a·· one col.'J.lJ-onte the· ~1al prob1 · . ot 
the ulttate ~-~re 0:t h\Dn oontei.ou..,.a•, 'With tho co:~panlon 
:rs-o.ld . ot 11Gs relati-ons to the plin1C41 or.gan1am and to 1te 
world. "· ~- ult b been detl.:r»d ~to i-nclude lt•consc1ouanruus1 
9. 1\$ 1~ "elt.lf" aa uatd heft ifl to be in~ted ~ 
to ineludo \t.lt dlat1nct.1:ve human acti Yi.ty ot .-olt.WOQn ctou.one .,,._ 
re $Oil and. t!ut capa~11'q to't' 14eal m••· Soma writers (e •• 
- . htman) pro~ to di . t!ngviah eo~t deftnite1y bet'le&n . ~t 
and on. ;- e. !Ttghtman, !m.t 3Sl•353· 
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the rational ~•nd the i deal• the~ the •tavbt.S.c1an · 
•ork. In our ~~ . __ ··rv natu:tal1tt1C ~ter · <m tte. eelt o 
c:leny 1.n pt!'aO~Lce lllhat tbe1 att~ ln. theory. !hey live wnop.. 
tioall.Y• n the· b¥"()ad _.. 1n whldl ·~ ~ 1• .· · tapbyaJ.eian') 
eaye. :Jobn tAil~_.: ~if ooeupt.e4, ~blf w:itn tile •tavblrsic• of 
the- .elt to • tP"O tar da than -.t. 'tb Al'll' ot~ f,bUOtOpliCAl. 
Pl'Obl••'.n :tt '1reuld •pctar1 tblre.ftl~.- tha• •inoe the~ 
ot eelth<tOd lls ot tMnacendent impo$tl)e to tbfl baan intc.l ~~ 
s.te Mtapbylilw feature• cannot -.1(thted1. -~ Virtual~ ~ 
otheJ" ph11oSOJ;il1Qil problem :t• rel•ted even~ to that 0.1 ·tt. 
88l~. Thl• :t11 not to ~at, h~, that the PJ."'Qbl . . 1 ·~!•m 
Um~•• n• .U u t1r!le17, tun» alwap he~n handled wlth con~ 
·te 0\.'1.ll ancl underttatldtng.l2 
'1thou.t •to®\, the VUlftnt ~ -o.f Cbellenging 'VIOrU M t 
tapb;yri.e:i• oJ~ MUhDOd ts due, •t l · It, ·s.n !.l4.l''t, t o the rel uctance 
ot ~ viteit<tl to enter the ~4 Poiition of · · tapbt-ai.cal. 
epecW'.atlQG, ,nth the nault. ~t ....,. tuoa ot the JIBl.t ... ua,.. 
equtpped to 1' l at hom tn •oulaUve ._,,_..,13 t n .addition• 
'the U,i~ ot tr. tillee ~& tba current trocedtt.r$. ot ch"a.tting 
kn091l.Gdne ot iehe lhwer to exp\dll the extetenee tJt th · hi he:t., 
without an ·a&lq\]Ate dEmonatration of 1tt17 t bi might be pbU.e>-
eophicall.T teneible. Until tJ.1itte 41nrl. <>.tber qae•Uona IU'e ~1¥ 
·rrl "IlLiA lij" ". t. t ........ .. 14 41 .. • f;·· 
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tao&d, tt 11 •\Pite yrobable • ebiU c!tUl be confttontod With 
~t1 . a ~~n« to d&'al comprehenttivel¥ with the eelt •ith-
o . t that '*1cb _. eeltho«11ntell.lelbl•• ttrata 1t1 thout ~ 
atrataa. '1be poi.nt 18 that an;, ~ologt.oal ~r4a ot the 
aelt .-t pre,~ .. 4ft o!'lard.le4 -aelt to l»~ w.t. th1 otberw:t.• 
n;, Mlll.711e i it potsit-1•• r-e.rl*p• -~ tl"C'Jble· l'd.th peycbolog:S.m 
1s1 ae one ot tb 8ll(mel9tsi tbat 
with oonddva'b.le tfmaoiV, pqohologltftl h.._ 
!-41.11 w cotMmtl.en., abetiraoting lrott :Ainde . 
tn!:hiall.y ot.gan!Ud oudl pll"'ptrtittu to ttuit 
theH.J>· ca~ntence--. and their eonvem.euce it dt-
ternd.:Ot<i lawel.T b)" •o1en:Ufto t.n41U~n. !ber· 
are ·ab$0r'bed bf the ehadow or thod "the~' -~ 
t.rs; •bhs •. i.tldlv16.1al. dt)jeot• upob ~• the llhadow 
:u.e .. lU . ' . 
AUpo~ ;so .s ~ec!l.y tmt W'let.ter w atuqr paNdOR$ or 
paraU _. ., ptamt• or poraontt, ·· t.(:iin (and end) with ~ 
1:n1tial.l¥ at'~~r>J.hd•*' rro . tte:r how scien:ttti0l413" o~ato the 
peyehelo&ical 4I$Cl"1pt1.on o£ tm e:x:pemrae. ~- be-• 1 t te 11~ 
· e · · tt~l) aa pld.lompl~ . · s tt, iUd .tn th:la ob~t!otl 
!t(.tgol cor.res ~:> tho toro. iiith co~te .*W. nd pb.UO$lphital 
~wt.IUn• he da~Sonstratoe this t.routb ~uen the l1ttl.-read Plltea 
ot ttJe ~IJ~Jf!• · . tbout thie 1na1ght1 pblloeopbiet4 ~-­
Cholomr ba1t Di'lt ewn tst#tod on it.e ~ ot dl4¥~•" tb 
thie oentnl,~tta&l ot the elt in~t, a.1'l sc:tent!t:tc 84v'ance 
1a madtt posst1~•• 
. . ; .t r;; tr, . . t, 
$. The ~~tructure ot the S.lf 
In put-BQianQe ot the · tatemeat md8 prGdQUfl.y hat. phUo-
~i.ool psychology must not 'b<t pBJ'Cbologte.ally der.cta.N, one 
rmJJt not tuJon ••ida 1n his ~ t:or" the amng of •tfhoo.d ~ 
t1 , vast oollllctlon ot relwant dn.ta placed a-t ld$ diiiJIOMl and 
Ul!n his re1tdl by·~ PS1Chol~.. Howover mch tho Ultuwd• 
out®• lf/4'9' •~non an at-owe t.ntory ot pereolll&llty, tbo.~ atU.l. 
~ tho mlllf 411. nt• WhiQll _.. . ~ined to the J'!$aul\ 
posa:f.bl · • 'ltlllfJ ~pale F*tft1PJ»MI anal;y&iSt the:ro Cat:l be M 
ayntrt•s1« Without tb4't:D.s and .anttth•ai••lg I n: ~· parl acienott 
!. ·. t,ba i&imtt:l)i.ng 9:f th ~· elGtMntlt ®ntttitut.tus t he tul>-
ject tter ·o:L" •• gt,.n seitnoiJ., As in o~w tlelda, psydlologr 
hatt :s.:t · liat ~"t olemtntft tecultie#, insttneto, retla~Uij ...... 
eat1o._, ide& , ~e ~ tt& on. t:,;AU.e d<*trint)a ot the -.holo 
ba'9Q 'ftOn 1DOI'l!llasing N_.Ot 'Wltb!n peydtolog$.ca1 cirolee,l6 ~ 
the ·search f.Q~ d18ttncUve elememt.s gee• ~• tt ahOill.d. l -~ 
tor uamplfJ, ,t.':tnd$ 4 Qbat'lletori.estic internal $tl'uc~ L"l kna\Ylw 
edge, and• oo~ntl1', .!n mltnd alld Goclety. ·fJnj V'Jirll or Jl«Y not 
ags'eC) w1th bta ln~t.ion. but tbnt ®eo no,t Mke interpretation 
one vil:l.'t lee. naces.&U.T• 
1. ·'thewlee Q£ ilJl tiplieitu 
.OrJQ ot tn. ~•t theol:7 .atte~ to account r~, th• 
15 It se. tbtct., 61.-5"8'. 
16. Tbl.a 1& oot to ·rr; tm t, e\ that tlr ~llQlogtat ott.on 
~ proaches an aMlyillu ot •ntal ~na 1Wm. h1a OfJn speo14 
line ot intttreet., .as. tor . . :ple, hen m1M ie 1n~te4 •• a 
~' t:tt' aen~ttaJ a «r•tem <>f we~•• a eollAtoUon ot idea. 1 
a n&'twork ot :~al. area, or ,_, otbd' ~tt«tlar deeigut!on., 
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C01JaPOs.'itl.o.n o;r :per ona1.1t;r on t .he basi · a .. ~tQ1'1tl1.t1os 1 · tt'-illt 
ot t cultte .. ·hap.o t , diltti.rJCtive · · . · ture in t -i . 
t.ton, o ,ecJ!).':t' et.c. ~ie "l cul:~" psyc..'tolo.g:r, by c · llnZ" at-
. nU<m t o, e uni~.:l na·turo ot tl• · tacul. tie~, cor.tld re~ 
c(:t) · t, it 1!1:i& helievod1 tor •n tho pooaibl.~ · sions o · 
porsoh411t¥ct ' O'Ultiev; U'W all• unito:ttti ll$ ~ctr1 
yet 11mB · U i e&.dl pal'&On. , re 1a• h01ie'ftl"j. etr.o.ng reaction 
contn.in 4t\VtM.n~ o.t rit, it : . b$ e:r~ifd.1 d1f .• cult to 
V'O it pt'O}'l<lrrly . dM d. In th.e ¢.Q>J.w flinet.Qenth <10nturr, -~ 
·o . r, i~ ·wu mob 1.n. YOQWt•lf the M.ln l"eAton to~ ~ntroducihQ 
~tunct t cul · . p ychol.o , ~8 within tho •c()t:l8 o· · t h· • PN•n~­
..,r , · t . 1~ t :h tawl w pqohol:ORlft in ener · · 11imed at .. · 
·:t>liahmani~ ot u.,-, . real : ao.~l tt· s• thereby hop1nc to ceotmt 
tor · ~~e .aet.:f.,tlti•-s of .r.dn • !n .a f aa Etg$1 1 .. lOW:$ ltld1'ii'idual 
dltt~nooa, he would 1 . t lean in spir1t1 BUIQI!tpt.ible- t o the 
• ot .tam:L\f pqoholoa. r~v psy"C.holow ~ ·. t!tl~h ot .ind 
tn -n at. nut 1!!h t'her 1~ l$ uni.~eal tall'U1td.ea, ·f.>r oondttio d 
ntl s~ 0'1! th . totality of one'• habit • w arrt o~ .uerios ot 
. 0 , ot; _I _J; ' .. . M!J,¥1 
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p r .eo l about t.'wQ.. The o 
aon~1 puz,:oee 1 ~a and 
"ffr J.em.nt, • 
tated 1n t his cllapte• is t o ~ nt 
1n brief' eo~ . · e ~ewr 1 or the aare wtatnndin ~ Ql.o~oal. 
theol"te• eae1rb cl..smine to. aceount fo~ t he etruot'llte o reo -
i t7. 'l'he v.ln apparently ottcn-:tng !IOGt tmerde a. · pbya1os ot 
the eelf' Otll.d be o . ·. Yh1ch hold$ tb t. t'hl) ere :. ·.rnt · 
structures j~n e eh JMlf'aon ·apl;ainlne · atewr eoM18temy the%'$ 
1 1ft tha\ person' t hoUQht and eonchlct. · t e suCh theori i tl , 
curront tt •n-.r ot tl:'aita.l9 
o:t tiret .and P'i11a17 impol:'tanoe in discuee.tng tl traits 
or perso; l.;Lty 1a to dewrmino 1lh · ther a eoncept o trait ;u, a 
favorable fac·~ that . cst:M. •· · th 
:p¢tr onal1 ty 
baV. nrl.S~•n as a l'eSCtion ~n&t t · the<~ey o ·.. fr®nality 
\Ype . in "¥Jl'l1cll o ch ~ i$ at · . . ~it hlt . artial ®seripti n o.f 
soml!t • ·' ton 7rin'- he· ®f .. : traits $S u!al~n;; di._.. 
mot"$ ·<n" lo o • ~~:tx~:d . ·m tandurin ·' J: tthi. t1 ~t . x·.~ 
tn ·f ec.tU• ot "' -~x-:tenoe. 
t tom 
~ordon A ... l J-Xl't'·t, oon d&:ro tnlS. 11$ au ge ~Clit:ed and ~tl.!i te 
e;:}durin.:: tenc'~;nci~s ! ;vin(: Uoll to. d.o \1 ,tll-.o.uoh l s·,•ng oontru.. 
. .,.ruc.ture. · &8 •. nte · ·. ttJ1 taot.Qo, c · "'>1 .tr>s., oontimen~· .s, 1donlo· 
.nd tdt l!ke, ~~ . le de~iption he ottf>'J' he*'e* ho . ~e ·, ie men 
t.Qo! loo · • iit1 oo.Bnes a tJ"ai t 4 
m5tnwalu .. a.'"!d foual-1 · d · uropqc'b!.c f!j~Q'tcm t c~ to t . .ind1v1tlual h ~:4th th. . cap®i·ey> 
to :r'Sndiw man;r ~timuli ~not ratl;y equivalont, 
d to initiate and t'Uide conttetent (~~~~ent.) to~re ot $dapt:f:ve a3!d OXlftS11~ b&l·uw1or.2~ 
'l'hle1 det'..ni.tio.."l ot wa5.t . '* ~ oournct1 . £ · .. 1a:v 
e®nd to &.J1l'1 .. ffl co~ v r p8$ohQlO ~el'll th"Ol?• It 1. rol ~ 
ii' ~r..c ~ ~ ~oth~r to S!We..C othe.:r pqchal ~ 
.. ,. . ~·*· -- ±i ll ' 
· th1 io 
o two · · ~ 8()~ ha¥" · ~i®lq 
ti 0 · · nd of ir~iivi·:tv 11 t: in c,vc ... 
al.* t.: t t¢e · . ,. . it, · · . icy'· tu 
· ~j) o. aacial · .. •et b;; vtt..rtu.e o· · .eet th t .a· 
·tts :a ·. 
ov look t u• . o~ · ~ ot social t-40l:gnn~. 'X! t tl' :ro i3 "ch 
co · plurtdi · rt· ~ . th theory :of ttwait.a than Jie~:cl 't'l'oold doubtl.s .· 
rJCrrJtt. 
-------•- '!Ed r • •· .t : . • 
204 
· ~to ·tiDe books •. To ~czolook this tact ie 
tbeoi7 or ·traLts a• it 
it aotd. ve po · · s of t h. · :mind~ Thi.. · ccmtifx!.l . a s'b"ea· o . oot.avio:" 
.• ba 0 d 
sophlc&l paycl2r¢l0f!t• I t l$ n ., ot tlln ~at 'mtll"~.t~o of :\o ~l' .·· 
ecript1on o;r , . th t Ao. , · .W6 Ml. oor..., .. d~i ~ o. to Ut$ 
e:J.e data tn ·ld ext ... on l)£ eQrt etott3nocs in t. c 
~nol.OI!t~t. "l'J!\ -4.tt ! MJeh, o.t (tOt . ~~ . · ..: n~t O '\ . :"V!l.'blra 
..,.-u ·-ut ·_ : . .•!"••• .· :. . 
in aru crt\). . i,.C\i.on ~t ., .·  beha . '0 . ... - . 
ta~. is a eu~uion ot · ~ . C!ttc a<!ts. T:rai.t » eon . q:.tnr~tJ.y # 
aro ·naoea~~ . interred 
tty. 
present. dt.IICUJilli&n .te it tolic . · gnttt~. T.raits h :v& tt • dnJ 
tor t he :tnalv~Ldual in 'that. the,. ee:~ · I'OUhd hie eonseioUtt :om-• 
poea,. lXi ~~· · ~ i~le from re•.m 
in 111 ·.~ 
o~tfld plu~ that lvee Q'l'!$ i 1f.tp)lt«l' .a for ~rt . t;,;,n r;oint!:J ~ 
tlte! n.u~~~~~ pt-e ~ ot 1>Ur;pr> in 1. . .n. 11 ·~. Tn 1 
~. h · 
20S 
6. The Ptoble · ot the &lpi&'ioal Utlity of Per:ilon&Ut.Y 
t>sychQl.Q~:f.oal ltutliee l'..a'ftt· dtscloaed liMN' Ul1llltnating thilli.l* 
~!oro~ • 1t :la quite pat· nt t • t 1 a :SC~t't ·of eo 
J:!.t'ooe · 1 i nteJ, , a ion2h tak p'l.aee u i .!' "t:.o o:to·t lt'+ t tl: ·· n;e"'eure 
,;- ) •. a · c l c at 
utrai f t;;-*ot t ol ~ ...... MlJ.ty 
.. :~h 1 n:rr ~~~; nt. !!f 1 . 
ot le-Nl• or ·dirvel.oparmt. b• tunotional. unita, thou poe-
lllOSinr': an imtependenot or tlie~ own• tnnd to co~ t J to oro 
• !hra¢1!1~ !11! te.:1s . • re 1 cot .t nt pro-~ si . .,01 .. ill 
o uni ,. t cP :l!h1 or oou:rse, rtGet uni cy · n vor e 
eu¢.rieal upanence. 
'lbi• •nt:lre proce•a ot dii"fe.rentiat1 n1 on tl or..e hMd, · d 
inte~ation o~ t other, developa ~ · a eo11d cor l oolf-
oo.nooi ous:tl(t , and 'hore a,_r.r,e::i;n the pal"allelim':t ~f $ppl"oa.oh W'. tl1 
1 t hQut doubt ,, natbi · ·~ e utr · w aot to .he uni ty o pe~.t7 
th-an t J• s <tnltlio center ol aelf"'i'(ronscS.ouaoosth t?'ds 
acioutmeN ie olo•l¥ :related to peruo~ pos$0~ons, to other 
person• and 01ll. tura.t ~ fll.tp.rea-.d through t.l"i nomal sootel 
ratton arld .:~ -e.s11eem. I \ ean QCAreely be denied t . t 
emotional ll.at fJ£ the 1tldiv1du.al1 \UIIlallt l'eP>:t:"e n ed~ 
lo · cally in 1~ of too · , e-elf-..eartcen1 t hf> $e;,t1 · n o ... aol.t-
rer,r.u'd Qt' ao· !f lUes dea:i t:Lon, o.f'ten cnhanQes Pft" o . unity. 
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Bu He ·~ 1 tmse no eueh value 1n tho ertl()Uonat l ife • ~u~a ~t.w 
nt of soul i)t' teeliM 1$ g.twn Within the tr~k of tho ab-
e.tract uni~ JV1; ·· • ilince amll i~ bu · tt'lU ·U'$i p: 3~ o.£ evn-
o~to sp!ri.~ .:lt it~~ conSI)q~· ntlyt u • ~ · ·1:1 G\f jecti ,.e r' •27 
lt1o ·t"e 'bmt oZ th«t om.o iO.nal 11.....-~.. ia1 i tho· t q~ :ct.1. n;: one o 
t.~e . .,et di•ppo1ntin"' fe · u.r a in all 'W"Jtt W1"'1~1t -~ o" tllC t,..~ai 
tr~.ilo~r. The cognitive ~it out. riegel undul:f lJJ:-:itn 
the j.ntel~iliiAl content o ,... our motionBl l. · o. ? ¥.dh:Olo!;;1e.al 
~· . '1!1h(\nev&jl" the. ln~pondor..tOIIt ot trai ta a ui;.rlcs .d. lt i& 
acomatic th ·t a.n:t \huot"y or tte~ate and itldepon nt. W...er nt$ 
nets up .1n ho)pele . cotli\'Uei on unle a eoh · nt account o£ th 
lements is. at.te!:l >ted• 10h a ~J is Ca0$d t t two a ~ 
tho •\lll!!lltotel ot imividUal tactoru.1 t.b l!'O~J ~o · ne 
"omnibus•• dt\tL ~·: ot· ~t~:J:tu. or ~leo it . t t11od-~ce ~ · 
thing co~iXi:v.e t o kf:o;:~ the · i"ts toe,ett.h r. J:t onv · ooapta tno 
t'rtiit , ,l .. B:Jme B~tn" thefl)7 o ·• .~~~)8lit~:r1 ho ver., unity is 
found w::. thin · ~ .o !m.erl.ook!:nrt nature ci' tl~e ~ t • lt.LO icb o£ 
tl.1s1on1 quite J.ntollitl,iblEt t,& HG\JCll.- i ·e oon·~d ·thin tl10 
conception it$$l:. lb:ua.- 'ibo hypo't.lie#is gf interdeponde:fit ~te 
of£'erf:i ~ t' a11 or.tan1c t.boe¢7' or po~sonal1 ~· tls-"1 atq other 
*''" **' · r·--••u• •• fi • . - . 1 llsl 
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in · . ·fl! .~. th tho 01" nio philoso~S.$e ot the ,Pl:"eeent d ·., l1:nd 
appo ·· s to v J.idato.,. at loaet in .. omo · . :ll 1Uiltre, the tn1e :J.n... 
?. :- · m ·i cal um.t.~ 'lbrou : to . . t.. t. 
i .. JS 'bulk o.~~. te tertal eubei t.tcd in too pr. aa.:~ 
1. t. ~au.. t Qt .t:'JOdeJIIn pqchol.t)gt.OU atttt\y . n the struotur o . 
·· reo :f.ty, liDl'l08 ! · 1 " ob'l'iouc omirieal b .. • at 
of t l ~· t 
~ , ~re J in ~ f ar & psyobolo~ apprcmc ieS th · vU eet r:;f the 
.re('jnal1:'.1 in teniUJ o£ de~ee ot l.ltlity, ~ i U:-"i!o"' ~ 
rb , t -e ~+,eat llliYIF,l:o etmtl~but'ion t "' 
" tn.e t~n. ty ot pert&O ality to date. i . that i t O· t.Je . s the 
.e~t · d ·Jud · nt not fat- t-em.ove<! t:.>:o !ln.v one . r ua whie 
• • I ~.,. te 
~ . o l" n h:Le i nftatip;:at1on o.. this · o&t olusi ve ot .1 su jeet. 
lt'llt..'l&l1 · rson. .- .uoooplet"s .,.~o l.t 
oc :; :- ~P t'l'ie epest t&pbyoic , PI'Ohletl u.t.l l do 'J'Jnll to ·vau 
.Omf.I'JlV&8 <Jt tho ap&dmfark do .. by poycbO,l ;1.8t .t UM a.ow d:te-
e Mtion ~nou«.h to 'be u if> to tell tlm tllrahlo fr'om ... he ar--ld. 
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.a · i o · •'l .:n our 
.~. ' o · t ae 
, 
g 1.n o~ rp 
I ts 
c-urrent de.ftni tion 
om 
o · one 
A.aftnl!"tn:lfln t o ~ X'(j.(!er<ie 
21.0 
nature of · •~illlt 1e diaplayed 1n the conown over tbe unity ot 
t eu.b-•tzuc11alre of soi11111~, a• . 11 · 8: t.he pr·obt .of ttl$ 
u~ t y ot the ·~tal per oonality 1t u . Co:lei.e.el "" p.1· • then, 1 
• )11'0 a · 1 re .. 
O>-~jectiWJly · ::r . · at t. . Thus, it .· tJ ® t 1ni ~ · ·:cy .la d t o t 
ar . amo theory ot per Mllt,-. 
B t the :stal. tin era col.i ns 111 · t.he 
adjUatoont &-ll.thllr th o. philoso•:>bicol · :. n · tMtion o~ the 
eel£ or .. r c:n. 1n 
- <;e . din ~ i n . to 
ty, ube. deeper otives, . n Gal" ill"' i n . t .e 
nt " llt nd .. judi~e • li t .ly, e 
ry anw is ttw in X' poruot r ' 1cn. the ~ore ot th 
re oi' · i' U i t · 
r 1 t..lm ~ e}(J :r:ience 
'101 • 
2..U 
(luiw d1 .fJUfl~lirJhable from the 11181"$ . ation ot one•e cbu'ao-· 
tena-tlce, !lt)e chle£ intveet ot Ge•talt lies in d&temin~ the 
.Y in --1ch pera0Ml1ty i dascri'bod wlth tQ parts UZ1Clen'st004 
not 1ft 1eol tl.on but a• eta ret.Leotlllg the nature ot the whole. 
I t 1a, dcubtl -u, a aerioueJ •ttempt ot 1llOd8n'l PSVcbo\Oa to "le"'otJ.• 
with the x;rol:a.aa or cont1nu1f41 atd d1econtl.n\11ty in thlt realities 
1fbich ~id the oonaeioue •U. It 1••• ua w1 tb a conceptiGn 
ot reona:U.1~ conoei'ftd in tAl'ma ot • N"at..i.Ued eyetecs, blwing 
a detillite ~it'Uctu1-e 1fh1,oh mikes prov1eion ~or eeparate regions 
or areas, b\11~, equally ~t;, perrn.1tting the necea_,. 1nter-
dependence ol~ the parts • o aa to FO"ide tor all kinde ot indi• 
vidual ditte:rrenoea. The degrM or un1 ty expJ"eutd in aJV one in-
d1Yidual per-son 1a de~n&tnt upon hie own 1nntr pel"aonal region 
or core or peraona.Ut)"1 the condition ot hie pxye1ologto.l organi · 
and tht type ot ~t in miob be t11'MU hilleelt. re is 
an obY1oue aer10Q8 decd.n 1.n the OfJatalt approach to · .. · pl.e witb 
the intricaie ioeuee inwl'ftd in • aatt~ tt.S7 ot pazo onel1ty 
an4 an tSDU81iildll' wooenlul. •ttemvt ma.c» i n d8:Aonatratt · that 
plrically tt.t«t unit7 of per-oo!lll.1tq ta a ttctl' ot dtfll'M• 
t tlllt po1nt ot de~ bo · n Geatalt,.lst and He · lan 
1e the -.y :~.n W11ch the t'~ in oontnat to the latter• preeenta 
· acb indivi•mal ·pertonalltq with au hla pecul1eities and~ 
nep. ·U4~. howeto:r, t.bo oa• ·OE the i...U.dduali acoordtid b 
conlidwati·on Within ata1 t oU'cl.ee, ~t tM marked ~81• on 
~-eatalt . doea <nate the proble of 'bh• wdnterJ&nOt ot 1nd1"'-dualitQ .. 
I ndMd, theN 1& a cautious doubt as to -.be~ a knowledge of 
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nernl l.tmJ ,l&fti,d t b:r bttr ct ·~• can •vv give ua 
ac~ate cientitic P"41ot1one · bout the 1nd1Vi&lal. ;,_t a\IJ.\tlkaa 
one here u tbe manner in 'ftlich Oe•talt pQ'Cboloru 1 aet.t1ng t 
eta . tor an e&rllbctpaUon .tro · ·eo1•ntif1c thod ( •• ~ 
undel"atood), eboul tl t · co an their inveeti tiona gilt 
be h~ l)y the llmitaUont ot sctontU!.o .-tbodol.OQ". um.n•a 
statement, ~,r exampl , that '111l ell. the lawa of psycholo 'WBft.l 
kno 1 o o:>Uld w• a prediot-ion about the behavior ot a oan onlY 
if' 1n f.dd1tion to the laws the •peo1al. nature ot tbe pertio.tl.O 
situation re lmo11n",ll. pointe. up thi~~t · trend ld.thtn Oeetalt 
r.J"'UptJ• 
· • 81Ull.7td.a. ot Geetalt P170bolou ~n in the ab~ 
• · · to eu~r st. that. 1n ita ~ed "iield theory"32 it c a, 
cloae•t to 1~ !Je 11an empbae1• on ·the na'Wre and ~tance ot 
'liliolee. D.l~l, aa with all tbeoriea ot tlll• nat'Cft1 inol~ the 
R r:e11an1 there u a strong urge t o ~et1 to the ~ ol 
e p;i.no1p dri"f'!JJg tnite of ,ph'aonality (deeper .,ti,..,t 811d 
intel'eet., eenU..nta, p:ejucUcea 4Wld the l.ilr.1J) that otton. with-
atlud in al'1r nn person the onalaugbte ot ~ o~ 
•tanoes. 1 e ,.. tendenoy 1• undoubtedlQ tn. moat eenou de-
r, ot 1n thl• H . ltm conoaptt.on t:Jt f*I'80.U. t.r whee l t atatda ,.... 
vMled 1n flLU ita tte-indlvidualillitl nalc*lneae. IndiVidual wait•• 
31. 1t. TAndn,. m, u • 
.32. 4ftle $\t9mpt to treat~ pfO'Cbo1ogical a1bjeot ~ 
itW"estigat;J.on in relation to 1 ta to\al •tting• and. thus inol:udin . 
t . · total i~J~nta.l Ntting aa ll u the inner ·at.l"Uoture o 
the pwf!IOn in 1 t . analyata ot J)ftrttonalieyo. 
att.S.tudit , 1!>1 ts and oentS.Aenta guarante ·1 it any-thine doe•, the 
1'$1 t1 . etabU1ty of the . reon, 
6 . Unitr and ldlnt1tr a lb110e!>ph1cal bleD 
.~ valuable the :vaUable lnl'otmatton on the ~cal 
proceed to put tbe . . . ta 111 eoma .,n ot · ta}tlye1cal conwxt. 
· Ue the ~rcholol,d.cal and the · . tarb;yatoal unity of per$0 ·tty 
· y have mud!l in oOIIJMD; they are not tb .. 
part, have r l&Cked tiiOrG i nto theil" detinitiona ot pe1'8onal1~ th.M 
have pqobol.Oft':i8tl•33 
U. p~~· moet IJ'.IIIPiltbetic to the view.- or prr;-chol.oeiato 
'liho 1n reot1 t )'&Ua bln'e done unueually floui ttul ~i"k tn th ·. ttu<J,y· 
ot ~~o~Lty, are thoee lllbich place the emphae:l• on eye : , ~ 
(JM!c1 or the hoUats.c apJ;rO&cb• In theee aye 
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pereonalitq1 .ror th mot part. ia ~ted in terse ot a co-
herent eya _ poe · .ainU 1ne'lba\l&ltlbl a1gnit1cance, and deeply 
ddld 'W1 thin the prl)blem or eun1.val value• fODt &ltudent• ot 
ph:1losQJ>h3' at'llt not ot the tact, that, eonerall.Y spealdtlg1 
in the philoe;opbiea ot eytJ t . uni:ficaUon ot personality is 
in h t\Y With a c:M>Co .e whicb diaplqe an lUting p tt~ 
o. o r nd 1)0herence. ~~onal Idealiem1 1n particular, la e:x-
tremel.,y belp~ll 1n 1 ts .taphyatos or· pell'eoo&l1 tq.34 
'Pt Uoeopl,y- • the principle of t:rue un1 t7 1 t maintained 
thr'ou . · <Nt al.:L the :ranitold changes 'llh!oh the indiVidual tu'1de.tt-
s in t . ~)Ul"- or h1a litet:l ' •• ot \JJlpilftlleled ir.l,porlance. 
I n the thic&l Aalll1 tor OX*'Plet it la 0~ bel.d that no. 
eturdy ~ 1ldv nee ia po•ible 1t personal ~aponsibU1ty1 nd 
-,r.tth it indt~l.c1ual identity,. en tepUdiated. If1· Contequentl.y1 
are to havo ~ 9tba- than the ch'evy reoi tal of wha-t 
do e and 11111 he do•• 1 t 1 more tuatain.d e-trort• m•t be dl in 
·t e dtntetion ot a deeper- · · ~oe ot man.lY 'ltd.·•• obrioual.Y, 
take• ·u• out.-jlde and ~d tbe ol'bf,t o.t npinetal pr;;ycholo -.. • 
I t cannot etop ahart ot tbe tranaotn«:ltnoe ot *'• • IJOI:»thing 
more tbaxl a p:"Qduet or eoe:l. V• 
OUJ 1~o Hegel ' e· •ol.ution to the PJ"Obl . ot uni tq and 
3h. See1• tot- t:IU.1J>l•• the 8Cb0lul;1 work on Tb . il~I!;Y; 
0 ? .. aonaliau b.y lbert e. ::nudltOli. 
' " • 3~. ·& "uterat.u:re ·on the #Ubjeot is td. te oxte . ... 
t•e e:ontrl.hut.ton tn the, ethical nat .. re aw in spite or All 
the av~ na.--.J.1attc·aocount• o.r . io in cur ~r. . · ·n · 
t co · · tely reoent contribution on~t .. cite :r. r. , · · · • o 
~l•f:2!!2 t<• Et ca a.e a .. rtro ·· ,. ca . o a £ pll,Y ica of raJ. • 
• 
t~nU ty ot tl .·· · tllf4t,. ae te true ot 1 other preblemo Wi tb:tn hi• 
syat-.1 1s to b . fOW'ld in bitt dial . ot1o · . thod. ntw the0%7 ot 
~sonal1t)r, 1suoh a tt ia, 'WOI.ild \:lett :tall ·under tho o~ n1e 
t.helory ot . tllpby'aior.l pe~aona:u .. ty.34 r.n rotft't'l to · a.tt!t 
as an . ante ·u.mti-1 ita advocates. aro not ·~ ot the dif• 
.ticultietJ 11hi1~h beaet om 'Who Uitea the ~ "ore4nie , 'tflet.l:l$r hb 
1e thinking about the lndtVidual peJ-son, 0'1! the pOeeibl or nt~ 
nature ot soclLov.31 I.t muat be Mid • . , on.-. howvert thAt; 1n 
. . . , 
~ pre•nt .· <nnt.at the authOJ' 1a ·not 't,lliftS orpnitm 1n 1 t a b1o-. 
logical Pnse but •• • anlngtul. co~pt attetlpt1 . to do ,1ui;tiot: 
to the llhol•~1use of pereonaliV• ~· peoit1~1 th .rtel£ is· 
.. ·. ' 
.. ~ ~· ; . 
· reg ... d aa· a tota.U:t¥ of eo~e e..~illnoe .in 'flbich t . o parie 
and the 'Whole an in u-·1n~lat1oneb1pa, all beilrit)g t he 
i rdelible mariE ot a J.'(ltional 1\i.JU'l. In the • · tar.b7elcet ot 1• 
eeil aa en-i.le:Loned here, tbero ia a r.a.tJ.o.Ml ¢l.U#tel"' ot ani1:1g__. 
volue1 r ......,.,~ 1:1)- ell ·odd& the ••t. aientt101Ul\ ~t cf bwnai'l 
I It U f. Ll t1 PUtt l" 
~enoe• 
1. ~ind R•latimrehip 
All ot th1 t etd . .d1 of c®r'•,. with ll .. o~gM.tton 
ot thQ relation exl$Ung between tbe $4t1 ot'l o• hand, 
ptwtdcal org n1 1 on the Qther. It 1s pot'h p untortuna that 
the two b4ft been. eo inte~Wd aa to lead t o 'ftlat 'M'ti t6h d. 'has 
termed ntbe b~'Uon ot natul"e.." re~e38 _1 US\lllly' at ttled 
out the e.utbor o~ thia du(Q.1 . in the woat, al though• ot 
1.t cannot be ~ atail'lbu.toel to ~- . · 1.11 ort t he oth . nd1 
tween ~ ancl t!1nd that boctf is but t._ ou~d ·~aton ~.\lad 
lf1lllbol ·tit mind. In U. l81' . r ·conten ot hitJ e · (tete Uosophy, 
it_ ii sp~1t that ~'We me~ to ...... ~. tJothtng t .twthor 
rernmAi4 boca the tocut ot th& ~198 a t .· sepa:r tion ot 
eel'U!IIltton &011 thougbt1 matter from $.Pktt• -~ rr l!dnd. 'i-'heJ!e. 
is an tndlvt td.bll tuli t¥ ~ both. The relation between the 
two u not 111 ~ a telat1on or o.r&rrle• . · ·tftial to orderly con-. 
oepts, or bltod ttw to . mpty forma.l9 For ire l the dit eJ'e'noe 
be~u b~ 1lil.d .Dliad, or matter And spirit, 1• one ot de~• 
.. --_- . i4D J f.J S! . ' I ; ·n -. dj ~ : M Jttt. JIU"IC . 
38. Te~~e in ·* term 1la-sCU'\Ge' ventuJre tttl-. ~uU:n 
aux.•Pas." urt I ,_,.. a4ked"1 he 1tt'ite, ttwbat was tho 1108\ 
· . · \rOue m01 nt in. the htetory ot ~~ I lbould be -~.l;y 
tempted to· m•r that 1 t Wail that p&ri;od: ot l · if~Ul'(} ·. .~ · n ~ 
n e .s, h ·ri M e1a - e to ~t, r,oe U.d :tor a 'Whole day abut 
·tq) aJ.one in · stove," t . . 1 S?.. · . 
· '-,; ~. ,ul& allusion, ot course1 t to :rranti .e u dannn · ne 
Inhalt aLnd 11 · 1 An~ ohM · ~tle aind bllnd.n . V ( ), 107. 
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l .· tttd, thil 'W11l. in tutrl At.tecrt one•· · ~· .tlrdin ot th· · ~ 
l t .ona.htp. A:s have l"ftpeatedl.Y $€1 .. n ~tot()re;w:ltl both "·tte;r 
nd s¢.nt are t'ee.l but Dt>irlt X'el#O a\$ tht tlt;tber degro. ot 
reali:ty. l ' t:ter ls but • 1~ de~ of' Spirit.. · ~ _ ~ ·· nd mind 
n1;1st not bo $ . ~~il.'ldeed e~t. 'bc-,.la. . !do:Ol1 · . · o depi~d 
by H . el regsl'ds nature · a tho llilld.totttation ot !ll!ndt · .nd : · nd · ·s: 
·til; , pnnc~ ot un1t7 in na~. Th$ 'td.~ of' na~ an 
~it are- J.ta reality oM in sp!. 1;(!. ot all tl\G~ ap )(;l.~n cont11ctlh 
TheH are no Mps.rt.te am d1atin«:t type.s ot na:U;tq. x : ~re 1$ only. 
thfl u~~ n!OYi.hg llbo.l or reality-. tie • l is right i aq tar a. 
h$ .w . , ttc that Qrl$1 :·_ thought O\lttbt to be. d!fi1 · tittted tr<Jttt 
the ol>ject ~f thouriht b\lt cannot be ilol.ated. from all obJeete o£· 
w!lbt it u , 'lf1;ebe~ to e:Jd.#\• te mn!\ltetr ld.. ~~-. ~ :~~, 
to tl a#U1PfJ !n 'Which he: tail to • · a.· tut.tiel~t:Jnt · l'lll"~at on 
betwMn th~~t ·and th1Dtl• 
l"ba1t •wear• to be qtltte app~ 1n Hezel t e trfltlt.~nt 
or o~~· (U one drawa ®t t.be itlplications), ttt th t · h. 
phUo10pby lii!IGH to M~~ the un:l ty .and idtmti t.y ot ind!.vi . al 
pwiJOMli t)" j~or 1• oompl.etton. ~per...e_. •• acu•ori"d i the 
~lcJIDBn~ot::~• fJiilmAd.•,-.~ .... !e <m&J-actel'laed bv ~ol.enea, - "-1t11*~. tr ·. _ • · • -- • ...., · ....- ..,_, · · rg · · · ' ·· v .- ,. 
and; not ·the letta't, by ·purpose. t"r» oot'lel#~  1n the., •ti 
that ltU~~aU turperienot 1a G41!1mttal)3 pU't';poa1vo1 and fhe. veJ!;( ot 
. FJ .. . A ). ·.v { .! t j Uf.~ 
as 
·· nttold 
.as• · ct• o . conscioueMsa• Ih thie ·nee all no 1,. intelllgent 
~rienee iG teleological. r on •re mtot'iou pur ~ · ot 
~· The true nahtr.e o Mlle tor th roal · . · it 
iflb~t po.tenU.U.tt: · fi1 u e 1 a : · tu . a . :ant-
...... ,...,A>, e.lM b~t him. R golt~ ·~CQOUnt tar: $ll"p& 
'b1olog10$3. tll'li '1:• 
11,. The Orstmio 1b ·~ or ~sONll.J.ty 
Fnl th . c:U.aleotlc dbe_.toet of i<Sitntt ·. · !n dlt'!eron.oo 
th~ Qt the organic not\JN ~ pereonalitq ecm!tr\lcted. 
1a v1ew· or •ltbood make be lftd1vt~~ . ·:P(!r n in ~ tar s 
be a ''law or contimttr .. in both th:Lntd..n; and li ~· Into OYe'lfY 
· ··. ae of cxptco!.enoe the tndivldlt.l · tJOn enwe e a: ole 'I'd · 
hi• attent1orl tooufJIIId ftrst in o .. directi<m nd hen in · . thw. 
I n ·•• nee. 1hia 18 .tenel*a V'.i.eW ot· reality in ~icb t 
le ~ tn and ~h p:art.toular ndtr, end tho parti e1 
tMtn though 4Hppctl\l"ing to b J:nde,pcm4fmtJ 4t'O· :really '\2l)l1eld Mtbin 
an entit.v · ·.' (»(i·ot but in oei"W.ru.y nc,t adtulll. !n re n- n. 
to t ort: · te : ture (tf . · . $0n8.\i 7 He ~ · • ~ own de~ption. ~ t 
Iii · t ell · kept .1,n :mind ~-
00 1~ ute •fAtur do . ~~~.lllll!!t d&e 1 wenn ni()ht 
eJ.J, 'lbeile ~ur r.~tt.t1tit ~rgeb.cm, "WWM ell 
' lt~r $Qlbotatind . tat. ana ~tt. n' . . . 
. .t lltt1 n .u4:! 
_._.. _ _ _ ....., . ; rr .. ·· st 
l t t 
bein·, nd with 'ttl& I*" . eta ot thl.t tnten.e · n. f:O tter how 
ne bt!1 o \11: - 1 .rJ!'ld r1 . tly· eo1 t.~ ·. · 'a. . · . arch "! or! t.ique 
o neg;Jl' ,,_ View of' tho mt · . ey 
ttoul.ar, t.hc taet atana•• tmd not- without eq>ir!cal .wtoonee, that 
no om i 10la"tAd ~· ot.h~s can develop hio tldnd to any COnt91deftb:le 
de • .All ec1eaititic kn~t:Ice, phUosophtcal. thoutJbt, and de-
incesaar.tt interaction with o~ hw1.uan bet . .• Indi'ri.du &X-
peri.enoo t'tlou v.1 tat. ! . . tt.er au 'VG't:7 li.'lli ted, btr . ieol. ted 
from otJ:ten orle lfOI.lld be deprtvocl ot · ·  .. intitd. .~ l'ieb ~ct 
or acoul111la.tea. e...~ome ~ the ~to&. It 1 · poe-
eible, t<>:: ~ , for a sebc:tl81" to. do arJ7 e;t~ftoa.nt work on 
e.."l i1: *."k.llt Without dtaw! .· ~on the t.tnding of 
0 
t2•- t ~- 1& .. ~ tc> CGnliii · aoo1 v nrt "'ltur ae ..:.Ql 
and tl().t . "1;1 . o¢l.le<rtion ot un-related t~.ct • ... . !n~act1 
o,i. bUJ n ooi,ne · pt,~ a re~ aocle~ or ayet <.tU1te unlU ·· 
tl tota.l.1ty ot the :tndi'V"ldaal :rt take. one by one. .t ~ 
pro.· trtl•a both &tl\totur. l and d.Y'n . 
pezi'IJf 
fe 
tical..· .. .. . t........ i'"'*~ ........ ..t. ••• ,... . 
0 nve& ~·~~-· ~'ithout eomo kno G.~ Q~ 
tll: eod.oty i nto 'flhi.C!h . · von indlv1Ql&l a• tom and ~ up, 
no t.ull knowled · o his· pmtsonallt y t:tAita ia ponible* S1~ 
!nd1v1W.al . ~ the only re.al co~nte ot all ootal. and cultural 
sya"' ; their ~nelS.. tie . $1'0 twe«ts~~Brily influenced by tho• 
· eial p ttem 1 and tbttt 1n tu ~ j.ntl.uenoe and . ape it. A · _.,_ 
r.dn"or n:!leoting his soeill at1l:l eult~lll world, r.-o!\11. study 
dl clcoe -r.o~ only · . ~t n i mlividual m l"elleot itt ·~ aeul'ea 
hi otetv• on one Nnd;- Ol14 · wltul"e wh1oh beu-.1 till the 
other-, rut a n• of both · xtriin ,. in a aoei.al •tn.oture ~ 
tlccttng ·both it. ® n\ponef!t trdividlal• and their oul.tultal P#lt-
rns-. Tmu• t cto_~a, .~yb , found tn Jtep,;el'·• · ().0_ . Nhenliv. thought 
• I • ~ '):',' f •.' :, .~- • I • 
structure•' W 10, .4f·.<me· to conclude that tbt ·~l vl orouely 
., 
ovw his aoc:t.ety ad tn Pl'O. ntate ot 1M IIIU~ ot eocibty 
fJWI: 1n~V$. ·· ·. :t · 4 bottcas quite .... NIJ7• I£ t . l.ndS.""' 
v1 '\'ll)Ul.d lm..~ to hi a sod. · t. tho SO.otsl.S.tsed *" Uonal wt.ll · 
Ail!il,~fJ sso · o, t hen .rq of · an · ni · ' 
d rtOt · Jo soeiolo~eal · .. ~ ·~ di . . tho 
· : ; • a. ,. • · · ~ , H · ~• · ., : l _ r 1.' • n• 
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1fld. :vi l1lll oc ee ·1'11thout 1n:Ji"V1c'tual. ~ ~ bo M fJFoup. 
':quall •· trt 1 no pS";eholord.oal 'thbax7 can •xplain th 1ndi\'idual 
1t it 1~ro.e th Wlu&nee. ot 5ciooul ~ -reacure upon the 
de lo nt or 
him a . 
reality, 1e pt~ed1oated on his b l1ot that th& .. -·~ ........... 
ocie tO'r it,e mtmi!eNt!on• '.\'bUI1 h1lo · n'-$ , t ~tal 
th{?U . t, aa in moral. develo · ·nt:r requtre• i:lie rela.ti~rnmip th 
o ra" !t 1• all patot an :pvcel ot He l•e conten·tion that 
t hor can be. m obJect lf'ithout .a $Jbjeot, no =:pint wl.thout r..aturO, 
no · 'Witbout ~•itr# no ~r. onn a • know tb ·. thout 
a - ele~. 
in Uta 
11 ' t-oft 
are all ev.ldetiefUJ ot t.J1e, ouata· ot oppo ttltr.; 
. tn thour,ht. All. th1fltte • t be ,.... in t.ha 
.ole to wttch they- belong. 'ro ~ th1.e ia to look 
7on.d t.'l&U' Umitationt, ani this 1n t'Ui"ti 1i ·l'l1en .a trtln oondent 
point or v1 f'rol!l ,.;} 1 . tlm rtft'l tmJ-ey hnp ni'ne $ tal.lin!t • th-
ill t.~e mntrtx ot ~ Oi". . 'Ytlol•• 
9 • l gel J s · . t.Bzil:roic:l o:t the .Vill 
,_ tr3 i~ 11~: t. 1n 1st1t'l~ the, •Uent · ~.u:-es o.. t l •c son 
' + ... _ ... k...._ ..,; .... 0 n. .. ~,.,..w • .,.~ ,.,,.,.-vn pat'allel p:t"Obl.eift 
dom 1 ... unque.U.tiom -~ 
. I 
I 
of t:anking importance for · philoscphical psycholo~,- , m1d any dis.. 
cussion o£ it with;Ln , the !'J"a~,..,;Ol"lt of. .. Hegelia.."l thou~t takes us 
· .. , .. . ; '• . ' .. · ~ lt./ ': ·.: 
-~ ' 
beyond acts of ehoioo 'W the ~ole · question of spirit,. The lose 
of freedom is not so much a question of the i mpracticability or 
deterl'linism1 as a eeriou:s cheapening of the concept .-f pei'S·~~·ality 
and .;; ecideclly hazardous for moral it.y, The prsmise which undctt-
lies tr.e present discussion or f'Tee!iom and determinism as they 
arc relat.:ed to the will, is that . they are not opposites• Freedom 
does not mean the absence of neceaeity, but spiritual dete)."'n.ination 
as distinct from mecl"sanical detertninisn. one agrees with Ho0el 
in making. them correlatives, but disagrees in any li..'llli t ation o£. 
t.he w.i..ll'<to the concept of right .With its legal a.nd economie 
a.ssoeiations . 
Hegel; however, .:ts facing in the . right di.reetion m€1n he 
apparently i gnores the attempt to interpret will solely as a 
volitional faculty. Doubtl~es1 he f~lt a "faculty" inter.Pl'""tation 
of the will to be the reSUlt ot. abstraction. Hef~el Vie, s it a s 
someth:U1g always in process of formation throughout life and 
hall:F.OO~d out under t he influence of one's natural and s oci al sur-.. 
rrn:mdings . Some witers44 have tavored the view t hat the ·will 
is 0".1!' persouality in so far as it is integrated, a definition 
•1hich the "'tt'iter finds t~aningt'ul .and helpfUl . While the locus 
or .n-oedom is to be found in personality as a whole, it is per-
haps in +,he life or t.hou.ght rather than in the will t hat its use 
i . ::cot ooatatvo. 'll1 . baoi to::.' tM.t~ rem:u"k i,e that h: ·lt"ln per-
. it.1 iB eelt-letenning ality1 !dfUl$ be.it ~ th · c dot in-· 
trument 1n that. self'-dotel"minati.On. Hegel1 11 inet net ' t trd~ 
theoretic · attitu® 41\d the })1raottcal •. 
, onn d1oaeo ft'Ul'" dQ~ tintex'$ch1e4 des 
~'lOaretiee.hon tmd ~akti~n Vtlt'haltono i::Jit; 
$0 ist 11Jn. 100br daa . ·11arhal t.~•s ~-ioer wuugcoon. 
Theoretisehe itt • . ntlieh 1m Pr ·ktiseben 
entnalton: oe . ht n die vw tel.lunat clas 
bei® ge~nnt ~nd. denn .n ham ~inon ~ ;\illen 
habon. QP Intclli . · na.. t m Gegont.huU; der 
;-me unt. daa '1 eo~t1$Cho in eieh s ·~ ~ ill~ 
~ati$'t sieh; .11 .~ ~st~s i&t ~¢hut 
~m nnens: l'U.· · i c. h • . ·U. #toll•· ich w- vor1 1~ ~~st nd rllr mcb.w~ 
~in¢.0 lllil'd ill tho bnsis or ell Megeliali ()O:n¢0pt • t-ir:~t 1e 
i ncluded w1 tllin it, 1 t . p~ci . ' plaoe .1¥1 ~int or Ol~{!:Ul ' .intt 
the Ydll. b6 ~11$11 t!. ~l U~ts ~hat t he "Will. ill i.'\ree1 be l J $ h 
u.niver,$4U, oot the 1ndtvidnal.1 nUl. in · :tnd. trll dor.l, not 
be~·n · 11 a.'ld .: · ·tt11• h&r~ ~....11 ia at hottct~. an ~qlt~esaion o. · 
mind, . n:l l nee tree., he ~oo·ns n:s toJ.;lQ'!'f:u 
•• 
N - 11-<>o;oA.-t?.,.. ..;2.<4"" . 't ~!, . . · ___ .A.. ·•"""""' 
.:..u.u ·~,.,. ...... I.'UI~c:..... ~eer .lit': ... $ . · .~ s ~·· 
Geist ~1t Intell!,.,.ettt. u.nd da$i't .di$ 
. ;~Gtix.wlui fl$ .. Cb : ldl~n S"ft in ~ 
F.nt\'tie lunt fo~tE.eht, VO:ll t 'i:ltiihl,-. ~eb 
Vor$toll.•ul, z.tun nenkon, ~ 'lt•OG' ~ind;t s~.eb ale 
rlille hf:~nu.bt'i~:en, leh¢t-:1. , · der 
!;$. t"l.1 sect. 1.u ddit1on. !t6. ?R• ceet. h. 
pratrt-:tschO !to!st -h · ~t, dlo ~ehet 1aht eit 
dmt ! ntolllge · i t , 1 
... . dialectie nalyai · · ot ll · · :t clu(f&s it t:on:Ji c· oi the 
de iT.· n uon/·J ou:t ot 
l'!$8.-1i49 n I \ 'ille 1 t die 
. ~ nt· o · thou t a nt o tho · · -~ 
· ., . t# tr q . iJll . . L . • 4f4- ." ~'" ._ , 
m1 ct. 11.. Ad tit n. See ale St .:', i~, .. ct .. 5. 
m, ooet. 6 .. 
, c-t. 1· 
star. 
ean e ly, a 
In .sx rt, 
... 
even 
51, • ~ot. 1. 






eye 10 o ~ r of tho indt "ual1 t . 
d l_ ¥. 1 ., 
. c~n un.-aG 
· •3.0t \miV~ ity st 
ati~ :J or .a n.illloo . .,., .,. or o n a• 
.r aeain t th~ if Vidual, 
is eon ·.· to in o. actor .• 
1n · ~"'d. t~ un1 · . ~cal 
~C"..il.or. .. F\ .. ,r . c ; l.t tl. \U'li .. real ic 
'10 only thrwr~h po·. 1 Uon .. 
~ill io ·the 
1 1 to be no . , eon q:uentl¥t that tho ttol tion bet · n 
is not o 
lo · o. Fo.r 1n~1 .. · . . dct!1 r m .d a 
logicnl propox-tio • T'~.u~,. his uni rsal1 l'lb t1er ·n · toey• in 
idool.o 1 .C'ft' in in dt ~ h . ~ . ·''..liugst must. unfold it l.t tbrout..h 
, t-· eulax" •·· and cannot bo roalU!ed. apart f'l-otl th · m in t.h · ir social 
ttin ... , 1'h uni ersal o concoi¥ ~ ie t .'ne wbstanoe o . nlJ~ wb-
qJWn ovel .t . In ver; .sense, the indivldu ·1 i · 
f'sal ·. 1 tieD tban .r h o . · t.iQulJ.lr 
In ~ o "'ar ne the th~ nkinH .I i~80n n-
ter:or W$ all ist:tnr; ecndltio. te ol., 
· ot~c • setc the \Uliwr t houebt prooesa · .. t i ndi• 
vidual el . . · . t . · . kno~ 1 the thinld.n1 gQ or n. nt. · in a 
lo _,io t l ~ttt ·- re · .. . to oo no .;u.~ld te to ao ~t tl1a t' 
oxiew · ~); th untvo . (\). ·mo. no tbe atruction ot the . ndi"t~ dual. 
,. · ... 1 eallY · t r:a.:r · Qthr: · so . 
at :. .. P ·in. i · -t.· t ho r~r·l· to ha:nc:.U.e t1 - irical 
.,............,_.oliioiiO......,-............,t .... i;;;;.;;;;.;;;.;;·, .-'! $ld tbe ~os!2Jift dee ~~ta. 
su.coe•dUl.l3* !he cp!ri.cel t• not ·~"*d wlth the loate&l 'With;. 
out aome d1•turb1ng reetdue be!ttg .lett ove't 
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'!he ttrlt cilv ot a orit.lc ia ~o rer:du' s ~tbetio u 
anal.fal• ot 'b · tAt1al. u~ .imee\igation . a he can, no rnatw 
how widely the p:re~e1t1on• under~ that eubject · tter may 
dif fl tro. b! .. a CJ'Ith. The task ta an tOJ.~lJ' cballGn«tnn one 
1n i's oaae by "f'11'1oe of the tact that bS.a re8Ult• are CGn-
t..ai:ned w1 th1n oat ot t t• :moat com,pre'hen81._ and coherent eyatou 
ot thou t to be found ~ 1n ~ phUoeopbJ'. · !o th1• 
1111'b be added the .tdiUQftll hurdl• ·f.bat in $Qflllt <tUWtM• thl ~ 
pathetic· expo.IJS.tce or ,... 1 111 thought to be 'UAduly exposed to 
the. ~ 1nf'luenoe ot t.he 41&\eo\ic or too eta~Grcad ·of 
the taeo1nat.1on of the Abaolute .• 
It oue1\ll. ~ate be tM t!ret duty ot the· •tudent ol 
H 11 then an ·~ iMportant noond .obJ.i«ation ie to prea 
the n idiU. ot t.tt. matter befe#e hila to •• lair a conolu!on 
pos 1ble., Eotl1 are eopeciallJ' r4gait1oant in tbe U. t ot Ule 
probloq introduced by a philo~phical payobOloey ot the id.• 
vidtull per on ld.th1n ·~ · lt ot He~liarl thou t. .IappUy; a 
principle ot prooMu:re ia tound within Uepl•e wrtt~e t.n the 
Ql.aia t;bat true ~UoaosMoal thought ie 411~ ilelt-crit!.Oid. 
The 1 r.eUen cr1uo, tbererore,. 1l10U1d eruuat. eael•a ~eo~ 
i te own 1.nternal ~e.. An •Glv~ and be~ 1"e twl• 
cal, prooedure, b.o.,er, ie to etand out-aide the ey.-. and hwt1 
. charpe ot total.1 V-1 pmlog! or aoM 11td.lar iJrfeottve against 
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challen • I t woe , on the· otll.er tan4, that ·. Bh014d 
not . b)' cQritice •bo .-.. not · · pated to 
undeJup the ·d1sa1 JUne ot dtalecti 
that t land:itlg dl a iN*t to 11 10 · , tor 1 in-
vol .. hie whole aT• and oamot be confined to the 1n ~· ,. ~ 
ot t.v• -ret th• d1. . · ~ncea. emonc the l0"18l.• · · pt. in 
lld.IXl. The drtep8l- que•U¢na llU8't ba taoed. D1d R. · 1~ tor • 
equate the ratio-nal With empUiOil tact-? ta thoft i.rreleYant 
teriill in~ i nto b1 ~»&~? ~bat. about. the t-elGtionabip 
ot the l.c61oal cate · e.e to ~ t••? I · · 1!&1 
WUd of togi~ tunw-Bpirit a ftltd oae? . critic 
that of tl•ae que.U.oa:-. can be an~ apart A-om ·total 
~ tb• \ etncture. 
S)'Mp&U.tio ~ · tr1t!on :ot tbe .,.. ia a.."lteC$dlnt 
to aqv aound eval:ua'Uon ot ittt 'ilthtn n~ne1•s own UV.ctm'e •-' 
tOUhd. ~ cr1te.r1 by 11M.Cb tl.l judge 1tt. · Uo 
• tll'lrM8tioM b&"ie bMn otte d a to · t QOnf.ti tutea tfe heart 
ot f ~u..m. 1 a• to 'Wbat. 1a l$.v.bliJ ~d ·at 1D dearl l n hi 
e)"etem, tho p:re•nt au~ Iinde pUl . beat ot hi• to 
cons18t 1n .aa orpnic 1lbole 1n \Yhich tho cone.\ituont · are. 
eer1Al •• ot a oinel• ·•lt-c»nati tutbtg acti't.ttl-· · cldl*<l ~ 
or ap1r.lt. ~¥o p;-oblem oan · acltquatoly cmal.JMd in • ~ deb 
1 rea the organ1c ntatv.i"e o! hi• ~ To db so · · to 
mae tely hie ·nn ot n.l1\Y• The point or · ~ t 
ry !eqeltan lewl,. tite1'otor.,. ia to· ~in 1 • plc&ce aD1 
... ,30 
1. v i di 0 
out the d'm:amt: 
i.oual1 ()b,l!!llll_~wt,l 
im'ol"V'ed. 
cttc· · ~ thod . 
r.ol•• 
impr. · .-.;~< A 
vel1dlty of · e d1aleotie i 
is 1.neUned to 
tribut:1on. It. ie• t.~.cr,. the p;. reaenc:•· ot th1 1n~l 
s1t10b t - t 
lo'' t 
1n e p _ 'Ololo~ o 
co~t'ttiona. 
no tw bow acute 
one - And 1n ·:a.n;r aroa ot au _ t. In 
Jreoonciled 111 thin a h · her un1 t,-. It · tnat lt-eontl'8.dlct1oo 
1 . a dlettnetJ.ft tea.-\uro ot -~ GlCI)8l"ienoe• . • l aa.rte e .t,e..; 
jorl.Wl.y · •~• ~no. ot l"C4110rl in · n . . a poe ble hi 
ti&1 unity. ~~ U tbel'O i . t ld ~t 1at1o 
s " ,lo at t}w heart of' bu.,_ e:rper-~r\C!t~ t h.en ·_ -. . ccntim.ou.• 
osclll tion O.tween conviction aS¥1 doubt, ng other m-~Uta.n 
phe - • 1• -~ e~ained-. 1n, th1 pl"inciple ot 
at:ivitlrt ~ to~ toeu.. a• it doa1 the~ dn 
1. lbi ., 
of tb~t and exparienoo, ls a rl8etGI4l",Y bast• fr:~r a dial otieal 
UOiJOJlh7• C:riUoa of He l ba'ft olton taU.od to no the ~ 
porttmce et \bi• duallem th1n. the dia.te.oU.c tor b .r oeul tant 
eynthena. 'Jh1e dualistic teaturo lt; nowbeh ..,. ~nt thC1 
in -_ ;l'e treatment ot the ll}lhce <;taction, h1• '*obj ctiw · :ad , 
in ioh the pbilo~Ktphical paycholog ot the ind1'¥idual. rson ta 
~ out. It toms the bae1e ot hie entlre dtacuRton ot 
~ the \Nth on t h1e ~ ot •c>oial inatituUObl ia: de-
n~ tht"ou8h tblr ,.. dtalectio. pattern ot uidln ., .-mt• 
reconcilable :1n t.luttr -.yntbeele. 
t 1fht.le lt 1 tb1n1cll that the dialectic 1e the only true 
pb1loeopllical •thod1 ware not. ttntitlad to a.- that t 
finality in hie or ant other Q7:Pt.d.O e.r.-. ot thou - t.-
'hhe dialec'Ue tacitly ilqllles that fll'tl' f.I7DtheD1a ot oppoatte• ie 
destU»d to be super._ded, that it in tura . nerate• a tb c 
1ch r,twa riee to· ita own antit.hea:t.••· .For ne l to point out 
the J#OT1aiol1111 d'l.araow ot hie philo•~ ...uld be to undel-11 
the obdoua. I n ape&king of tile .-im'e ot proce• • .• ~ • 
us tha't •.s.e 1et der 4ft a1eb 111D'iclcgebead,e lre1e1 deJ> eolnen 
~ Vt#&WIIet&" ;md ibn ..-a,r 1la Ende 8t'Te10ht., "2 A 'ftl;id ~ 
theaia, tberetore, aet contain 111thlll 1tllllilt the podtbUity• 
iJv:ln4 t neo~.Utq,. of obuge. -and :pteg;NIIJ• •egcl'e . ..,ntM•• 
we 'neYel' atatio. 'Mlat gfll. hoped to acoo!IP118h in the u• ot 
the ¢1al ctAc -.e to diWS.ee a . thod enabling hW to find a placet 
tt vari · 
ot t · · dialeetie . ~ be .• 
hertmt dlu:;ortptiotl ot ext)f)rjlom~. 
Th c$ . . . ot1o 11m1r.elllim 
t 1aleo.t1.o if .aJLCIU.'!IMll 
. 1ca1 ~ o.tonr 
· lo.gieal co ction · •twMtl 
· a · · ini?.Ult'¢ 
g:l; . Q. oo-
'RV'n.''l!'~.,.. of l.o[{lc. 
h.~l'Vlib'l:a· • ft· · . . prj.nclpl · o · · 
. ita expo•tion 1 .. ub · t 
dentitq in d:Ltterenoo. s.e concte and i~ 
div:wun:L.. 1'lltl•• ~fl(lct 1 tf:lit ~0\ll t ot &acowrtng tha . real tq 
1tl ,t · ot an atte · 
not to be i,n'"·"' ~JPn~'lfta•n 
The aeeertton · 
· di et.tc ia rela · to om:Uj!.G 
.. . 
qu stio. ~ aooept . · n10 of pure being.; l · t 
leot:tc 1 valid · · at • pbU~ i,bica.t CbQlo01 
ot the Y1dttal1 .10 · st · Qt tho . bein .. 
23:3 
o ... be . 
ht is 
po1nt o f!_ .• lts ~d.tion o£ . e a~d or eonsci· u~ · aCJ1 t hen 
ct.te. devclo~ nt 1_ e · le . . • 
it lt tl 
-.1 it is ' 
·- ,C} acoept.s: Qlt· :ro~t"" t propositio-ns. • ·gel t 1.o ill · l ·. 
, ; nol.OJl!e to do ..1tl''"ti.Qe to tb$ ind1111dual pet- ·on M. ta -M , 
enoe 1 · be~ dinleot1cal}1 serib$0 tltt'ou. · 1 ru 
V. -~ten., D to t ~~ nlldif41 ot t · 
a rentl ~ _ n:> tSoubt • It :ls ,a . med td.thou.t. 
t10l'h Xn ble · :t.s just~d~: ainca. the , d1ated pr9 ppo · ·• · 
l..met.u.:atc and · 1th t eh t 1: c®d be no · atiao. · ue, 
wortbi.M. a ot tr.e tb'st; yet uubje.<lttnn .it to 't> . di®l · tnte 
!Jl'Gtation., 'to 4etV the.t ti1'&t f() tnt.- ~- -~ntlffiy # • 10: t . 
"\ lOU t illpOss!blAt • 
......... -.~t ot tb ·. oa-teUQr3 ot inS!, thG 
cr,.t · :~tAo:o bec:t o t hat of do ~- ·~<r t.ho. . lidit<; ~t t1 
1\!hereby sub .. quent •·t4~ea e .,tabliehed. -~lta.tod · ·. :pl.u1 
thnt ;::,~ the intemal eotud.steno,r ot the ·_ · · · o~ 
sot l'aTtb 1~ the ~~Ja. .. .  :tncct, h' 1 








-... ion . 
-. otr 
to 
th .fQct o 
to tJ . 
to abo 
.... . . , . - ~ iJ : )'!It[ I. . f j . . .. ( t. 
th · ~t 




nt.lcqtty o · the 
011 ' 
It the · t!· · 13 chi · s . r · cone1li ~ion ot tbea1s 
ancl tit. . tie, be:r'e 1ec -~ · • _ r a o.n Q ae~pt t t a · ~ lid, $!.nee 
ao:l~ d ~ tradietitr ~ ~ld .led. t o ~r nsw d or to t:tuth. 
'ill d1 l ct1e tttru.etu're ta built on the ·e .. rt1 .n t~at 
eontl'ttr:r e te ,ori Q"& ; de · poeet· 3.! onlY b~cua tl 
throu(Jh a eyn ·neat· .. The. :reol probl · hu . bee~ tbil , or ·~ 
· toring ·the Uf'J.ty QU.t et: 'l'fhieb he .... . · cont.radicti.·on b · Drisen. 
ror coll: t.ion ot atomio poi'tttt an .·~ ~ · ieh t."t a ytle 
n!'lf.l..l.n}. or the undet'etendS.ng b~ respone1ble.s Gi 'VIIm tho ct that · 
tlleei$ nnlt antij :thee:ts are but two a~cts llhich u'ke a eynth .sis 
estblo, lt ·can be ~e that the syntheale is tn tYff:Jrll nee a 
·unity ot the t-.o 'Which bo ·, ut)ttee .m . dda. Th ere ·t contd.-
bution t th 11'\ •te 1e to m~ aplJ.eit that teh 'WO.t!J al""*Y• 
,..;licit 1n experi.<moe. It 1& ob~1 Mt lnRnted. 
u. ~ner!ens 'W1 thtn t.lle mateo tie 
..• te.VeJ"· c . 1£:ne h :ve been li'f8.~d a~net th tr<t~n 
-~ t o a: · , itle ltr\al ~1.,t :te l"WWly ; @ int-emt.tl one ,.._ 
volv1ng ~n 't· · t:no toe! !)f ethod and .-. 'ttll"o.u :. ut that 
... 
. -. . 
system more than the individual is in evidence, .although it is 
largely a matter of emphaeis. Indeed, Heg«tl a~te in the · 
f'hilosol?!'!!e des Rechts tt!at "die bewua&te Identi t.lt von beidan 
ist die philoeophiaohe Idee."7 
For the most part, the life or any- individual does not 
follow a strict logically consistent pattern. In the Phlnomenolos¢!1 
human experience is related ~o univereals 1thich are subject to the 
many viciaC.tudes of SOC1ety, a tact which is not al.wqe tuJJ.y 
recognised. It 1• an undeniable tact that in many instances the 
1ndi"fidual is 8lbject. to external .forces whiCh do not alwqs com-
ply With or correspond to any discernible logical pattern. 'lbeae 
torcea are often a pei"petual ~t to 8J'JY logical process 1 al• 
though Hegel is persuaded that he has. traced tn.t diaJ,.ectJ..e ~ 
these inescapable force a. llhen, however, · the Ulogical loOJ118 too 
large to -be Ughtly aet aside, he admi ta the preeenee of con-
tingency~ even going eo tar as to give. it rights within ita own 
sphere,a thenby suggesti.."'l!J that reason cannot demand that every-
thing be tull.y ·explained. Given the rating of po~sibllity~ the 
actual is a contingent. tti_n dieeem. werte _ einer bloseen 
~gl1chke1 t 1st daa Wll'kliche· ein Zlflilliges. "' 1he aeTeri ty o! 
the onalaughts of the accident&l. cannot be denied. The contingent 
mst somehow be contained 'll'ithin the contiDantaJ. ayeteil1 ~ince "the 
true is the whole." Hie solution is to treat. the contingent a a 
7 • FR, Vo~de, )6~ . 
8. EFt:,. sect. 145. 
9. EP\'11 sect. J.hh. 
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tor a · 
i hi philo o . '1; at~ · .- i · - . .. w!:nt:!.y li p1 y rol !llt 
t0 . · pf'O\tlem o this di 
.n1atlflll.y r t1onal, thon ll the · ~e.~s f oxper en~ aro in r. aU.if' 
tJ. .08 0£ 1~& !)On, .o·...,.or!f llT ti· l'llO/l or CO. < 1. ~'. ·rn:t 
:t . 
it. ,lf' 
ind1v1du.&l •. ;: .. ··nee, a: negel r1ft)l~ · inte out, it is 
i;WJ:t.Jil1'~ With · · scope o • .-:lPh-1®1 ~ _., 1 nco_, V4"'l&Jr~ a'ble· 
~ is laid on tu.cb :nor l qua:U.ties a.s 1r.1 _punt 
lilce.lO It ·tam:ts O'J.t · · t t . dialaotu !'ftl, ''O'n1~. 
in 
~0. :- tr. Sailli , , 668 tt, 771 t, 77) tr, 119, 00 E t 
m. aoct • 1 ; 96-103• 
2. '!be Status ot ttl · D':v:l1:ri.du.U ~ton 
:~• . 1t:M.n H<t J..' tJ Elbioll. 1,bef11"1 
In atngUn~ out t~ dt~e1cm. the •tbical. aapeot ot 
t.~o- itldiddualf$ exptl'ie~ •. Oat must note tha\ the not$ Of 
"!e_eol ts ethical. pr:t.i\ciple# _.. to he .tou.nd 'Within. his lo~ 
t heory. A:., ntty bt neft,. ~tit eitbW deaiJ!Able ~ 
nece.aary t ·o &mtlop tile albjeott• li&t ot etbi Of 1n arJT 
. ~tic i':hhlon. I ll no other ftAl.l1 doe• tb$ aubjeCU• b.!' 
1Tld1vldual.tat1c ap!lFoadl 1:iiiDr8 tv' a.tault than ln h!.$ «q»n tAon 
ot th:ica. ll1 t~..e PllUo~ ®a R!9!!\i ion llhicb the top!o re-
, ..... " •• 1 .tl .~ 
eet· tJ it• tullest end molt &.tailed ~ G.•• «ll ~~.1¢61 tJlou ·· . t 
. • Within an o\lje4tive tX)ntf:IXt;t ~-ng . ·Ob aoc1al m-
. .... tu.u-... a · ~- #aw,.ot...... the· c .... - .-.c ~ ~ •"'• ....,_toe U - ~ithl.n If.,.._ IUN. UII • "'~ -4~  lijl~AJ;U.i. >y ~.l· lli'J~ . • 
thia toelal :tria :l• found the J.ite.-blood ot bis ethical .,__.. 
'l'bJ.• tthoold OC(';UltliOll . 1~ ttlM , IU!rptille 1 . il'lCe !1CJt,el' 8 int.er&at wrte 
. ooncei\W tAd on tho. . U.titut.tone el1Cpnu-.1.ve of •t.M«U ~"'-_ .... ,_ 
· i*ll -. l ·_ ~ 4 -t%1 L . IM --tl * 
2)$ 
.b.l.tltutt<m$ •• the b~ll"k apart hOJa Which bW~Wt f'.\Wdom •• 
aub ot 14 thoUt ebetance. ·ftle impl1c.a\totl l s ()~. ?he obo-
tatd.~ ~Oidtm:t 1t noed \)6. ¢N«r the '\lr.S.U M4 wlahi.ts ot the~ 
socialised 1nd1vidlal. .eo. ot hie thouehto on . . .. tter are 
reftaled tn th · tollowlnn ata-.nfit . ~ . . . 
· · :11 d:UJ sJ~ ttliohetl • n · n 
'!'{ grift . ' )j . : .1 ~· *"• . $1ntl. . ' . die 
rubatactl«l! t ~ dU ell~tM . -., • 
Indt rt1 n. ldll aidl ZU tall" QJ,s Gin 
Aoat.dentoU.et 'WQ:'hldten.- Ob dU IndivSdtnJl 
· .1, f::ilt - obj ·t11ren .,:!..t tliQhk ... it .. ·A:Sich1 
. . ldle elletn da• :tn.l~ und dle !!a.cbt itlt1 
Wrch .... 1 . ~J . .;. Lebon 1~ ! ndi\ .."' , ,..n ~-: . ert. 
td.l'd.. l»AJ · ttlichkeit. tat ~· de:r vfi .. 
al.o die Q'td C~chtt ... t: · t. alo an, und !'l.tr 
tdtil ~ o8t.t.ar ~llt ~ ge 
diG das eU<t 'ire. il dar · rdivt~~ rm:- e1n 
C11JC)gendee Spiol bl•J.bt.l 
!\ ehould no.tfd,. l~r. that 1n 1te. · ot this 
~n · oft • tubjooti.'ve e1~ or· the eth.ioal. queRton 1ritb 
ita •ttond.ant. •ttet;t upot'l the role ot the id.'ft®&l., tt ta a.t-
~d th t; the ~ l1te1 \llbll.e ~nttng the per.teatt.oo ot 
obje4tiftt epirit1 ¢Ontd.M tbe tll'\lth at,.._ Sttbj•o.ti• 814& •• 
weU.u Th 1•M"Mt at •tat«; he:ro t s not wbe~ ob.,.cttve tJPlri.t 
ts a hif)l.e wtage ot -etb:t.dl Cllt'ftl.O}*lnt. on tl'i* tteselt . . thad.• 
it nJUf$t be. b qtleetion ~ the natw or t.~ · rensor4n; 
1flheNbT W<Jb a. olabl o.an be adftttQM. It 1• juatified on tie 
ba.t• o .. logi~l ·· : thad, !4th the poaaibl.,, illp3.1cat1on thAt 1'.10 
:t:ter how , ' f4'N indt..S.dual ~1\y y be, f.t stt !Mt 
. ' 
12. .,. , e,t . 14$. ddit.ton. 
13. m,. eect . U2. 
·~ 1n order to ~ce .-thing hotter itt the 
~cti•e• ft8lm ot ..- .cil.l lrlJ.t.itu.tion. 
n,l-4 it '*..,..,, ,..,.._le••• \ll111:14\a . · · ;te. &Vidfmeea 
or .-. <n.-eattve ""'*""'• Uoweftl', the ~•tion a t1> tl ~ 
to t to : ul t l a boo ~~ ·b7 the: ~al*s pul"!)()eG aJld 
.. ll t:<:Um . · he . ~11 aside. And 2iepl .,... to have Mtiolpat.e.d. 
• · -~ . ·Qil there s.• the o,bri.w• -..ahftl.linft ol 
·~ar · ·nt t;o. ·· . t Ji; eh a cn\ic1••. lf• om may ~. · ~cal 
· pertOl'i:l that 
function,. t i$0 t o-.f and ~e ~· t~r ani ot ~· 
unt-.rer'* u , thon · they not »dueto of toroe•l)oy.ond the tn-
, ld. pernep• the ranr;e, ot indi-r1dn.al ·? .A.t thle poln • 
~··''"' to bo ~ ®t..rmirtiea prellQnt than: cet1 ·. · · · ~ 
'W , t.:ln ' order .tlt.lpposedl.rl' 'baaed on fNe-- an4 ~U'it. u:&t 
': ppena to individUal bwmn tntadorl? the ~· that n t! ·· lt#tt 
:l"£eot ot: thica.J. 1nsti\t.itiona ~-- onlr •· ~ al !' .. l!A Uon 
ox t 1 ~ epiri.t.- ctoee not tnt~ ue a• to tho· t•te And t~tune 
ot t i~laividual lt$'te ~1abg tho• 1mtt4tuticm • ID-
a ·w. * dily be c:i.t.d U'L 'llh10h the ethi¢111 " ataniti• 
d'lra :tOed boqauee inCU.V.S.duale a-tood ~ •~. 1nat the at . t1ng 
so $.al i n tiW.tioilll ot ~:U' da1't ~~ at least, 1n t .. in'tfn"etta 
I 1 ! '!" , Pl. . i _ ,t l~dl ,.. t11: . J U . -
~. ~ •. b .t,;Q~"' lOu. ... ..;. a...,.tion ie: t.bat in. Hettel's 'Vll.-
~n to the ~ ot au lit., •hd :mo-.ta . in tta uniwr , 
henco @ ., " ito in - a. ~ m. eect. lhb. 
2Ll 
o£ better 1-nftitut!.QJ'i•• 
Seen tn it-a tfue. ltght1 l\l$~ltan eth:t.ca 1 . t. · ·. ~-
philo~ e.nd the.· pblJ.Oa~ ot latf# 41th~~ ·the) t· .. noc f;~ 
bad ina,ti tu.tlona 1e l"eeO. ·· .14. t'Ulice · · a pc>:J$1 \le tho: ~ 
end. dllltvelor•nt t>:t .$0cAtll it18t1tuti.or.ht ~· the ~e dri:vo 
at ' · collectS..-.. et1rlt. ~ ha . ~d th t tho entire hilo 
ophy o . mind · e ue~l conoetftd tt. te ~oal.lY' • m01"8l. 
l5 pd.l01,40J'b.T·· (lD tho ue~ian vi ··.. ·f.bat the ethf.cal -wosoold. !! 
wo.ti!Ld of' .tela ~, t.he olAU.I· 1M · j\1fU.tte4. 
~tan- c;i tbor to m ·. . 1~ e . . tJ'~ au.J"#1'9&1 ~ oi ther 1nd1-
Vichuil. ethi-ea or ao~ th1c:a ~ • rJUdh.. In under~ . ~ 
tanC!ilt ftt imiftcl\ill -etJt toa;, o: does not Q)ltl {none!. con-
Ct.UTil'l·.J tt 1eolate4 .nd • lill.lpa lUiai"ohical tndt •idw, 
rson lt"dn · co . ttuct1'V$l,y 111t.hi.n a oo1ety 1n whiCh rmon 
itt . · ntainad betwftn t.ha irtdi'ftdnal ~ aoo1etu a."ld the indi~ 
and -· • l •;) :1, hOW&ftr ~ __. to require that 411 tension 
reaol~d toe aNl.e s Q'l the pr1.ee paid by t · lnd:t•idual. 
~left111Cl. 
. t:Q$k ot thi.oa 
• . · ':>"'! ( .,...,. ~r· "' } li. 
· ..... e. g. i:.,, ~·· ..  : + o , ·q· 
ae Appt.l"e.ntl.Y ~iWd . it 1& not that ot .,...tasb1on1ng tbt 
mor 1 U . in ~ ot d1~nt 1dola. l:u' to toUO'W tbe lelld. o 
' . b . ... 
rld. in its. mniteriatiorut o. elpirit\J ··hilt't ~,ey. 
if "'KJG OUf! ttl C!:l)"l'f!.l)i.r .... di~·i' 
ph!lOr!:D . 
1 . . 
• 
1:'\ll''tfl(!~:ll. ~. tho 
. an .n obl 
.. nee 1 t ·orJ.g:Lna · . s 111 tb 
posoibiU v o! a cla · 
'nl1e Clearly indio .··· at 
e tlQl'maU• nature of 
thr~ou · h!fJ writ1 · a. 
· calla ~be l • · ot .ture 
venJ -whet'eae the L tter 1e poAwd 
18 ... 
aenao ot tho ptE!££• · ~J'OOve:r• 
f:8S£lft it made bundantl.y aloe ell 
. 1B a fUndlcontal 1ncoMt.tenc:.v With-
~lk:IO!n 0 t . I.n.UTidual 
tndividual 1'11 th1n. clety 1 iv n 1 s 
st xnot fUld un:de:takable expre eiQn in tho ....,..........,....,. ....... ........., ... 
ecbte. :tn tbia lmric, Hor.el tDJce• (tognia.not ot the ~c 
ba u ot man•• lite• lated &ee to propenq, · .nd applles 
natural l ·:w t o the, ~bl e ot a co=:Mt·ti Uw aoc1etq.1St vi 
ia • ld that bee: · turea, ~ .t.r. 
eociev, ee. pzoe•nt il.io1~ from : · beginnin ,. ..)Qo!ety 
tl011eeJ t.OS'WIU"d u · the ~ tua ot social a't'ld 4JCOm:n:dO orctt· . bow-
it 
;ow1 cnce tbt indS.vi~al poaaea . · · W• ~ of the Will# 
··. dac1t4ona &nil ~ b.ia OtU:dlct in ooordrl . 
W1 th hie ~ 1d.ll U ho $0 chooae•• If th:l.·s ba.«t1Q pos1 tion 
aceepted,. t _ · n . o et1t11'8 ranee JJ.t right P :ltJ*"Oeoed throu l 
11:\ cich fl"Oecka -continues tar the indl~. 
rcaalt otten ·dierd.ea t~ lct!S.e&l ~-·· 
n b1 dftvelotaen' of the doottine of 
atatee that · tho· wUl pos- •••• on t.w .o• ~ e. unlveraal 
a~PQct22 1oh .at'to!npts to tU11tate &1t•intt the lh':d.tatiou of· 
•aitto co001t1ona, and on tbe o~, • •eonct f, aturo in · 1Cb 
b 1ndivtdual. ~gnj.M · tn. ClaS..a ot th . puoticular. 23 In the 
t.t.rst oa , the indS.Yi~.t ego C.on$t11tutes. a t.l"ue un!ftl'oal 1n 
aen that it irllnSOend t.htt preent, tb l:l.mi · d• th$ .. 
ticular. .., •ccmd I a~ cGU• a t4m\ton to e t•ct tba 
incU.vi&lal _ ohoo the #;peoit!c :cot'd1t1on. ~ . 1dl ~ 
1IUl live his lite. f.o lt ··· CKCl'Wiiv.l1 itt e1 tbar l"Ml · ia to 
ao. Ht, sot. 1. Addltion. 
a. ~ aeot. lt .. 
22. .f'R. . •. ot. s. 
t). m, eect. 6,. 
ot natur to the 'WU.l, lt · · · t bo 
rn t lO\hh it i o ela - d t.'mt atl that 1 i m'Ol here 
ie . rol1 pol.or1ty o the un1ver · aoo tho f,i4U't1~u. It 
·t. not b& tol"gotrton tbat ~ing dOJ:tt'J haw a t · ·told ·tu;ro 
ordet' tor dial oUoal drmllo · ·nt to ta pl. . • 
then th · ·re i :s ~ lo~eal Jte .· n at le•et ~ the indivithal · 
should pursue nta om~ . per ·· nal. interEnJta. ·. · \her thq neceseart13 
·control t~ · olalh o.C ~I*"t.r i. .. W'osta., tor aample, e oall;v 
1nce: private~ 111 on b1t O'ln Vift, litO indiapcmeahle to 
per onol.ltq? Since t..'l! · Wl'f. will of .· · indi,.. 
vidual 1· . det~l11':14l4 by- bio :tm,pullh,; ap · t.1 to·. and nclinationa,2h 
bow, 1t y be a , 1a it po ·10.1e t<:>r a .• 1ven .1ndittidnal to 
object :9..-ntt · · to t.ho~ poodl and dtmJl.oz-nt? · ~l hilt 
to ·dra arq .noticoab-1• <Usttnets..on ~en What ma.y b ~ a 
law of _ tul'e d · 1 · ..tlicb 11at t be intftituttd and. ob ..... d. 
1n a ~Otlpot.i. Uw soo1~V. 'Jib .&to '4'1ill as defined 1• fbilt ot 
· 'ftbQI» pi:~ te· Pl'Ol*'V ....... •• an ~••ion o . 
that '·· ·'5 
~ dtirtning that the uni'UW•liV ot ·tttt 'td.ll ~· 
jJ Z4 I_ _ .... " - .. . . ' [LJ d@ · 
1 A'Jrt>~~Ml taet.o1'e to ,·,~.~ 'IIIUil~ h 
l.t·s.denti t ·· , 
e outme a of~ 
Ud, 1 t neveJ"t 
eoci 8:1 ~:bion in 
~-·v. otice. GG to 




. ndtvi · . ·.1 . tt iJdll c1 
rrt~t1de~ ot 41111 1ihUe t · n 
o · au · ·. e bli dt I t 
t ettarta ot t 1 . clailtled 1t0 · at · odeal~ 
t t t1 · · ldll w.Ula t.b6: : l'ltU. 26 A.ccol"<ltnel71 not .~ .. -~. .. 
j~n tte · ·. right· 
nt. · ttdam, ~tol"'1 io ·not · . towed 
upon one 11fflethe*' he 4e tire• it r mt* but ~ · n 
reSUlt ot • tY'Pf) ot l~ · · and thought -¢0' ~.~C-touely· 
eelr...eonaet®• ~'Y1~.nll h l.t. Tnt• au . . . . 'tt!Y th t there 
• ind:lvt · t4CJ eo te~d bzf the eh~e ot· eil"cumat..an~o that 
tho ri. ht tQ ~do thPcaugh the e~oiee ().t the 1dll ia an •4-
ol.ra'ble ·o · ·.. T<i pr.ovct· o · "• ~ by· -~ the wUl in 
"2. •. a 
and att · ·- hlo 
t 11· t1 · 1• said 
·sent 
n his t.ree . but 11 eoc1 \V , poa tblo 
!t? 
Accord!~ to the d1 . c;tiQ de ~~n~, t.""' 1n$'ti tut~ onu 
wbi ap · ar ~ e .. a• 
trat · ee .. · · by t l . h1 r!trnce · or ~. l"el1 , ·on ar.d Jib '""' 
l.O . · ~y., It could be a:cl\led · . . Cally, then~ 
tro"' llan ·at.atel rw •"-" oo ~ts 1t !14 'b i".·· w- to , ia 
not the tmd ot tb4l proce·ss and hen · oonta1ns only '. · 
since 1t 1a not ttt. hi .heat ata ot the dttlloctic. In 
1.' .>. .1 8 td..t. ·tho . n £.1tt t t.m et . thle is true, 
. · ~ ,S£!.tf. to '4il1e · · t look tef' t .. ·11e•t expre•1on ot 
'r . 
day to ~. tb&l'l weri~ 1 sue~e are at ttako-. rr th inatttution 
1 ant tn Hist the. 1ndiv1~al in t,tia ..tCm an in"' llcctual 
·- 'L. . '21 il.'-o.o.. V,.llli J W.J!Wl..!< 
quentJ.:y · ·1 n politieal philot!!Oph,y contAins within itlfel ita 
tntn oorreoU.'". cl:Jd tbat · eta~ t-le;!el. part,rl\,Vil i ~ 
wet ot n$CtJIS1ty . k the .dot tbo indi~ ie not W~Jtat 
· 01t.a de~ U.e<:baft Ufld des 5taate .tnd die 
P\'li.V'Ai!A. · n.tt r.vw. . ct.. 1186. S.e· allfO m (11?. ' ·JJree). 
0 
' 
nt . r il.osopey. 
nd J~o j ct 
eo.tonUon 
0 nt•l~:I'IT...~ on t~~ t diecu:uJ10il ot n ! 1 pa 
-
losopby t etart m :and .tur to th Jf) .·29 • 
not io to au 
)I n·ir wch a e: .· · · ~ · tabl! ed, 
it auld the · t.:J.ndard ot Cl"1~ r a n · d 
.• . ~ 1 >.:£>-'" .... ....... 
ie ~ , ound . inst i .ch 
' •• . •• r• '...,. 
• •. "C; 177• 
29. Brie~ atatecl, tho nature 4t'd •:ta• {)f the atate are 
oll (l.) 1 · tt alint: ~n ot tbe t .... c 1 3, 
(2) a true state if the ethical wb.ole and. the ....U..at.ion ot 
· . . 1 ) ) · • . · , . o . . . . · :t t.he · ot' nm . 
realising iteelt ae will, (3) ~ dtpelda Up()t'l t . unit¥ 
o£ . . . · . a Y.l • • . . l • (,?) · · t7 nd l"i . .' t. 
utalted, (6) the •• 1& .«ft organifJil or" the dlrnlo . nt o£ the 
1 _ nto it dit . nceo1 (1) ittt al.ity eonaiats 1n .. e in-
te:re•t of he 'tlbol bo1ne reat!Md 1n pwtt...Ue enda, ( ) 
QV<lJI~~· · · .s co· sci a . thou t. 
21:? 
he ot ·' ·diG' .X> n t 
~"'".._,.,<it o:u.t an . 0111 to 
aluo 't.b.4J ccm: truot1on o£ tlr 
ar.2 t o t 
doe :vt 'R\ti'A'rn the uoe or 
org.a. , c atatc1 •7epl 
.incipll • Fm oe, 
l.icbc odel' Gr.uobe~ .n 
stan . · in~$-p. n32 0 
. in th . 
I n tho. sta 
tates 
ily de lopin . 
.r... ;~t i .t . e· ··:trklicbke1t • konkret4n 
1be1 t} ~ konkrete. 1hei t. ·a'bea' bea'Mht dw!n, 
250 
1t conceives 
tull . iV'ia1on tor 
·• s scm deo nouen tes 1Bt,. dau da 
~b»~Mimitda:'~ ·~t 
· . ~· . ·o~c!t. nd : . ;iQlll~ do3t .n-
dindum\•.)5 
. au, t'- vvtoue •cial t()J"Oee .-. not oo._idetoc:l a• 
forttign to tbli 1ndl~al : "aon inn l•:ft e•\ .. ·tion. 
\»raovw, Ill bit: CQnc.ption ot uniV«rl&.l 'ld.l.lt the will 
ot .all 1bcliv:tdualo. ta . • a1DC* 1fU1 is 1n 1 teel.t tb con.-
il01oucme• ot indiYidWLl ~~on•• UniVQ!Ml 11'111 l t 
!ri:cbt lor l eo •. ~ • tl!·ro dots Will n dar 
in •tmttcb · i . nde •~" !t:Olld· .· ntU1:e Ti'imdll1mmg 
, ·. ·. ·t~-e · ,~ ·rd1 o · n ~~l. .on · · iiltlr v:m n, 
U l.en .:Uv· ~ime1nef' al• solcm.r. m-
•\llen 1 . t an . a c t. das ·~ · ot. ~· ·. u <lor. ?ol"-
,.Onl.1ohkei t odor •Iitle• .i«don u.M 41• diesor 
. . ·lrtto£ta · it"K.l.idh ,,1llen .11 r · in, als 
~J~lbl$t~M~e . Mn ~6l.lM und je&t.-~ 
· nl1ehka1t 1 . o . JQ . .., un~ ·:ilt AU~ul tut, Und •• ala Tun a.e ~n au.ttrt tt; 
$ 'q~ittelbnro t;n:j .. ,.!UOO Tun o· ec j n 
tet.n 
'?:! .Ue thctl"O t a . . : 1ned ·empJt~aat th t the un1vertal 
=•t be rtpoullf· pur:S®d,1 thJ.s, by no· s ittpllea that the· 
.~ar autt not be ®Uftted. ·~• :e.~i· ttdae• d4a All ·~ rno~ 
. s elao betblti~ ·• i n, ablr die Subj•kt.tntlt •ut del' a~en 
·t~ite l'Yft'i'\Gt ~ .. -~. .. .................... t'l -.t........t. ""'-·l."' _......... )8  . t:.-- · ..r..w.UVJJU.~o.,,;; ~u\j'l'J:.i..,.'llfii!J ,.,. - ~ .... 
I n VieW ot the above• 1t ie ol.e.r that rfe~l tully be-
Uev~ a uniV\Weal ·and tJational la,. 'WOUld be mft.i1)1ent w .sa.r.-
. · .W!"d the inte~at!Jt• ot tl* indl:d.dul-. fht. lndlYS.&Ial \llb1le ... 
bodde4 (ei!tJ!~~!!' ) ~thin the ~P l e not _.,_.ny ·~ed 
by tt, it the l~e of the dialectic :ta b p't in JUnd. en toe. 
other tulndt houeWlt'., liO ~· ot ·G· pctr.eonal oature· appe~ 1n the. 
~eoe!ih da&. R!t!!ta• No ~~~N~· 11 .,_. to the ~td!v.ldual 
, . . (,' .. . ._ . r 1 L l . • n _ ~ •.,. 
1lbo tul.tUla the !Unction ot a coun~t• to tho. intlt1tutional 
...... o£ loc1e.v. na~ • ., Gbould ~ 1ndi<fi.ddl J.Gae 'trlr.lae_lf 
in Jll$ll"f'ice t<> tr..e "ll!bole.. ;::q• U.· . ·1 •• the tlo• ot the Vor~ 
in the a-J~o~r .. : . . -~
. 'r.-'011 iibri.rten . in · 1nBv 7A1 t, _.in die . 
ill{tQr'ae1."1h¢it ·a ttoi•a . · hi'· ••tark ·Uftd . 
ttb .ch 1 
u.Yi bitlaolt to til. de , · in whlcn 1t 1 · 411ble to tra an 
lec:t1o t.tern. It 
•iduol o, ·coord1ni; to· nceeJ., fiDda hiS true intei"Ht. in 
t . l'dll3' 1ftt. · ,. indiv1 1 d. eta a.s a r-
on taoed by the 
not 




n. the J.ndiVidual 1• 
lied in all 
,.. .3 
I •' 
o · n 
lian ~e -
ot n. · 1$: Ep1o~·· 
r ~ ot epi G'Wac>lor;,t3 in ~ · · ~ -~ \1 at, 
tr.r no tine 1t. · ~:Uonship to ' • al.lie d:ieciplinee ot pe-choloffl, 
l o e and .. tapbyeics.. '!bier :rela\to 1 ~ thould 
.frui rnl within·, lian thought, al~ the ol.OM at.t'ini\1 ot 
lo~ and ta . by:cnoa i s ~eft · : idont in H .l•a eyetom. 
·r : ~.ave ll.reati\1 lndioe.ted tho · a eoctatiOn be~ op1at.ti0logr 
.and, Pttrebolog .• !a 
l dl of 
opi . -OJI1 lltld ta~aica. Z!at:h , · ,., i t s phtl.o«>pbioal c..~ne. 
1'h.at ep1stemolo. · 1• prior, haa bean vgu.t: b7 wtetandin!J th1tllt.vs 









i. t '. t, 
b;y .: 1 
t t. ' 
·'~--~-t·.ne<! to.r it 
·1 co-;nitiYG state. tt 
iori sources :o.i' o 
thodol. 
tiotli!Uiot:J · 




. ·mon t:r tion aM deduction., .,... •• irieiete haw tended to 
at .e l avotde t.be 
0 
v 
induct1 ~ly i nclined., lt 
"Uel<~ u . or ei r tho • 
t n hitl atlaljat• of d a d11t1nct 
otuees ot Bt.rl~ 
in t10 ble int in t' · ~~ 
,~llft tho a ion,. · the-
que· Uon o t t 1e pX1,or;S. 
M1.J.y di>:lbW;. . .,.....,d trca eel, althou ' . 0 attei pt 
th n ·nU3w1 o ... 1 1'0 · :1ppoa.itione. At. bottoo, 
oo _.a t hat o 1solat1~ the ·noQ-OapJri(tll · nd :t en 
J.ri· 1 tOO, 
the nauoua or to the i.a1media WlY ·Bi wn. 
Un®rJ.r...ne n ... •gel• ·• uae. f:)! bo ~irl~land t. ~ 
l.ed i U clear indi-.tion t.n.at thq cannot be treated in. 
If _Q¢ 11U . I. b • U ..... t;. 
ieol.atlon ttort eaoh other. n.y are opp,oalt.tli, but oppodt.e 
th ·t are ltnDd ~eotlcall:y by 'drt.ue ot the tact that. . ·one 
~t1.ctlar Pl."'"' nt 
~nco h·;) 
~ t li 
.t; ·:,_ ;,!'· 
'i OP. 
• It ig 
t.'(1 . a.l 
int · out 






. l arul 
a :· lt-
· t ¢on·'· in~~ 1\a tto~t ldthin i .. l£. 
-· ...... 11!0 co.;nple W:ithau.t thia t•o~.,~ : ich 
l~ ·ol , ., ture and · Urit can t 
_ · ""e:ln~. · tn ott· r "WOrdf1 ~~ -~ · 
.• Hll " ·.,. \.. ' ,.. 
·. ;,;r .. ,. ........ . f. J J 
· thi n 
. , aine& 
s t · nd8 by the p:oinc1p1 ot the utlitq o . t.om rd ·content,. . 
lo~c . at eont41n · · emp!ricalotb~ . ·. hia ow frlfteiple ie 
vi ola .d.. t 
f'uller · .e;t ttori o.i' "ob · t.i 
bob+- t t H.. l h 
•• r n.Jf!J 
--.. l evel or ,;. • · 
~ ......... ·~··. of 
ubt lees 001 t i ~n - th . · t 
Sp!.l": ,. ., fl r m~ 
.r .rret 
pl~·~'-'~'e' 
tn .. p ........ ~. -........ _ ~ ~ ~~-~~~- ~ 
rel;y gt . n · t 1 'COn•t't'\1ctA!Cl ~. a .twdi till · ee .. 
s. tnt 13 ~c.. · by t"eeolVln~ \."'.e · iftn IJ.i)ec ·c i t.a ot 
e.xt~i.em)G lfitbtn a gi: n at'b.t•tinn .if~to W'Ji~ 1 nd 
1'$1 . t:ton .pirtc.l. b~!enca ~~. 
porMcuJ.at, then: a m · #1 . i ,nJach Ybioh h.Qld.a t! pat"tiou 
and the uni~.eal ·tn un1tu-tJ conc:rew untver . 4S 
.: . "' .;.. . . .,. · , ~ luc ~ ac uJ.nt, ot t \ 
'1bil.l.y, lOP, . 1.61-.469. 
·- '' 
., - t 1 kr.tO ' 
ctual and th r o.ual.L-6 t.h · · i 
. l· . l. of "Obj cU 
t3l th lie :, 11 
is 
.ph:U.osoptW. 'The · · 1 , a .. ·. ro nt~ hor.--
critiot:t "Who ela · . th t. H ~ l · Q<ifioc ... th : 
t.tr t:he """""~~ ttd. .• ; t dt ll to ~e.;> in ·s.nd, 
c\1: in ·trt.rttmn:·nP, the aetu~1tq {hene.e .r tion "ity) N: tt 
wve . 1n t. "' cti. f.p:i.ri. t: - to 1n.ei. 
M .. her phaee., h~ w · • lt is unfail' to 
p, 1 o ovorl®k ec~ly his conetatlt ra:~an t.h t l . ~3.1.11 
d it 
t ··. ~ . . dial; otic~ the f roJ 
i1~ 1 ' sy%lt!'l fli$ 
h .• 
,....._ - _,, q;p I . U . 1YI . 4 1 " U ( . i U 
~. One o£ the- guiding principles ot hie phUoaopl:JT at 
stated in the Vor:rede to Pa. 
h7. Ibid. ' 2')Jf;2W.h 
tit . • or tt:tl.U , .... its 
ol , 
· alec~ · . ctt ... tq 
~'11"1l_.wd a 
tes tic o.... ir'tt. 
at re· .t1 · 
i.tc . . l .· 
The Cleperien ·., upon r~.ioh ·; · r~, .·.t· 
1 · oti¢ ~ nero, i G S>Jpa.rent in. l".ie \vr 
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Abstract ot the Illseertation 
!he problem ot t his diseertation is that o£ determining 
the nature ot the individual. person and his eocial statue w1 thin 
the scope ot Hegel1a phUosOphical Psychology. !he probl• ia 
that ot ascertaining to llbat extent the 1nd1v1dual, on all lewls 
ot exiatence, is conceived as an aspect or mcment ot the un1vereal. 
No detin1t1ve work has as yet appeared dealing exclusively with 
the probl• as presented herewith. 
1'he basic Hegelian material utilized 1n this work is 
contained within the Fblnomenoloee, the En&cl~e, the 
PhUo.aJ?h!e des Recht2J and, to a leuer a:tent1 within the earlier 
e:goaopW..sche . ProJ?!deutik. Among eecondary sources the writings 
ot Harris, Baillie, v.J.lace, Stirling, Royce, VeTaggart~ Staoe, 
Xnox and Jlure uy be cited. In German, the work• of Lasson, 
m.ockner, Hartmann, Kroner, Fischer de~ wmtion. 
Hegel t s philosophy nth 1 ts historical background is 
brietl.y sketched, noting in particular the influence ot Aristotle 
and JCant. Atter recognition ot the linguilltic problem in Hegel, 
1 t is aeen that the aphasia on the empirical and the organic 
ever:fWbere characterizes his phUosopey-. A renew or the historical 
developaent of the dialectic trom Heraclitus to JCant discloeea that 
Hegel gives it a distinctive place in his thought. '!he principl.e 
ot negatiTity is paramount to 8.l'7J' advance towards the speculative 
truth discoverable w1 thin the synthesis. His metaJitysical principles 
are eo interwoven within his logie that no sharp distinction can 
be made between them. The nature ot the Real is disclosed to be 
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dialectic, empirical, organic; conrete and Absolute. 
'Ihe logical development o:t the category- ot individuality 
reveals the ht-oad dialectical developnent by -..hicll Hegel expounds 
every philosophical subject according to a well-conceived theory 
of degrees o:t reality. '!he development o:t the indiVidual is ex-
pr$saed on the various levels ot conseioueneas., aelt•consc1ouenesa1 
and reason, all requiring the exiatence of social institutions tor 
their realization. But whereas individuality unfolds dialectically' 
as an organic ldlole, 1 t appears that lie gel does not always reco~ 
. . 
rn..e the exact relationabip between the various expressions of in-
dividuality as displayed on the many levels. 'l'bis procedure results 
. •. 
in the shading of psychology and metaphysics into each other. 
Personality 1e envi~oned as the logical. outcome ot in-
dividuality but its deser.iption is disappointingly formal. 'By ex• 
pounding personality within a legal. and economic context, Hegel 
tails to do jUetice to its empirical richness. Thia ia most evident 
ld. thin the scope ot Hegel t a psychology ot personall ty '~Jhich seta 
forth the torme ot mental actiVity. !he minilldai:ng ot the uniqu.e-
neaa ot ·the ordinal7' individual and the failure to provide tor a 
ten~on between h1JI1 and hie eociety is ever;rwhere apparent in 
Hegel's anal.y81e, eepeotally in hia treatnaent ot the 'Will. 'the 
universal and the ·particular ~oal.e8C6 ao imperceptibly that the 
ind1"11dual ia in grave danger or being absorbed within "objective 
mind. n It is highly questionable whether the ease tor individu.al 
freedom can be sustained 1n his thought. Hegel identities the a.ime · 
o:t the individllal m. th those of the state by mean a or the logical 
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Begrif'£. l!."thical personality ie not possible until the individual 
itt thoroughly inte.grated within society 'Whoee ethical ·~JUbs.tanoe ie 
contained 'Within the tamily1 ci'rl.l. society and the state.. Per-
aonali ty is emiaioned aa an imfardly developed, genuinely organic 
whole, 
The scope. or Hegel•e psyChology ot the indiVidual leads 
to an inquii'y' coneel'ning the nature and need fOr a uetapbysics o£ 
the eelt. 'l'hat Jld.nd manifests i tselt 'diaJ.ectiea.'l.l.y as the proeese 
of reason,. constitutes the guiding principle in Hegel ts metapb;ysice 
or the eelt. 'lbis ooncrete development or mind a a s;yntbet!ds sup-
plies the Hegelian view of speculation • . His Jililosopb:y o£ mind 
. . . 
discloses the pl"esenee of mind on every level of existence, no 
matter how inadequate the expression uy be on~ given level. 
Jfatter and mind are m.odes of one l'eality• the Absolute. Hie clea:r-
cut doctrine or degree,s ot truth and reality is a logical outcome 
of his understanding ot the dynamic organic nature of .knowledge. 
ln pursuing the problems or sel.thoocl one notes the 
atrueture of the sel.t as outlined in modern psychology. The psy• 
chology o£ traits 1.• especially BUggeltive tot' a psychology or the 
individual, although its philosophical l.ira1tations are ap~nt. 
Baaio to the problem ot a metaphysics ot the self is the question 
of the ei!J.pirical unity ot pcreonali ty in which the complimelltary 
proce88ee or differentiation and integration mat be maintained 
11'1 thin the eolld core ot eelf-eoneciou.snees. One promising venture 
in empirical unity is to be .f'ound in Qes.tal t psyebolow • w1 th which 
Hegel's organic emphasis has 1\I&J'J;Y attinities. But the GestaJ.tiete 
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run into the same dang~r at the empiricalle"Vel a.s does Hegel# 
namely, th.e problem of ea.ving the uriiqueness or indiViduality of 
the ord1nar,y ind:lrtdUal person. It appears that the problem ot 
the philosophical unity and identity ot the person transcends all 
psychOlogical. descriptions o:f it, thus forming the water.shed between 
modem psychology and. phUosopb:r ~ The organic th ory o:f' personal! t.r 
in 'Which the whole is realized in and through particul~ parts, and 
particulars are upheld within the 'Whole• is the view arrived at 
here. tis approach requires the. organic eotmm.mi ty for its ccc-
. . 
pleiion~ inV'ol~g the relationship between the individual wUl 
and the policies of the group as renected .in the univer.ea11!Ul, 
For Hegel the univereal is the rational and is knom only through 
speculat.i,on, But the univ~real so permeates the particular that 
the latteJt stande in grave danger of being subdued, 
l'h!e d1s.-ta:t:Lon ~w not only to otfe<J: a sympa:t~1et1c 
ellpoaition of Hegelts leading ideas a:s germaine to a philosophical 
psychology ot t he individual, but proceeds to press these ideas to 
as fail' a co.ncluaion as possible. This i"equil'ee ·strict attention 
to the internal s'b!'ueture .of Hegel ta system and poses the probleu 
o! the relation of the rational to the empi:ticalf the relevancy ot 
Hef!el te logical cate~ries for a phUosopby ot mind. '!be heart ot 
Hegelianiaa it~ tound in the .concept ot an organic whole the eon-
sti tuent moments ot wllich are serial pha·•s or a single selt .. 
const.i.tut1ng actint,- ealled ndnd or spirit. 'l'he present stu~ 
has disclosed the presence ot an inherent dualistic struggle in 
human experience, recognized by Hegel in his exposition and appearing 
lithin the dialectic as t he principle of negatiTi.ty. 
The rational .de~elopnent of thought and experience re• 
' quires that all partial truths. be transcended yet preserved within 
the whole. »hUe it would appear tbat Hegel eacritiees the indi• 
vidual to the state, he has in mind a r•tional state, and .tul:cy-
recognizes the evils inherent in· the empirical state. Moreovel"a 
the dialectic moves forward to a higher conwmmation 1n the realms 
ot religion and philosophy. A synthesis, therefore, does not 
necesearily mean the destruction ot the particulara but their 
preservation in something higher. By commitment to the dialectic, 
Hegel proVides an ongoing developuental view of hum9.n experience 
lfith new vistas to ehaU~nge hwnan thought and achievement.. 
The conelusions reached in this di.eaertation are as 
follows a 
l. The principle o£ inclusiveness, basic for an adequate 
phUosophieal psychology, is apparent everywhere throughout Hegel 's 
la'itings~ 1he aaaertion that "the true is the whole" implies a 
system featuring an orderly relation of parts wi thin a liVing 
signif1eant whole. Reality is thus conceived as a coherent system 
ot unity established through a reconc.Uiation of opposites. The 
logic of the concrete universal is tbQt all phaaes o£ being lllist 
be preeened thougll transcended .. 
a. Hegel makes reason the touchstone of his philosophy'. 
It ie indispensable fo't' his synoptic gra.sp of mind, experience and 
:reality.. No phaee of human experience i$ independent or another. 
hence the importance o:r internal relations. Reason makes human 
experience an intelligible venture .• 
). ! he organic view ot pe:oponaJ.ity implies that all the 
features or traits have no oonorete exist ence apart tram t he 
conscious whole9 The experienc~ of selt-eonsciousness makes pof!IIOor 
sible the u.nity of per!Jonality. In so ra:r as Hel!el fails to do 
justice t() the empirical richn es of personality_. particularly its 
emotional overton~HJ.1 his view is detective. '.the cognitive enpha.s:is 
overshadows all others !n his treatment. 
4. The ~acious use or hie tori cal data. in Hegel ' s ex• 
position of human experience atones eome"What tor the lack ot psy• 
chological ruqJerimental data at his disposal. There is, hol'lever, 
a too tacUe acceptance of the vie'"; that the individual recapi tul.atee 
his culture and too little reco¢t:ton of the fact that he helpa 
create and modi.f;y that culture. 
S. No ethics of the individual as such· appears in Hegel's 
trea"tlmnt . Ethical theory is absorbed wi thin political p ilosophy. 
1he individual is a participator in the nature and ·ends or othere. 
Hegel unwisely ignores the value -of ~nd.ividual. consci~nce~. The 
social becomes the central category in his ethicth He tails to 
eee that man is by nature individUal as -well as social. 
6 .• , !be importance or human experience is paramount since 
nothing is known mich does not !all within experience, broac:Jl¥ 
considered, Hegel ta experiential basis tor all lmo ledge ie .tUn<:ia-
mental and protou.nd.- thus ma1d.ng his ph.UosoJily epistemologically 
significant. 
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7. By Virtue of reason the state poss sees an organic 
nature and is based on universal, rational lawe calculated to a :;siat 
in the individual's growth and devel-optaent. The dialectic makes 
all veneration of the ernpirlcal state hiehly question :ble, s:i.nce 
it is superseded by religion, art ard philosophy. To t ho degree 
that Hegel ts state calls for the predominance ot reason and the 
existence ,of .f'reedom1 it contains the necessary pnnciple ... for :1.n ... 
diVidual preservation, 
8, Hegel ts philosophical psychology grapples searchingly' 
with man t s nature and destin.r. It is a brilliant dialectical ac-
count ot .ante true existence, encompassinr questions or the na ture 
and acope or lmowledge, the universal nature of mind, the signi.t1• 
canoe of selt-consciousness as these ax-e related to the Absolute. 
It is the contention of his present 'WOrk, however, that Hegel 




nte author was born a t Weate:rn Ba1' .. Nelrfoundland on Oct. 
17, 1906, the second chUd of Albert and Cora W!Alah. After re-
ceiving primary education in the denominational school of his birth-
place, he entered the Methodist Junior College in St. John's, from 
which he matriculated in 1924. After preparation in a. teacher 
training school he taught public school education for four years, 
at the end or llbioh time he was accepted as a candidate for the 
ministry of the United Church of Canada ard served tor two years 
as a missionary in IAbrador. I n 1930 he entered tlount Allison 
University, SackVill.e, New Brunsw1ck1 canada, and us graduated 
with the B.A. degree !'rom that institution in 1933. For the three 
succeeding years he atten~d Boston Univers1 ty School of' Theology 
receiVing the A..~l . degree in 1935 and the S.T.B. degree, lfagna Cwa 
Laude in 1936. Boston University awarded him the Jacob Sleeper 
Fel1owehip in 19.36 and he spent the academic year of 1937-1938 at 
the !Dndon School of Economics and Political Science. Bet'WH!l the 
years 19.36-1947 he served four parishes 1d:~hin the ~lew Fhgland Con-
ference of the Methodist Church. Since 1947 he has been teaching 
1n the Department of Philosophy at .~ornin«side College, Sioux City, 
Iowa • . lle is married and is· the father o! three children, Samuel 
Earl, Dlvid Albert and Ruth r arga.ret. 
